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Beyond the Double Veto: Housing Plans as 
Preemptive Intergovernmental Compacts 
CHRISTOPHER S. ELMENDORF† 
The problem of local-government barriers to housing supply is finally enjoying its moment in 
the sun. For decades, the states did little to remedy this problem and arguably they made it 
worse. But spurred by a rising Yes in My Backyard (YIMBY) movement, state legislatures are 
now trying to make local governments plan for more housing, allow greater density in existing 
residential zones, and follow their own rules when reviewing development applications. This 
Article describes and takes stock of the new state housing initiatives, relating them to preexisting 
Northeastern and West Coast approaches to the housing-supply problem; to the legal-academic 
literature on land use; and, going a bit further afield, to the federal government’s efforts to 
protect the voting rights of African Americans in the Jim Crow South. Of particular interest, we 
will see that in California, ground zero for the housing crisis, the general plan is evolving into 
something that resembles less a traditional land-use plan than a preemptive and self-executing 
intergovernmental compact for development permitting, one which supersedes other local law 
at least until the local government has produced its quota of housing for the planning cycle. The 
parties to the compact are the state, acting through its housing agency, and the local government 
in whose territory the housing would be built. I argue that this general approach holds real 
promise as a way of overcoming local barriers to housing supply, particularly in a world—our 
world—where there is little political consensus about the appropriate balance between local 
and state control over land use, or about what constitutes an illegitimate local barrier. The main 
weakness of the emerging California model is that the state framework does little to change the 
local political dynamics that caused the housing crisis in the first place. To remedy this 
shortcoming, I propose some modest extensions of the model, which would give relatively pro-
housing factions in city politics more leverage and facilitate regional housing deals.  
 
 †  Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law, UC Davis. For comments on earlier drafts, I am indebted to 
Eric Biber, Sarah Bronin, Steve Calandrillo, Paul Diller, Rose Cuison Villazor, Ethan Elkind, Bob Ellickson, 
Rick Frank, Dan Golub, Adam Gordon, Brian Hanlon, Rick Hills, David Horton, John Infranca, Tom Joo, Joe 
Miller, David Schleicher, Rich Schragger, Darien Shanske, Ken Stahl, Ed Sullivan, Tim Taylor, Christian 
Turner, and Katrina Wyman. This Article also benefited from presentations and feedback at the 7th Annual State 
and Local Government Law Works-in-Progress Conference at Fordham University, the Binational Workshop 
on Intergovernmental Relations in Planning Practice at UCLA, and on the Oral Argument Podcast. Thanks also 
to Michelle Anderson, Jasmine Harris, Jennifer Hernandez, Jed Kolko, Al Lin, and Aaron Tang for various 
productive conversations along the way; to Peg Durkin, David Holt, and Sam Bacal-Graves for assistance with 
the research; and to the student editors of the Hastings Law Journal who worked on this Article, especially Gian 
Gualco-Nelson. 
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INTRODUCTION  
In 1971, Fred Bosselman and David Callies famously described a “quiet 
revolution” in land-use law.1 Prodded by the nascent environmental movement, 
states were fettering local governments with new planning mandates, new 
requirements for public participation, and new procedures for state-level review 
of local plans. In some instances, states seemed poised to preempt local land-use 
authority entirely.  
Looking back twenty years later, Callies remarked that the “‘ancient 
regime’ of local land use controls” had been “metamorphosed rather 
than . . . overthrown.”2 The quiet revolution had culminated not in state 
preemption, but rather in the local embrace, or cooptation, of sensitive-lands and 
growth-control missions, and an overlay of environmental review and state-
permitting requirements3—what economist William Fischel dubbed “the double 
veto.”4 Development opponents who had lost a local battle could now use state 
law and state tribunals to take another whack. 
Callies expressed concern that the “plethora of . . . requirements” might 
simply “choke off development, the good with the bad.”5 His warning proved 
prescient. Anti-development interests used the new regulatory frameworks to 
slow housing production on urban and suburban lands, not just in remote natural 
areas.6 In the coastal states that led the “quiet revolution,” the supply of new 
housing was throttled, with devasting equity, economic, and environmental 
repercussions.7  
But something new is afoot. California, posterchild for the housing crisis, 
is laying groundwork to make heretofore restrictive local governments allow as 
much new housing as “healthy housing markets” in “comparable regions of the 
nation” would produce.8 Though a number of states have set quantitative targets 
for the production of subsidized, income-restricted housing units, and a few 
states have instructed local governments to accommodate projected population 
growth with new housing at a variety of price points, California will be the first 
to assign market-rate housing quotas shaped by a nationally normed standard.9  
 
 1. FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971). 
 2. David L. Callies, The Quiet Revolution Revisited, 46 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 135, 142 (1980). 
 3. See generally David L. Callies, The Quiet Revolution Revisited: A Quarter Century of Progress, 26 
URB. LAW. 197 (1994). 
 4. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES!: THE ECONOMICS OF LAND USE REGULATION 54-57 (2015) 
[hereinafter FISCHEL, ZONING RULES]. 
 5. Callies, supra note 2, at 142. 
 6. See infra Part I. 
 7. See infra Part I. 
 8. See infra Subpart III.A. 
 9. See infra Subpart III.A.1. 
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These quotas are to be accommodated by local governments through the 
“housing elements” of their general plans.10 Belying its nominal status, the 
California housing element is transmuting into something that resembles less a 
traditional land-use plan than a preemptive and self-executing 
intergovernmental compact for development permitting. The parties to the 
agreement are the state, acting through its housing agency, and the local 
government, whose general plan the housing element revises. Developers may 
apply for permits on the authority of the housing element itself, irrespective of 
contrary local ordinances, at least until the jurisdiction has produced its quota of 
housing for the planning cycle. Local governments must provide advance notice 
to the state before amending their housing elements, and the state agency may 
respond by decertifying the housing element, exposing the local government to 
financial and regulatory sanctions.  
Beyond the planning mandates, state legislators are also trying more 
directly to preempt local restrictions on housing density.11 Pro-housing 
lawmakers have won national media acclaim for bills to upzone land near transit 
stations, and to authorize additional dwelling units on parcels locally zoned for 
single-family homes.12  
This Article describes and takes stock of the new state housing initiatives, 
relating them to preexisting Northeastern and West Coast approaches to the 
housing-supply problem; to the legal-academic literature on land use; and, going 
a bit further afield, to the federal government’s efforts to protect the voting rights 
of African Americans in the Jim Crow South. I shall argue that statutes that 
directly preempt local restrictions on housing of certain types or densities are 
prone to failure, but that the emerging California model of the plan as a 
preemptive intergovernmental compact for development permitting holds some 
promise as a political solution to the housing-supply problem.  
The underlying difficulty is this: local government have, by tradition, very 
broad authority over land use and housing development, which has come to be 
exercised through discretionary permitting regimes.13 Local governments also 
have better information than the state about local conditions, preferences, and 
practices. Under these circumstances, state mandates requiring local 
governments to allow certain housing types or densities are fragile and easily 
vitiated. If the state tells localities to allow accessory dwelling units (ADU) on 
parcels zoned for single family homes, for example, and the localities don’t want 
them, the local governments can bring the localities’ zoning into compliance 
while using discretionary design review to saddle ADU projects with expensive, 
ad hoc, and unpredictable conditions. Local governments can also use their 
residual regulatory authority to enact more systematic barriers to ADUs, such as 
costly building code amendments, setback or parking requirements, fees, layers 
 
 10. For citations to the code provisions relevant to this paragraph, see infra Subparts II.B & III.A. 
 11. See infra Subpart III.B. 
 12. See infra Subpart III.B. 
 13. See infra Subparts I.B. & IV.B. 
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of internal appeals, and so on. The history of California’s ADU statute illustrates 
this dynamic all too vividly.14  
If the state is to intervene effectively under such circumstances, it is not 
enough to make discrete, liberalizing changes to the local regulatory baseline for 
housing development. The state also needs some way to block the retrogressive 
stratagems of local governments, including bad-faith exercises of permitting 
discretion.  
The emerging California model of the general plan positions the state to do 
precisely this—and to do it in a manner that is politically discreet and responsive 
to local conditions, and thus suited to a world (our world) in which there is no 
general political consensus about the proper balance between state and local 
control over land use, or about what constitutes an illegitimate barrier to housing 
supply.15 The baseline change occurs not by state legislative command, but 
through the local government’s articulation in its housing element of appropriate 
densities for developable parcels and a schedule of actions to remove 
development constraints. These local commitments are made under pressure 
from the state, as the state determines housing need and penalizes local 
governments that do not adopt a new, “substantially compliant” housing element 
every eight years. But the state’s hand is not particularly visible, as state-local 
negotiations over the housing element play out in a low-limelight administrative 
setting, rather than in the legislative arena. 
The housing element’s de jure status as a component of the local 
government’s own general plan, and the obscure process through which state 
approval is obtained, should help state legislators parry any accusation that they 
have, through the housing-element framework, imposed a statewide zoning map 
and development code on local governments. Yet, to the extent that housing 
elements are self-executing and supersede contrary local requirements as a 
matter of state law, the aggregate set of housing elements has the potential to 
function much like a statewide zoning and development code, controlling 
permitting by local governments until such time as the locality has produced its 
quota of housing for the cycle.  
The new regulatory baseline defined by a housing element is substantially, 
but not completely, locked in. A local government may amend its housing 
element without the state agency’s consent,16 but doing so is costly. The locality 
must provide advance notice and a justification, and the agency may respond by 
decertifying the housing element, exposing the local government to fiscal and 
possibly regulatory sanctions. This “soft” lock-in mechanism is just about right 
for a world lacking political consensus about the appropriate balance between 
local and state control over land use. It discourages local governments from 
circumventing the regulatory baseline, while leaving open a path for the most 
 
 14. See infra Subpart III.B. 
 15. For citations to the code provisions relevant to the argument previewed here, see infra Parts III & IV.  
 16. See infra Parts III & IV. 
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dogged and influential anti-housing jurisdictions to get what they want without 
bringing down the whole regime.  
All in all, the emerging California framework positions a pro-housing 
governor, acting through the state housing agency, to push very hard against 
local “NIMBYism” when the political stars align—and also to propitiate locally 
powerful interests when necessary.17 
One should not be too Pollyannaish though. The California model is very 
much a work in progress. Its full realization may require changes to the legal 
standard for a “substantially compliant” housing element,18 as well as stronger 
mechanisms for developers to obtain project-level exemptions from local 
standards or procedures that hinder plan-compliant projects. And then there is 
the matter of setting housing targets. The traditional methods have rewarded 
exclusionary locales with small quotas,19 and while California’s new “healthy 
housing markets” approach sounds promising, it leaves much to be desired in 
the statutory particulars. Finally, even if California develops sensible housing 
targets, local governments with superior information about local practices, 
conditions, and political tolerances may still manage to bamboozle or cow the 
state agency into accepting dysfunctional housing elements.  
This highlights the California model’s most fundamental weakness: the 
state-law framework positions an agency to pressure local governments from 
above, but it does not generate bottom-up political incentives for local officials 
to heed the interests of the outsiders (such as prospective residents) they now 
ignore.20 I shall argue, however, that with a few modest tweaks, the California 
model could also be used to redistribute political authority and policymaking 
discretion at the municipal level toward relatively pro-housing actors—from the 
voters to the city council, and from the city council to the mayor.21 The 
extensions I propose would also facilitate the sort of citywide and regional 
housing bargains for which Professors Rick Hills and David Schleicher have 
advocated.22 In sum, the California framework could easily evolve into a source 
of bottom-up as well as top-down attacks on local barriers to new housing.  
The balance of this Article unfolds as follows. Part I furnishes the 
motivation, briefly describing the transformation in housing supply and prices 
that has occurred over the last fifty years, and the attendant social, economic and 
environmental consequences. Part II provides an overview of state frameworks 
 
 17. The acronym NIMBY stands for Not In My Backyard, and is an epithet used to describe anti-
development activists who parochially resist changes to land use in their neighborhoods. 
 18. The reforms previewed in this paragraph are fleshed out in Part IV. 
 19. See infra Subpart II.B.2. 
 20. The outsiders, of course, are the prospective residents who would benefit from expansion of the housing 
supply. 
 21. In California, so-called “general law” cities lack a separately elected mayor. See CAL GOV’T 
CODE §§ 36501, 34851 (West 2019). Section 36501 provides that general law cities shall be governed by a city 
council, a city clerk, a city treasurer, a police chief, a fire chief and any subordinate officers or employees as 
required by law. Section 34851 authorizes a city-manager form of government for general-law cities. In these 
cities, the reallocation of authority could run to the city manager rather than to the mayor. 
 22. See infra Subpart IV.B. 
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that developed from the 1970s to the 1990s for superintending local regulation 
of housing supply and the critiques these frameworks engendered. Part III 
describes notable recent reforms to the state frameworks, discussing California’s 
evolution and flagging examples from other states. Part IV offers a tentative 
defense of planning for housing through preemptive intergovernmental 
compacts and explains how the California model could be extended to put 
bottom-up as well as top-down pressure on local barriers to housing supply. I 
compare the problem of overcoming local barriers to housing supply to the 
problem the federal government faced in the 1960s when it undertook to 
dismantle Jim Crow, and I argue that the emerging California model of the plan 
can be understood as an adaptation of the regulatory paradigm of the federal 
Voting Rights Act for a structurally similar problem whose solutions are not 
(yet) the object of a sustaining consensus in the body politic. 
I.  MOTIVATION: BOOMS WITHOUT BOOMTOWNS 
A. THE STYLIZED FACTS 
For nearly all of American history, economic development unfolded more 
or less as follows.23 A new technology or discovery would make certain places 
suddenly valuable. Entrepreneurs would locate to these high-value places and 
bid up wages, causing workers to flood in. A construction boom would ensue, 
furnishing housing to workers who had relocated from other parts of the country. 
Speculative bubbles or a temporary imbalance between supply and demand 
occasionally drove the price of housing above the cost of construction, but these 
fluctuations were temporary; soon enough, the price of housing would revert to 
construction cost.  
This familiar pattern has broken down. The major cities of the West Coast 
and the Northeast have experienced a massive, decades-long economic shock 
accompanied by meager population growth and little expansion of the housing 
stock.24 The population influx that has occurred in these economically fortunate 
places consists mostly of high earners.25 Although wages for low-skilled labor 
have risen too,26 housing has become so expensive that it’s no longer worthwhile 
for low-skill workers to emigrate from the low-wage regions.27  
 
 23. To read the story briefly summarized in this paragraph in much greater depth, see Peter Ganong & 
Daniel Shoag, Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S. Declined?, 102 J. URB. ECON. 76 (2017); 
David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE L.J. 78 (2017). 
 24. See David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1675 (2013). 
 25. See ISSE ROMEM & ELIZABETH KNEEBONE, U.C. BERKELEY TERNER CTR. FOR HOUS. INNOVATION, 
DISPARITY IN DEPARTURE: WHO LEAVES THE BAY AREA AND WHERE DO THEY GO? (Oct. 2018), 
https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/disparity-in-departure; Schleicher, supra note 23, at 83, and sources cited 
therein. 
 26. The long-term trend toward interstate convergence in wages slowed in the 1980s and has now stopped. 
Ganong & Shoag, supra note 23, at 76. 
 27. See Schleicher, supra note 23, at 82–83, 115–16, and sources cited therein. 
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Proving the point that the escalation of housing prices is not a nationally 
uniform phenomenon, economists Edward Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko 
estimate that as of 1985, about 6% of metropolitan regions had a median home 
price more than 25% above the cost of production.28 By 2013, the share of metro 
areas in the high-cost bin had nearly doubled to 10%, still only a modest 
number.29 Yet the small subset of metro areas afflicted by high housing prices is 
very economically significant. Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, Seattle, 
the District of Columbia, Boston, and Denver are all in the high-cost bucket.30 
These regions have barely expanded their housing supply, even as the affordable 
metropolises of the South and Southwest—cities such as Atlanta, Charleston, 
Orlando, Houston, Phoenix, and Las Vegas—issued building permits between 
2000 and 2013 totaling 30%–60% of their year-2000 housing stock.31 
Geomorphology is an obvious difference between the high-cost coastal 
cities and their still-affordable counterparts in the South and Southwest, but 
regulation rather than “oceans and slopes” seems to be the principal housing-
supply barrier in high-cost regions.32 In a careful study of Manhattan, Glaeser 
and co-authors found that the cost of adding a new floor to an existing building, 
while very expensive, was only about half of what the additional living space 
would sell for.33  
The scholarly consensus holds that regulatory barriers to new housing have 
become much more stringent in the high-cost regions since the late 1960s and 
early 1970s.34 Exactly how much more stringent is hard to say, because it is 
difficult to quantify regional and over-time variation in the intensity of land-use 
regulation. Local regulations can take an almost innumerable number of forms—
height limits, density and lot-size limits, setback requirements, design 
guidelines, neighbor notification requirements, development fees and in-kind 
exactions, historical preservation, price restrictions, open space preservation, 
environmental review requirements, prevailing-wage and local-workface labor 
requirements, and so forth.35  
 
 28. Edward Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Economic Implications of Housing Supply, 32 J. ECON. PERSP. 
3, 13 tbl.2 (2018).  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 14 n.8. 
 31. Id. at 19 fig.3. 
 32. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Bryce A. Ward, The Causes and Consequences of Land Use Regulation: 
Evidence from Greater Boston, 65 J. URB. ECON. 265 (2009). 
 33. Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko & Raven E. Saks, Why is Manhattan So Expensive? Regulation 
and the Rise in Housing Prices, 48 J.L. & ECON. 369 (2005). 
 34. For leading reviews, see FISCHEL, ZONING RULES, supra note 4; Joseph Gyourko & Raven Molloy, 
Regulation and Housing Supply, in 5B HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 1289 (Gilles 
Duranton et al. eds, 2015). 
 35. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Bryce A. Ward, The Causes and Consequences of Land Use Regulation: 
Evidence from Greater Boston, 65 J. URB. ECON. 265, 266 (2009) (describing “remarkable variety” and 
“astonish[ing] vague[ness]” of land-use regulations uncovered through the authors’ in-depth investigation of 
Boston-area suburbs). 
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Moreover, while the original theory of zoning presupposed that 
conforming projects would be approved as of right, development permitting in 
the high-cost regions has become thoroughly discretionary, requiring project-
by-project negotiations over design, scale, public benefits, affordable housing 
set asides, and so much more.36 Local governments and neighborhood NIMBYs 
use this discretion to kill projects they dislike, and though some projects make 
it through, the delays and uncertainties can be very costly.37 The actual intensity 
of land-use regulation in a world of discretionary permitting is a function not 
just of the rules that exist on paper; rather, it is the interactive product of rules, 
interest groups, and the preferences of local administrators.38 
Economists have tried to quantify and compare the stringency of land-use 
regulation by surveying nationally representative samples of local public 
officials, and aggregating the results into indices.39 The general finding, 
unsurprisingly, is that metro areas with stricter regulation also have higher 
housing prices.40 In theory, this could reflect the internalization of aesthetic and 
congestion externalities from new development, but studies that attempt to 
quantify benefits as well as costs have largely found that the costs of 
development restrictions far outweigh the benefits.41  
There is no national time-series dataset on local land use regulation, but 
scholars have assembled detailed time series for California, the Boston area, and 
a few other locales. Difference-in-difference studies using these data corroborate 
the national, cross-sectional analyses: the adoption of most types of development 
restrictions reduces the number of housing units permitted in the next time 
period, relative to “control” jurisdictions that did not enact such restrictions.42 
The over-time studies also confirm that in expensive coastal regions, there has 
been a dramatic upswing in the number and variety of local land-use 
regulations.43  
There is, however, one important commonality between the high-cost 
metro areas of the West and Northeast, and the low-cost metros of the South and 
 
 36. See generally Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land Use Regulation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
591 (2011). For an in-depth look at discretionary development permitting in the San Francisco Bay Area, see 
Moira O’Neill et al., Developing Policy from the Ground Up: Examining Entitlement in the Bay Area to Inform 
California’s Housing Policy Debates, 25 HASTINGS ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2019). 
 37. O’Neill et al., supra note 36, at 26; see also Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of 
Zoning on Housing Affordability 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8835, 2002), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w8835.  
 38. Cf. Glaeser & Ward, supra note 35, at 266 (concluding from detailed study of Boston-area suburbs that 
one of the most basic facts about land use regulations is that they are “often astonishingly vague”). 
 39. For a review, see Gyourko & Molloy, supra note 34, at 1297–1302. 
 40. Id. at 1297.  
 41. See David Albouy & Gabriel Ehrlich, Housing Productivity and the Social Cost of Land-Use 
Restrictions, 107 J. URB. ECON. 101, 102 (2018), and sources cited therein.  
 42. See, e.g., Kristoffer Jackson, Do Land Use Regulations Stifle Residential Development? Evidence from 
California Cities, 91 J. URB. ECON. 45 (2016). 
 43. See Glaeser & Ward, supra note 32, at 269–71; Jackson, supra note 42, at 48. Using Google’s ngram 
service, Fischel shows that in the corpus of written work known to Google, references to “growth management” 
were very scarce before 1970 and shot upward after then. See FISCHEL, ZONING RULES, supra note 4, at 194–96. 
F - ELMENDORF_26 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 11/6/2019  7:14 PM 
December 2019] BEYOND THE DOUBLE VETO 89 
Southwest: density stasis in extant residential neighborhoods.44 Prior to the 
Great Depression, it was common for single-family homes in growing regions 
to be torn down and replaced by small apartment buildings.45 Yet when housing 
development picked up again after World War II, the old pattern of residential 
intensification did not materialize.46 Whether due to the spread of Euclidian 
zoning,47 the interstate highway system,48 or the increasing popularity of private 
covenants,49 housing development since the 1940s and especially post-1970 has 
occurred mostly through building on outlying “greenfields” and, to a lesser 
extent, on repurposed industrial “brownfields.”50 The main observable 
difference between the expensive coastal regions and their affordable inland 
counterparts is that less raw land has been converted from non-housing uses in 
the former areas.  
B. CAUSES 
Why did some jurisdictions throw up the barricades to new housing while 
others continued to welcome development, at least in previously non-residential 
areas? A standard view, popularized by economist William Fischel in his 2001 
book, The Homevoter Hypothesis, places the blame on incumbent 
homeowners.51 Risk averse, and deeply concerned about the value of their most 
important asset (their home), suburban homeowners turn out in droves to oppose 
any development that might change the character of the neighborhood. Local 
governments end up functioning as de facto homeowner cartels. There are some 
puzzles though. No one suburb can exercise much power over the overall supply 
(and hence, price) of housing in a metropolitan region composed of numerous 
suburbs. And why would suburban homevoter cartels block housing starting in 
the 1970s, but not beforehand, and why in the Northeast and the West, but not 
in the South?  
Fischel posits that general price inflation, and the environmental 
movement, explain the 1970s inflection point.52 Inflation made homes into more 
 
 44. Issi Romem, America’s New Metropolitan Landscape: Pockets of Dense Construction in a Dormant 
Suburban Interior, BUILDZOOM (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.buildzoom.com/blog/pockets-of-dense-
construction-in-a-dormant-suburban-interior. Romem notes that the 1960s saw a modest upswing in 
densification, but this was choked off by the 1970s. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. On which, see William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for Its Exclusionary 
Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317, 319 (2004). 
 48. CLAYTON NALL, THE ROAD TO INEQUALITY: HOW THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY PROGRAM POLARIZED 
AMERICA AND UNDERMINED CITIES (2018). 
 49. Erin A. Hopkins, The Impact of Community Associations on Residential Property Values, 43 HOUSING 
& SOC’Y 157 (2016). 
 50. See Romem, supra note 44. 
 51. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 1, 1, 4 (2001). 
 52. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES, supra note 4, at 203–07, 212–15. 
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economically important assets.53 The environmental movement engendered 
local open-space and “small is beautiful” initiatives, particularly in affluent, 
topographically interesting communities, which raised the real price of existing 
homes.54 This triggered a vicious spiral, as homeowners observing rising prices 
became more focused on protecting the value of their ever-more-important 
asset.55 Corroborating Fischel’s hypothesis, Saiz finds that metro areas whose 
natural geography most constrains housing production—and which, therefore, 
“naturally” experience larger housing-price runups during local economic 
expansions—are also the metro areas with the tightest regulatory constraints.56 
The small size of towns in the Northeast, and the availability of the ballot 
initiative in the West, made local governments in these areas particular easy for 
homeowners to control.57  
Empirically, the enactment of growth controls in a given suburb makes it 
more likely that nearby suburbs will do the same.58 Thus do the decentralized 
decisions of many politically independent subdivisions cumulate into region-
wide barriers to new housing. Development is pushed outward, into rural exurbs 
where owners of undeveloped land tend to have more political power,59 or 
inward, into central cities, which were long thought to be controlled by “growth 
machine” business coalitions.60 
If growth machines truly dominated urban politics, the deflection of 
development pressure from the suburbs might not constrain the regional supply 
of housing very much. But in economically productive coastal cities, the growth 
machine ran out of steam.61 In 1960, Los Angeles was zoned for four times its 
then-current population.62 Today, it’s zoned for the number of people it has.63 
Using parcel-level data from New York, Vicki Been and colleagues find that the 
probability of a parcel being upzoned for higher-density development is 
 
 53. See id. at 212–15 (explaining tax laws that make homes an attractive investment during inflations 
periods). 
 54. Id. at 203–05. 
 55. Id. at 214–15. 
 56. Albert Saiz, The Geographic Determinants of Housing Supply, 125 Q. J. ECON. 1253, 1272–82 (2010). 
 57. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES, supra note 4, at 163–218. 
 58. Jan K. Brueckner, Testing for Strategic Interaction Among Local Governments: The Case of Growth 
Controls, 44 J. URB. ECON. 438, 465 (1998). This is consistent with strategic behavior by participants in a cartel, 
though it might be innocent copycatting. See id. 
 59. Michelle Wilde Anderson, Sprawl’s Shepherd: The Rural County, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 365, 373–76 
(2012). 
 60. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES, supra note 4, at 296–98. 
 61. See Schleicher, supra note 23, at 114; Vicki Been, City NIMBYs, 33 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 217, 
219-27, 236-45 (2018) (discussing emergence and efficacy of anti-growth groups within cities). 
 62. Greg Morrow, The Homeowner Revolution: Democracy, Land Use and the Los Angeles Slow-Growth 
Movement, 1965–1992 3 fig.1-1 (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. in Urban Planning dissertation, UCLA) (on file with 
author). 
 63. Id. More precisely, it has been zoned for 92% of the number of people that it has. Id. 
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inversely correlated with the proportion of owner-occupied parcels nearby.64 
Homevoters are clearly exercising sway in the central city, not just in 
homogeneous suburbs.65  
Anti-gentrification activists have also become a fixture of urban politics in 
expensive cities.66 They are using discretionary permitting regimes and state 
environmental review laws as leverage to demand expensive “community 
benefit” concessions from developers,67 or to block projects outright. The costs, 
delays, and uncertainties involved in negotiating a community benefit agreement 
constitute a large, de facto tax on new housing development in the urban core. 
One might think that renters, who comprise a large share of the voting-
eligible population in many cities, would be stalwart allies of developers. But 
renters vote at much lower rates than homeowners,68 and though renters are 
generally more pro-development than homeowners,69 renters in expensive cities 
have classic NIMBY preferences. They oppose projects in their neighborhood, 
even though they would favor citywide measures to increase housing 
development.70 Alas, their neighborhood-level preferences are likely to be more 
consequential for new development (or its absence), since upzoning and project-
approval decisions tend to be made on a neighborhood-by-neighborhood basis, 
with councilmembers deferring to one another on projects in their districts.71 
 
 64. Vicki Been et al., Urban Land‐Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the Growth Machine?, 11 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 227, 234 (2014). The same pattern occurs in Los Angeles. See C.J. Gabbe, Why Are 
Regulations Changed? A Parcel Analysis of Upzoning in Los Angeles, 38 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 289, 295 (2018). 
 65. See Morrow, supra note 62, for a detailed, 30-year case study of Los Angeles, showing that “local 
groups of largely affluent, white homeowners used the community planning process to effectively re-direct 
growth away from their communities towards lower-income, minority areas that did not have strong local 
organizations to resist these changes.” Id. at 14. 
 66. Been, supra note 64, at 242–45; Nancy H Kwak, Anti-Gentrification Campaigns and the Fight for 
Local Control in California Cities, 12 NEW GLOBAL STUD. 9, 9 (2018). 
 67. See generally Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or Another 
Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5 (2010) (describing emergence of contracts between 
developers and community groups whereby the groups agree not to sue or otherwise oppose a project, in return 
for benefits from the developer). 
 68. For a review of the literature and new estimates that plausibly identify the causal effect of 
homeownership on turnout, see Andrew B. Hall & Jesse Yoder, Does Homeownership Influence Political 
Behavior? Evidence from Administrative Data (Mar. 26, 2019) (unpublished working paper) (on file with 
author); see also Brian J. McCabe, Are Homeowners Better Citizens? Homeownership and Community 
Participation in the United States, 91 SOC. FORCES 929, 948-49 (2013) (finding that homeownership positively 
correlates with turnout in elections, but not with forms of civic participation that do not affect home values). 
 69. See Michael Hankinson, When Do Renters Behave Like Homeowners? High Rent, Price Anxiety, and 
NIMBYism, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 473, 477 (2018); William Marble & Clayton Nall, Where Self-Interest 
Trumps Ideology: Liberal Homeowners and Local Opposition to Housing Development 10 (Mar. 19, 2019) 
(unpublished working paper) (on file with author); Press Release, Public Policy Institute of California, PPIC 
Statewide Survey: Californians & Their Government 5 (June 5, 2019), https://www.ppic.org/wp-
content/uploads/ppic-statewide-survey-californians-and-their-government-may-2019.pdf [hereinafter 
Californians & Their Government].  
 70. Hankinson, supra note 69, at 473.  
 71. Schleicher, supra note 23, at 85. 
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C. CONSEQUENCES 
Barriers to housing development in the expensive coastal metropolises 
have at least three types of deleterious impacts: they exacerbate socioeconomic 
inequality; they induce pollution, particularly greenhouse gas emissions; and 
they undermine national economic welfare.  
1. Inequality 
The escalating price of housing in economically productive coastal regions 
has made incumbent homeowners rich.72 One study finds that returns on housing 
investments account for nearly all of the much-discussed increase in capital’s 
share of national income since 1970.73 Other studies show that land-use 
restrictions exacerbate segregation within metropolitan regions.74  
There are also serious consequences for socioeconomic mobility across 
generations. Using income-tax microdata, Raj Chetty and co-authors have 
shown that intergenerational mobility in the United States varies greatly with 
geography.75 Some locales “in the United States have relative mobility 
comparable to the highest mobility countries in the world, such as Canada and 
Denmark, while others have lower levels of mobility than any developed country 
for which data are available.”76 Many of the high-opportunity communities are 
found in the expensive metropolitan areas.77 If more poor families could afford 
to emigrate from the South and the declining regions of the Midwest, more poor 
children would reach the middle class. 
 
 72. See, e.g., Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 28, at 22; David Albouy & Mike Zabek, Housing Inequality 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21916, 2016) (documenting increase in housing-
consumption inequality since 1970 and showing that it is mostly due to location-specific changes in dwelling-
unit value, rather than more dispersion in the size and other observable characteristics of dwelling units 
consumed by the rich and the poor).  
 73. See Matthew Rognlie, Deciphering the Fall and Rise in the Net Capital Share: Accumulation or 
Scarcity?, BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2015, at 1, 3. To be sure, a more liberal regime of land 
use in expensive coastal cities would not necessarily reduce returns to capital. Liberalization would probably 
reduce the value of the existing housing stock, but increase the value of land. 
 74. Michael C. Lens & Paavo Monkkonen, Do Strict Land Use Regulations Make Metropolitan Areas 
More Segregated by Income?, 82 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 6, 6 (2016) (showing strong correlation between land use 
regulation and income segregation across metro areas); Jessica Trounstine, The Geography of Inequality: 
How Land Use Regulation Produces Segregation and Polarization 2 (July 2018) (unpublished working paper) 
(on file with author) (showing that restrictive land use policies exacerbate racial segregation). 
 75. Raj Chetty & Nathaniel Hendren, The Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational Mobility II: 
County-Level Estimates, 133 Q. J. ECON. 1163, 1164 (2018); Raj Chetty et al., Where is the Land of Opportunity? 
The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States, 129 Q.J. ECONOMICS 1553, 1619 (2014). 
 76. Raj Chetty et al., supra note 75, at 1556. This is not just the byproduct of chance variation in the 
distribution of, say, “good families” across localities. Comparing siblings who moved to high-mobility zones at 
different ages and examining the subset of people who were displaced by adverse economic shocks, it is 
estimated that one-half to two-thirds of the geographic variation is causal. Raj Chetty & Nathaniel Hendren, The 
Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational Mobility: Childhood Exposure Effects and County-Level 
Estimates 2–4 (May 2015) (unpublished working paper) (on file with author).  
 77. Arthur Acolin & Susan Wachter, Opportunity and Housing Access, 19 CITYSCAPE 135, 136 (2017).  
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2. Environment 
Regulatory barriers to housing production in coastal cities displace growth 
to regions with less temperate climates and more autocentric commuting 
patterns, resulting in greater greenhouse gas emissions.78 Americans who move 
to opportunity nowadays are mostly moving to the Atlantas, Houstons, and 
Phoenixes of the world, not to the mild coastal climes of Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, Portland, and Seattle.79 Within metro areas, development restrictions 
in city cores and inner suburbs push growth to outlying rural areas, gobbling up 
land that may have value as natural habitat or parkland, and relegating the new 
homeowners to greenhouse-gas-intensive commutes.80  
California is famous in environmental circles for its ambitious greenhouse-
gas emission targets.81 So far, the state is making impressive progress—except 
in the transportation sector.82 California has little hope of meeting its 2030 and 
2040 targets without a huge reduction in transportation emissions, and this is 
unlikely to be achieved unless urban and suburban communities start 
accommodating a lot of new, higher-density housing, particularly near transit 
stations.83  
3. National Economic Welfare 
As David Schleicher and others have emphasized, barriers to new housing 
in economically successful metro areas affect national economic welfare.84 They 
deprive would-be residents of the “agglomeration” benefits of dense labor 
markets, where stiff competition among firms for workers raises wages, where 
workers have insurance (in the form of fallback job options) in the event that 
they prove to be a bad fit with one employer, and where innovation is nurtured 
by the everyday exchanges that occur when people live and work close to others 
 
 78. See generally EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY (2011); Nadja Popovich & Dennis Lu, The 
Most Detailed Map of Auto Emissions in America, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2019) 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/10/10/climate/driving-emissions-map.html. 
 79. See Schleicher, supra note 23, at 115 and sources cited therein. 
 80. Christopher M. Jones et al., Carbon Footprint Planning: Quantifying Local and State Mitigation 
Opportunities for 700 California Cities, 3 URB. PLAN. 35, 48 (2018); Nathaniel Decker et al., Right Type, Right 
Place: Assessing the Environmental and Economic Impacts of Infill Residential Development Through 2030 5 
(Mar. 2017), (unpublished working paper) https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/right-type-right-place.  
 81. See, e.g., David Roberts, California Gov. Jerry Brown Casually Unveils History’s Most Ambitious 
Climate Target, VOX (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/9/11/17844896/ 
california-jerry-brown-carbon-neutral-2045-climate-change. 
 82. CAL. AIR RES. BD., 2018 PROGRESS REPORT: CALIFORNIA’S SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES AND 
CLIMATE PROTECTION ACT 5 (2018) https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2018-
11/Final2018Report_SB150_112618_02_Report.pdf.  
 83. Liam Dillon, California Won’t Meet Its Climate Change Goals Without a Lot More Housing Density 
in Its Cities, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-housing-climate-change-
goals-20170306-story.html; David Roberts, California Has a Climate Problem, and Its Name Is Cars, VOX 
(Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/8/22/16177820/california-transportation. 
 84. See, e.g., Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Why Do Cities Matter? Local Growth and Aggregate 
Growth 5 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Kreisman Working Paper Series in Hous. Law and Policy No. 30, 2015); 
Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 37, at 5; Schleicher, supra note 23, at 85–86. 
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who are similarly engaged.85 Schleicher also observes that mobility barriers 
make it harder for the Federal Reserve Bank to establish sensible monetary 
policies.86 A lax monetary policy, calibrated to regions of the United States that 
have suffered negative shocks, would cause inflation in the thriving regions, 
whereas a tighter policy suited to the successful regions would perpetuate 
unemployment in other areas. 
Economists have tried to quantify the national-welfare losses from 
underproduction of housing in expensive coastal markets.87 These efforts are 
model-dependent and rest on strong assumptions, but by most estimates, GDP 
would be at least a couple of percentage points higher if housing supply could 
expand to the “natural” equilibrium point where price equals the average (non-
regulatory) cost of production.88 
II.  HOW THE EXPENSIVE STATES HAVE TRIED (?) TO MAKE HOUSING MORE 
AFFORDABLE 
State efforts to check unduly restrictive zoning in the now-expensive 
coastal metropolises got underway in the late 1960s and 1970s, around the same 
time that housing prices in these areas began to separate from prices elsewhere 
in the nation. Though each state followed its own path, if one squints a bit, one 
can discern two basic models. I will call these the Northeastern Model and the 
West Coast Model, after the regions where each predominates. California, 
Oregon, and Washington (as well as Florida) follow the West Coast Model, 
while the Northeastern Model is found in New Jersey, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Illinois.  
The Northeastern Model treats the affordability/housing supply problem as 
essentially about suburban regulatory barriers to subsidized, income-restricted 
housing. The primary goal is to get each local government to accommodate its 
“fair share” of low-income housing, and the primary tool is the “builder’s 
remedy,” a judicial or administrative proceeding whereby developers of housing 
projects with a large proportion of income-restricted units may obtain 
exemptions from local regulations.  
The West Coast Model treats the problem instead as one of local regulatory 
barriers to producing enough housing to accommodate projected household 
growth across all income categories. Local governments are required to enact 
and periodically update a comprehensive plan or “housing element” that 
 
 85. Schleicher, supra note 23, at 102. There is also some evidence that people underestimate losses to their 
own welfare from long commutes. See Alois Stutzer & Bruno S. Frey, Stress that Doesn’t Pay: The Commuting 
Paradox, 110 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 339, 340 (2008). Causal claims about this alleged cognitive bias are a bit 
suspect, since researchers have not been able to randomly assign commutes to workers and compare workers’ 
projected well-being with their realized well-being. But whether or not they undervalue time lost to commuting, 
buyers and renters in expensive coastal markets are clearly willing to pay big premiums for housing near jobs 
and transit—if only the market would provide it. 
 86. Schleicher, supra note 23, at 88–96. 
 87. See Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 37 (reviewing literature). 
 88. Id. at 24 fig.4. 
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explains how the jurisdiction will accommodate its share of state-projected 
population growth. These plans are subject to review and approval by a state 
agency. Localities without a compliant plan may lose access to certain funding 
streams, but traditionally, they have not been exposed to strong builders’ 
remedies. 
As we will see, there has been some cross-fertilization between the 
Northeastern and West Coast states. For example, housing need determinations 
in California are made in a loosely similar way to housing need determinations 
in New Jersey, except that California assesses need for market-rate as well as 
subsidized housing. And, echoing the builder’s remedy of the Northeastern 
Model, California has authorized developers of affordable housing to bypass 
local zoning rules if the local government lacks a substantially compliant 
housing element. Conversely, most Northeastern Model states now immunize 
local governments from the builder’s remedy if the locality submits its 
affordable-housing plan to a state agency and the agency approves it. This is 
analogous to plan-review under the West Coast Model, except review in the 
Northeastern Model states only addresses income-restricted housing.  
The Northeastern Model and West Coast Model are not the only ways in 
which states have acted to accommodate more housing, denser housing, or more 
below-market-rate units. A few states have created incentive programs to 
encourage denser housing near mass transit, and many more provide for tax 
abatements or tax increment financing to encourage redevelopment of 
deteriorating areas. I focus here on the Northeastern and West Coast Models, 
however, because they capture the principal means by which parent states of 
expensive local governments have undertaken to regulate locally erected barriers 
to new housing. As such, these models are the precursors and reference points 
for the spate of “Yes In My Backyard” housing bills now making their way 
through the statehouses, the subject of the next Part. 
A. THE NORTHEASTERN MODEL: BUILDER’S REMEDY, SAFE HARBORS, AND 
INDIFFERENCE TO MARKET-RATE HOUSING  
1. The Framework 
The Northeastern Model is a legacy of the civil rights movement. Cities in 
the 1970s were in disarray. White people with means had fled to the suburbs and 
were using large-lot zoning and other exclusionary tactics to keep poor people 
and minorities from following behind them.89 Civil rights activists demanded 
state intervention to make the “tight little islands” of suburbia accept their fair 
share of low-income housing.90 The aim was to dismantle concentrated urban 
poverty and racial isolation, giving poor black families in the central cities 
 
 89. See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS: AN URBAN STRATEGY FOR AMERICA 
(1973). 
 90.  See Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the 
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969). 
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access via housing to the good schools and increasingly bountiful employment 
opportunities of the suburbs.91 
New Jersey’s courts in the Mt. Laurel line of cases famously converted this 
civil rights demand into state-constitutional doctrine.92 In Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Illinois, the legislature answered the call.93 But 
all of these states eventually settled on a similar strategy for opening up the 
suburbs. A state-level actor—the legislature, an administrative agency, or the 
courts—sets a target for the number of “below-market rate” (BMR) dwelling 
units in the territory of each local government.94 In New Jersey, BMR quotas 
emerge from a complicated and contentious process of periodically determining 
regional “needs” and then jurisdiction-specific “fair shares,”95 whereas 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Illinois have simply declared 
that 10% of the housing stock of each locality should consist of BMR units.96 
(BMR units are subject to deed restrictions permitting them to be sold or rented 
only to persons who earn no more than a defined share of the Area Median 
Income, and at restricted prices.97) 
 
 91. See CHARLES M. HAAR, Breaking New Ground: The Role of the Courts in Social Change, in SUBURBS 
UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES 3–11 (2d. ed. 1998) (describing background to the Mt. 
Laurel litigation). 
 92. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. Of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713, 728, 731–32 
(N.J. 1975) appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP. V. Twp. Of 
Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).  
 93. On the history of the Massachusetts framework, see Sharon Perlman Krefetz, The Impact and Evolution 
of the Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit and Zoning Appeals Act: Thirty Years of Experience with a State 
Legislative Effort to Overcome Exclusionary Zoning, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 381, 384–89 (2001). Regarding 
Connecticut, see Robert D. Carroll, Note, Connecticut Retrenches: A Proposal to Save the Affordable Housing 
Appeals Procedure, 110 YALE L.J. 1247, 1253–55 (2001). The Illinois framework, which dates to 2003, is 
summarized in ILL. HOUS. DEV. AUTH., AFFORDABLE HOUSING PLANNING AND APPEAL ACT: 2013 NON-EXEMPT 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT HANDBOOK (rev. Jan. 7, 2014), [hereinafter ILL. HANDBOOK], https://www.ihda.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/Final2013AHPAANELGHandbook.pdf. Regarding Rhode Island, whose framework 
dates to 1991, see Town of Burrillville v. Pascoag Apartment Assocs., LLC, 950 A.2d 435, 439–40 (R.I. 2008). 
 94. Rachel G. Bratt & Abigail Vladeck, Addressing Restrictive Zoning for Affordable Housing: 
Experiences in Four States, 24 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 594, 596 (2014). 
 95. The state projects population growth in each of six regions, estimates the share of growth likely to 
consist of low- and moderate-income people, adds to this the number of low- and moderate-income households 
in the region who currently lack subsidized housing or inhabit substandard housing, and adjusts for projected 
demolitions and conversions of existing housing units. Having so determined each region’s need, the state 
allocates a share of it to each political subdivision within the region, weighing the amount of undeveloped land 
in the subdivision, the characteristics of its population, and the quantity of BMR housing it has produced in the 
past. See In re Declaratory Judgment Actions Filed by Various Municipalities, 152 A.3d 915 (N.J. 2017) 
(instructing lower courts on housing-need calculation); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Saving Mount Laurel?, 40 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 1619–23 (2013) (discussing controversy). 
 96. See Sam Stonefield, Affordable Housing in Suburbia: The Importance but Limited Power and 
Effectiveness of the State Override Tool, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 323, 339 (2001). Massachusetts has not 
sidestepped it entirely, however, in those jurisdictions below the 10%-of-housing-stock threshold that seek an 
exemption from the builder’s remedy (on which, see infra notes 96–99 and accompanying text) must submit an 
affordable housing plan tied to projected population growth in various income categories. See MASS. DEP’T OF 
HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., G.L. C.40B COMPREHENSIVE PERMIT PROJECTS: SUBSIDIZED HOUSING INVENTORY II-8–
II-10 (2014), https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2017/10/10/guidecomprehensivepermit.pdf.  
 97. Bratt & Vladeck, supra note 94, at 598 (comparing BMR housing definition in several states). 
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The second feature of the Northeastern Model is the so-called builder’s 
remedy. If a local government denies a project with a substantial fraction of 
BMR units, typically 20–25%,98 the developer may appeal to a state tribunal and 
obtain an exemption from otherwise-applicable local ordinances.99 In these 
proceedings, the burden of proof is on the local government to show that any 
local interests adversely affected by the project outweigh the regional or 
statewide need for BMR units.100 To prevent local governments from killing 
BMR projects with delays, Massachusetts and Rhode Island deem qualifying 
projects approved as a matter of law if the local government fails to act on the 
permit application within a brief window of time.101 However, only nonprofit or 
limited-profit developers are entitled to speedy permitting, which limits the 
disruptive potential of the “deemed approved” proviso.102 
The final component of the Northeastern Model is a safe harbor. Local 
governments that have met their BMR target, or that have received state 
approval of their BMR housing plan, are immune from the builder’s remedy.103 
 
 98. See, e.g., 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-53-4(a) (2019) (25%); In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 
6 A.3d 445, 463 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010), aff’d as modified In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 74 
A.3d 893 (N.J. 2013) (“[A] 20% set-aside requirement has been considered the norm in the administration of the 
Mount Laurel doctrine.”); Stuborn Ltd. P’ship v. Barnstable Bd. Of Appeals, Decision on Jurisdiction, No. 98–
01, 1999 WL 34782799, at *6–*7 (Mass. Hous. Appeals Comm., Mar. 5, 1999) (25%). 
 99. These proceedings take place before an administrative tribunal in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and 
Illinois, and courts in Connecticut. ILL. HANDBOOK, supra note 93 (describing the Illinois procedures); see 
Carroll, supra note 93 (describing the Connecticut procedures); Krefetz, supra note 93 (describing the 
Massachusetts procedures); Town of Burriville v. Pascoag Apartment Assocs., LLC, 950 A.2d 435, 438 (R.I. 
2008) (exemplifying Rhode Island procedures). In New Jersey, the proceedings took place before courts initially, 
then an agency, and most recently before courts again, since the agency was declared “defunct.” See In re 
Declaratory Judgment Actions, 152 A.3d at 918-22 (summarizing history). Additionally, Rhode Island restricts 
the builder’s remedy to projects that are publicly subsidized. 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-53-3 (2019). And 
Massachusetts restricts it to projects proposed by public agencies, nonprofits, and “limited divided” 
organizations. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 21 (2019). 
 100. See ILL. HANDBOOK, supra note 93, at 33; Carroll, supra note 93, at 1255; Krefetz, supra note 93, at 
388; Town of Burriville, 950 A.2d at 456. 
 101. Regarding the expedited, “comprehensive permit” procedure in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, see, 
respectively, 28 ARTHUR L. ENO, JR. & WILLIAM V. HOVEY, MASS. PRACTICE SERIES § 23.30 (4th ed. Supp. 
2016–2017); Erika Barber, Note, Affordable Housing in Massachusetts: How to Preserve the Promise of “40B” 
with Lessons from Rhode Island, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 125, 132–33 (2011). 
 102. See Ellen Callahan, Will an Increase in Profits Increase Affordable Housing? Examining the Limited 
Dividend Requirement of Chapter 40B of the Massachusetts General Laws, 50 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 649, 654 
(2017) (describing and critiquing this limitation). 
 103. Regarding New Jersey, see section 52:27D–313–317 of the New Jersey code; see also In re Adoption 
of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 110 A.3d 31, 45 (N.J. 2015) (stating that “substantive certification” of plan “afford[s] 
the ordinances implementing the housing elements of such municipalities a strong presumption of validity in 
any exclusionary zoning action and, thus, would provide powerful protection from a builder’s remedy”); Hills 
Dev. Co. v. Twp. Of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621, 651, 653–54 (N.J. 1986) (explaining certification procedure). 
Regarding Massachusetts, see title 760, section 56.03 of the Code of Massachusetts Regulations; MASS. DEP’T 
OF HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., G.L. C.40B COMPREHENSIVE PERMIT PROJECTS: SUBSIDIZED HOUSING INVENTORY II-
8–II-10 (2014), https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2017/10/10/guidecomprehensivepermit.pdf (exempting 
local governments that both have a current, state-approved “housing production plan” in place, and produced 
affordable units equal to 0.5% of their total housing stock during the previous year). Regarding Rhode Island, 
see title 45, section 45–53–4 of the General Laws of Rhode Island (stating that the review board may deny 
affordable-housing development application if the local government “has an approved affordable housing plan 
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To obtain the plan-based immunity, localities typically must adopt an 
inclusionary-zoning ordinance, which requires developers of multi-unit projects 
to set aside a percentage as BMR units or pay an in-lieu fee.104 Local 
governments are also encouraged to enact a “density bonus” ordinance, allowing 
projects with a substantial share of BMR units to be somewhat denser or bulkier 
than otherwise permitted.105 
The underlying premises of the Northeastern Model seem to be (1) that the 
problem of housing affordability deserves the state’s attention only insofar as it 
affects poor people; and (2) that the problem can be redressed only through the 
construction or rehabilitation of deed-restricted BMR units. Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Illinois could hardly be more explicit about this, 
as they condition exposure to the builder’s remedy solely on the locality’s weak 
BMR track record or plan, and they provide the remedy solely for builders of 
BMR units.106 And while New Jersey has recognized that a generous supply of 
new market-rate units may make existing units more affordable—thus reducing 
the regional need for BMR housing107—the state’s courts have resisted efforts 
to account for market-supply effects in the calculation of regional needs.108 A 
 
and is meeting housing needs, and the proposal is inconsistent with the affordable housing plan”); DIV. OF 
PLANNING, R.I. DEP’T OF ADMIN., STATE GUIDE PLAN ELEMENT 423 app. D (2006), 
http://www.planning.ri.gov/documents/guide_plan/shp06.pdf (reprinting guidelines for affordable housing 
plans). Regarding Illinois, see ILL. HANDBOOK, supra note 93, at 13 (noting, inter alia, that local governments 
are exempt from builder’s remedy if they adopt an affordable housing plan establishing a goal that 15% of all 
new housing consist of affordable units). In contrast to the other Northeastern states, Connecticut does not appear 
to offer plan-based immunity. Instead, it limits the threat of the builder’s remedy by allowing local governments 
to adopt a temporary affordable-housing moratoria, provided that certain criteria are met. See CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 8–30g(l) (2019). 
 104. See Stonefield, supra note 96, at 334–35 (noting that, with the partial exception of Massachusetts, the 
Northeastern Model states have all pushed local governments to achieve their affordable housing targets through 
zoning regimes designed to induce private developers to set aside BMR units).  
 105. See 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 128-8.1(g) (2019) (directing agency to promulgate guidelines for inclusionary 
zoning and density bonuses); DIV. OF PLANNING, R.I. DEP’T OF ADMIN., STATE GUIDE PLAN ELEMENT 423 app. 
D (2006), http://www.planning.ri.gov/documents/guide_plan/shp06.pdf (reprinting Inclusionary Zoning 
Guidelines, which call for the BMR set-aside to be offset more than 1:1 with extra market-rate units through a 
density bonus); In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 6 A.3d 445, 461–64 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010), 
aff’d, In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 74 A.3d 893 (N.J. 2013) (invalidating Third Round Regulations 
for implementing Mt. Laurel because, inter alia, the regulations did not provide sufficient density bonuses or 
other incentives for private construction of BMR housing). 
 106. See supra text accompanying notes 98–103. 
 107. See In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95, 914 A.2d 348, 362 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) 
(stating that the housing agency had “recognized filtering as the most significant market force in reducing 
housing need”). 
 108. See id. at 372–75 (criticizing agency’s filtering adjustment for disregarding current data on house prices 
and paying no need to whether local governments actually would increase the supply of market-rate housing). 
In 2015, responsibility for fair-share calculations was reassigned to the judiciary pursuant to In re Adoption of 
N.J.A.C., 110 A.3d 31, and the housing-need determinations since then have not adjusted for filtering. See In re 
Twp. Of S. Brunswick, 153 A.3d 981, 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2016) (acknowledging filtering as relevant 
in principle but stating that neither expert had “satisfactorily addressed the deficiencies identified by the 
Appellate Division” with respect to filtering estimation); In re Mun. of Princeton, No. MER-L-1550-15, 2018 
WL 1352272, at *40–42 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2018) (same).  
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New Jersey municipality that meets its fair-share obligation for BMR units may 
zone the rest of its land as restrictively as it wishes.109  
2. Critiques 
The Northeastern Model has been bashed from many directions.110 The 
most fundamental concern for present purposes is the deep mismatch between 
the Model’s conception of the housing-supply problem and the actual problems 
described in Part I. The root problem today is not (or not just) the racist or snooty 
suburb trying to keep out poor folks, but rather an unwillingness on the part of 
governments throughout expensive metro areas to allow enough market-rate 
housing, especially dense housing near transit. As the gentrification fights attest, 
there are now plenty of affluent whites willing to live near poor people and 
minorities,111 but there is not enough housing to go around.  
Some critics posit the Northeastern Model is not only mismatched to 
today’s housing problems but actually exacerbates them.112 Because 
Northeastern Model states (other than New Jersey) define the affordable-
housing target as a percentage of the total housing stock (10%), rather than as 
an amount of new housing units,113 they effectively punish suburban 
communities that approve market-rate housing projects. Any new market rate 
units will reduce the BMR share of the community’s housing stock, potentially 
exposing the jurisdiction to builder’s remedy lawsuits. There’s also some 
evidence that the Northeastern Model has led suburban governments to buy up 
developable parcels for protected parks and open space, so that the parcels 
cannot be used to house locally unwelcome populations.114  
On the other hand, the Northeastern Model may have induced some local 
governments to accommodate reasonably dense housing projects they would 
otherwise have rejected. The least fiscally burdensome way for a local 
government to meet its affordable-housing target is to make it profitable for 
developers to build projects with a substantial fraction of BMR units. Courts in 
New Jersey have also put some pressure on local governments to zone for fairly 
 
 109. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 421 (N.J. 1983) (stating that jurisdictions 
which meet their fair-share obligations are free to enact “large-lot and open space zoning”).  
 110. Some critics complain that deed-restricted BMR units are a terribly inefficient way to subsidize housing 
for poor people. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 983 (2009) (arguing for portable housing vouchers instead). Others fault the states for inadequate 
commitment. See What Is the Mount Laurel Doctrine?, FAIR SHARE HOUS. CTR., 
http://fairsharehousing.org/mount-laurel-doctrine (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). Still, others want the states to better 
account for the filtering of market-rate units into or out of “affordable” price points. See Hills, supra note 90, at 
1639–44. 
 111. For a review of the literature on time trends in white preferences for residential integration, see Nicholas 
O. Stephanopoulos, Civil Rights in a Desegregating America, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1329, 1351–52 (2016).  
 112. See, e.g., FISCHEL, ZONING RULES, supra note 4, at 359–62. 
 113. See supra text accompanying note 96. 
 114. See FISCHEL, ZONING RULES, supra note 4, at 359–60. 
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dense, low-cost housing forms, and have pushed back against BMR 
requirements that are so onerous as to render development unprofitable.115 
The few empirical studies that have tried to sort out how the Northeastern 
Model has affected total housing supply are inconclusive.116 About the best that 
can be said for the model is that while its conception of the housing-affordability 
problem is too narrow,  it has induced construction of BMR units without clearly 
diminishing the overall supply of new housing.  
B. THE WEST COAST MODEL: SUPERVISED PLANNING FOR PROJECTED 
POPULATION GROWTH  
1. The Framework 
The West Coast Model emerged from the wave of enthusiasm for 
comprehensive planning that washed over the states in the 1960s and 1970s.117 
Housing wasn’t the focus of the initial planning mandates,118 but it became much 
more central in the 1980s and 1990s.119 By 1991, when Washington enacted its 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. A recent difference-in-difference study finds that the Mt. Laurel intervention in New Jersey caused an 
increase in the multifamily and townhome housing stock in New Jersey counties relative to similar counties in 
New York, but not Pennsylvania (where the courts have also invalidated exclusionary zoning). See Nicholas J. 
Marantz & Huixin Zheng, Exclusionary Zoning and the Limits of Judicial Impact, J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 1 
(2018). Another study finds that during the 1990s, a greater proportion of new construction in New Jersey 
consisted of multi-family units than in seven comparison states. See GARY K. INGRAM & YU-HUNG HONG, 
LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY, EVALUATING SMART GROWTH: STATE AND LOCAL POLICY OUTCOMES 25–27 
(2009), https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/evaluating-smart-growth-full.pdf. In 
Connecticut, adoption of the Northeastern Model did not reduce housing production in Connecticut suburbs 
relative to nearby “control” suburbs in New York (a state that has not adopted the model). See Nicholas J. 
Marantz & Harya S. Dillon, Do State Affordable Housing Appeals Systems Backfire? A Natural Experiment, 28 
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 267, 269 (2018). On the other hand, there’s suggestive evidence that New Jersey 
suburbs, which voted (unsuccessfully) against the Northeastern Model, have used public “parkland” bonds to 
buy up and set aside parcels that have low value as parkland but high value for housing development. See Stephan 
Schmidt & Kurt Paulsen, Is Open-Space Preservation a Form of Exclusionary Zoning? The Evolution of 
Municipal Open-Space Policies in New Jersey, 45 URB. AFF. REV. 92, 94 (2009).  
 117. See Daniel R. Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74 
MICH. L. REV. 899 (1976) (describing environmental, civil rights, and federal funding influences on the new 
planning requirements).  
 118. Id. at 900. 
 119. California’s framework legislation dates back to 1968, but the Regional Housing Need Allocation 
(RHNA) and state-review requirements were not established until the early 1980s. See William C. Baer, 
California’s Fair-Share Housing 1967–2004: The Planning Approach, 7 J. PLAN. HIST. 48, 54–62 (2008). 
Oregon’s framework dates back to 1973 and acquired its modern form by 1979. See Paul A. Diller & Edward J. 
Sullivan, The Challenge of Housing Affordability in Oregon: Facts, Tools, and Outcomes, 27 J. AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING & COMMUNITY. DEV. L. 183, 185–86, 204–10 (2018); Robert L. Liberty, Oregon’s Comprehensive 
Growth Management Program: An Implementation Review and Lessons for Other States, 22 ENVT’L L. REP. 
10367, 10368 (1992); Edward J. Sullivan, The Quiet Revolution Goes West: The Oregon Planning Program 
1961–2011, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 357, 367–72 (2012). Washington’s framework, the Growth Management 
Act, dates back to 1990. See Paul Marshall Parker, The Evolution of Growth Management in Washington: 25 
Years and Counting (2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.washington-
apa.org/assets/docs/2015/Events/GMA_Gala_Event/parker_presentation_gma_25_years_and_counting.pdf. 
Florida’s regime originated in the early 1970s, but state review of local plans for various required elements was 
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Growth Management Act, the three West Coast states (and Florida) had all 
embraced the following principles. First, local governments have a duty to plan, 
on a state-mandated cycle (generally seven to ten years)120, for enough new 
housing to accommodate projected population growth.121 Second, local 
comprehensive plans, or at least their “housing elements,” must be submitted to 
 
not mandatory until the mid 1980s. See Nancy Stroud, A History and New Turns in Florida’s Growth 
Management Reform, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 397, 400–06 (2012). 
 120. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65588 (West 2019) (eight-year cycle); OR. REV. STAT. § 197.629 (2017) (seven- 
to ten-year cycle); FLA. STAT. § 163.3191 (2019) (seven-year cycle); WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.130 (2019) 
(eight year cycle). 
 121. In Washington, “[c]ounty officials . . . select[] a 20-year . . . planning target from within the range of 
high and low prepared by [the state finance agency]. . . . [T]hen within each county, population planning targets 
for cities, towns, and unincorporated areas are developed among all affected local jurisdictions.” Growth 
Management Act County Projections, OFFICE OF FIN. MGMT., https://www.ofm.wa.gov/washington-data-
research/population-demographics/population-forecasts-and-projections/growth-management-act-county-
projections (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). The housing element of the plan must “[i]nclude[] an inventory and 
analysis of existing and projected housing needs that identifies the number of housing units necessary to manage 
projected growth . . . mak[ing] adequate provisions for existing and projected needs of all economic segments 
of the community.” WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.070(2) (2019). In Oregon, local governments must plan for 
“needed housing” “in one or more zoning districts . . . with sufficient buildable land to satisfy that need.” OR. 
REV. STAT. § 197.307(3) (2019). “Needed housing,” in turn,  
[M]eans all housing on land zoned for residential use . . . that is determined to meet the need shown 
for housing within an urban growth boundary at price ranges and rent levels that are affordable to 
households within the county with a variety of incomes, including but not limited to households with 
low incomes, very low incomes and extremely low incomes.  
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.303(1) (2019). “Needed housing” is determined using a 20-year population forecast. See 
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.296(2) (2019) (requiring cities to adjust growth boundaries and/or density to 
accommodate needed housing per 20-year forecast); OR. ADMIN. R. 660-024-0040 (2019) (“The determination 
of 20-year residential land needs for an urban area must be consistent with the appropriate 20-year coordinated 
population forecast.”). In 2013, Oregon’s legislature assigned responsibility for making the associated 
population-forecast projection to the Population Research Center at Portland State University (for most of the 
state) and to the Metro regional government (for the Portland area). See Edward J. Sullivan, Population 
Forecasting and Planning Authority, 48 URB. LAW. 47, 62–64 (2016). The California process for determining 
housing need is described in the text accompanying supra notes 119–120, and infra note 122. But see also CAL. 
GOV’T CODE § 65584 et seq. (West 2019); CAL. AFFORDABLE HOUS. LAW PROJECT, CALIFORNIA HOUSING 
ELEMENT MANUAL 18–21 (3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter CAL. MANUAL]. In Florida:  
The plan must be based on at least the minimum amount of land required to accommodate the 
medium projections as published by the Office of Economic and Demographic Research for at least 
a 10-year planning period . . . . Absent physical limitations . . . population projections for each 
municipality, and the unincorporated area within a county must, at a minimum, be reflective of each 
area’s proportional share of the total county population and the total county population growth. 
FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(f)(3) (2019).  
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a state agency for review.122 Third, local land-use regulations and by extension, 
local permitting decisions must conform to the plan.123  
Population forecasts are made by a state agency and forwarded to local 
planners.124 Oregon, Washington, and Florida instruct their local governments 
to convert these population forecasts into estimates of needed housing for “all 
economic segments of the community.”125  
California goes a step further.126 In 1980, the state legislature enacted a 
framework for periodically establishing regional housing quotas through 
negotiations between the state Department of Housing and Community 
Development (HCD) and regional associations of local governments, the so-
called Councils of Governments.127 Though HCD ultimately determines the size 
 
 122. Oregon requires local governments to have their comprehensive plans and implementing regulations 
“acknowledged” by the state agency. See Sullivan, supra note 119, at 370–71. This process was completed by 
1986. Id. Amendments to an acknowledged plan must be submitted for state review. See OR. REV. ST. § 197.610 
(2019). Additionally, plans covering urban areas (with a few exceptions) must be updated and submitted for 
state review every seven to ten years. Id. § 197.629. For a comparison of the post-acknowledgment amendment 
and periodic review processes, see Sullivan, supra note 109, at 370–72, 392–93. In California, local governments 
must submit draft housing elements and amendments to Housing and Community Development (HCD) for 
review. If HCD objects, the local government may enact the element or amendment anyway but must make 
findings regarding why it believes the element substantially complies. HCD then makes a written determination 
about substantial compliance and if it finds noncompliance, may refer the matter to the Attorney General for 
enforcement. See CAL GOV’T CODE § 65585 (West 2019); See CAL. MANUAL, supra note 121, at 15. In 
Washington, plans and plan amendments must be submitted to the state Department of Commerce for review at 
least sixty days before adoption. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.106 (2019); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-196-
630 (2019). If the department believes that the plan is inadequate, it may initiate a proceeding before the Growth 
Management Hearing Board. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.280 (2019). In Florida, plans and plan 
amendments must be submitted to the state planning agency (and several other agencies) for comments after the 
local government’s first public hearing. After adoption of the plan or plan amendment, the final package is sent 
back to the state agency, which has forty-five days to make a compliance determination. If the agency finds the 
plan non-compliant, it may initiate proceedings before the Division of Administrative Hearings, which 
adjudicates plan validity. See FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3184(4)(e)(4), 163.3184(5) (2019). For a history of earlier 
incarnations of the Florida plan-review process, see Stroud, supra note 119 (offering a history of this 
background).  
 123. California’s consistency requirements are codified as sections 65860, 66473.5, and 65583, subsection 
I of the California Government Code. Regarding Florida, see Stroud, supra note 119, at 400–01, 414 (describing 
emergence of consistency requirement in the early 1970s, and its preservation even during the 2009–2011 
“counter-revolution” against strong state oversight of local planning). In Washington, the courts seem somewhat 
ambivalent about the consistency requirement. Compare Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 
947 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Wash. 1997) (deeming the comprehensive plan only a “guide” or a “blueprint”), with King 
Cty. V. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 979 P.2d 374, 380 (Wash. 1999), as amended on denial 
of reconsideration (Sept. 22, 1999) (holding that urban growth boundaries designated in plan are binding). 
Oregon has strong consistency requirements, enforceable via “work task” orders that the state land-use agency 
may issue to local governments. See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.636 (2019); Liberty, supra note 119, at 10372. 
 124. In California and Washington, the population projections are made by the state’s department of finance. 
See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65584 et seq. (West 2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.62.035 (2019). In Oregon, they are 
made by a state university, see section 195.033 of the Oregon Revised Statutes, and in Florida, they are made by 
the state’s Office of Economic and Demographic Research, see section 163.3177 of the Florida Statutes. 
 125. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(f)(3); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.296(2) & 197.303(1); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 36.70A.070(2). 
 126. See generally CAL. MANUAL, supra note 121, at 18–21. 
 127. 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 1143 (adding CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65580 et seq.). 
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of each region’s quota (the “regional housing needs assessment,” or RHNA), the 
Councils are invited to provide information and propose methodologies for 
translating the state’s population forecasts into housing quotas.128 RHNAs are 
subdivided into four affordability bands: housing units to be produced over the 
planning cycle for households of very-low, low, moderate, and above-moderate 
incomes, respectively129 (“above-moderate” is code for market-rate housing).130 
Councils of Governments then allocate their region’s quotas among the member 
governments.131 This roughly resembles the process of determining and then 
allocating regional housing need in New Jersey, except that New Jersey 
considers only the need for subsidized housing, and New Jersey allocations have 
been made by courts or agencies, rather than by confederations of local 
governments.132 
Beyond the essential commonalities noted above—periodic planning to 
accommodate state-forecasted population growth, state review of the plan, and 
a duty to conform local law to the plan—the housing frameworks of the West 
Coast Model states differ in many important particulars.  
Consider how the planning mandate is enforced. In all of the West Coast 
Model states, local governments that fail to adopt a compliant housing element, 
on the state’s timeline, may lose access to certain streams of funding.133 In 
Washington, this appears to be the only consequence, and it is suffered only in 
the discretion of the governor.134 In California and Oregon, local governments 
that do not maintain a compliant plan also put their regulatory autonomy at risk. 
California’s courts and Oregon’s Land Conservation and Development 
Commission (LCDC) have enjoined non-compliant local governments from 
issuing land-use permits.135 In Oregon, permits issued by local governments that 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Darrel Ramsey-Musolf, Evaluating California’s Housing Element Law, Housing Equity, and Housing 
Production (1990–2007), 26 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 488, 491 (2016). 
 131. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65584.03 (West 2019). 
 132. In New Jersey, “regional need” is the sum of the region’s “present need” (defined as substandard or 
too-expensive housing now occupied by the region’s poorer residents) and projected “future need” (new housing 
for new poor families, per projected population growth). The “gap” between a local government’s prior-round 
affordable housing quota and its actual production during that planning cycle is also carried forward. See In re 
Declaratory Judgment Actions Filed by Various Municipalities, 152 A.3d 915 (N.J. 2017). 
 133. Regarding Washington, see WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.340–.345 (2019); Washington Department 
of Commerce Growth Management Submitting Materials, WASH. STATE DEP’T COMMERCE, 
https://www.commerce.wa.gov/serving-communities/growth-management/washington-department-of-
commerce-growth-management-submitting-materials/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). Regarding California, see 
DEP’T HOUS. AND CMTY. DEV., INCENTIVES FOR HOUSING ELEMENT COMPLIANCE (2009), 
http://www.hcd.ca.gov/community-development/housing-element/docs/loan_grant_hecompl011708.pdf. 
Regarding Oregon, see sections 197.319 through 197.335 of the Oregon Revised Statutes from 2017 and section 
660-045 of the Oregon Administrative Rules from 2017; see also Sullivan, supra note 119, at 391 (noting that 
these powers in Oregon are “now largely unused”) 
 134. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70a.330, 36.70a.340, 36.70a.345 (2019).  
 135. Regarding California, see Ben Field, Why Our Fair Share Housing Laws Fail, 34 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 35, 43–44, 47–50 (1993) (discussing cases). Regarding Oregon, see sections 197.319 through 197.335 of 
the Oregon Revised Statutes from 2011 and section 660-045 of the Oregon Administrative Rules from 2011. 
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lack an approved comprehensive plan may also be invalidated for not 
conforming to the state’s nineteen land-use goals.136 Though no West Coast 
Model state has established a full-blown builder’s remedy to enforce the 
planning duty,137 California has recently taken some steps in this direction,138 
and Oregon’s state-oversight body may remedy planning defaults by ordering 
development projects approved.139  
The West Coast Model states also differ in how they superintend plan 
implementation. In Oregon, the LCDC has authority to review actions and 
inactions by local governments at the implementation stage, and to issue 
prescriptive “work task” orders if the LCDC deems implementation 
inadequate.140 The commission also has broad rulemaking authority, which it 
has used to establish minimum zoning densities.141 By contrast, Washington’s 
oversight entity, the Growth Management Hearing Board (GMHB), has no 
authority to establish minimum densities or any other “public policy,” and its 
remedial powers are very limited.142 All it can do is forward its findings of 
noncompliance to the governor, who then decides whether to cut funding from 
the disobedient local government.143 In California, HCD lacks general 
rulemaking authority and has had virtually no oversight role with respect to plan 
implementation,144 although recent reforms are starting to change this.145  
California and Oregon have taken some steps to thwart local evasion of the 
plan at the project-permitting stage. Both states set time limits within which local 
 
 136. Local land use actions, such as rezonings and permit decisions, may be challenged before the state’s 
Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), and are reviewed for consistency with the state’s land use goals unless the 
jurisdiction has adopted an LCDC-approved land use plan. See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.835(5) (2017); Liberty, 
supra note 119, at 10371.  
 137. That is, an expedited, burden-shifting procedure for developers in jurisdictions without an approved 
plan to bypass local ordinances and obtain permits from a state decision maker. 
 138. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 69–72 (4th ed. 2013).  
 139. More specifically, the LCDC may order “such interim measures as the commission deems necessary 
to ensure compliance with the statewide planning goals.” OR. REV. STAT. § 197.636 (2017).  
[It] shall, as part of its order, limit, prohibit or require the approval by the local government of 
applications for subdivisions, partitions, building permits, limited land use decisions or land use 
decisions until the plan, land use regulation or subsequent land use decisions and limited land use 
decisions are brought into compliance. 
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.335 (2017) (emphasis added). Oregon’s Land Use Board of Appeals also has authority to 
order projects approved. See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.835(10) (2017); Walter v. City of Eugene, 73 Or. LUBA 
356, 362, aff'd, 383 P.3d 1009 (Or. Ct. App. 2016). 
 140. See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.636(2) (2017); see, e.g., BILL KLOOS, FAIR HOUSING COUNCIL OF OREGON—
PLANNING FOR HOUSING: DON’T FORGET THE BASICS 18 (May 15, 2008) (citing LCDC Compliance Order (Aug. 
23, 1982) and Staff Report (Aug. 19, 1982) at 28-19); id. (citing LCDC Work Task Order 02-WKTASK-001412, 
at 4 (June 27, 2002) (faulting planned development overlay zoning for insufficient clarity).  
 141. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-07-035 (adopted 1981). 
 142. Viking Properties, Inc. v. Holm, 118 P.3d 322, 331 (Wash. 2005) (en banc).  
 143. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.70A.330, 36.70A.340, 36.70A.345 (2019).  
 144. See Baer, supra note 119, at 56–60; CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65585(a) (West 2019).  
 145. See infra text accompanying note 211.  
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governments must act on permit applications,146 and local governments may 
deny permits only on the basis of objective standards (Washington and Florida 
do not have such requirements). 147 In California, the housing element must 
include an analysis of constraints to the “development of housing for all income 
levels,”148 and a “schedule of actions” to “[a]ddress and, where appropriate and 
legally possible, remove constraints.”149  
Finally, the West Coast Model states vary in the strength of their 
commitment to periodic plan revision. At one end of the spectrum is California 
and, arguably, Washington. California, as we have seen, periodically assesses 
regional housing needs and requires local governments to update their housing 
elements shortly after receiving RHNA allocations.150 In Washington, local 
governments must update urban growth boundaries on the official cycle if the 
state’s forecast of local population growth has changed since the last round.151 
In Oregon, by contrast, the theory of periodic plan revision has given way to a 
practice of ad-hoc amendment.152 Oregon, by statute, requires most urban 
communities to revise their plans on a regular cycle,153 but LCDC regulations 
have exempted local governments that choose other, simplified procedures for 
plan amendments.154 Ed Sullivan, a veteran of the Oregon scene, reports that 
periodic review outside of the Portland metro area has become virtually a dead 
letter, and that piecemeal plan amendments provide little opportunity for LCDC 
to examine local housing policies.155 Florida’s abandonment of periodic, state-
supervised plan revision has been even more thoroughgoing.156  
 
 146. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65950 (West 2019) (requiring final action on housing development permits 
within 60-180 days of completion of environmental review); OR. REV. STAT § 227.178 (2017) (requiring final 
action on development permits, including resolution of all appeals, within 120 days of date application is deemed 
complete); OR. REV. STAT § 197.311 (2017) (requiring final action including resolution of internal appeals 
within 100 days on certain types of affordable housing projects). 
 147. See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.307(4) (2017) (“Except as provided in subsection (6) of this section, a local 
government may adopt and apply only clear and objective standards, conditions and procedures regulating the 
development of housing, including needed housing [on buildable land].”); Honchariw v. Cty. Of Stanislaus, 132 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 874, 875–76, 880 (2011) (discussing the objective standards requirement and tracing it to a bill 
enacted in 1999). 
 148. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65583(a)(5)– 65583(a)(6) (West 2019). 
 149. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65583(3) (West 2019). 
 150. See supra notes 122, 126–131 and accompanying text. 
 151. See Clallam Cty. V. Dry Creek Coal., 255 P.3d 709, 712 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (“The Growth Board 
determined that a county is required to revise its [urban growth area] designations when OFM population 
projections change. RCW 36.70A.130(3)(b).”); see also 36 WASH. PRAC., WASHINGTON LAND USE § 5:12 
(2018) (“UGAs . . . [shall] provide densities[] ‘sufficient to permit the urban growth that is projected [by the 
State Office of Financial Management] to occur in the county or city for the succeeding twenty-year period.’” 
(footnote omitted)).  
 152. See Sullivan, supra note 119, at 392–93. 
 153. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.629 (2017). 
 154. See OR. ADMIN. R. 660-038-0020(15), 660-038-0210(2) (2018).  
 155. Telephone Interview with Edward J. Sullivan, Adjunct Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School (Oct. 1, 
2018).  
 156. In 2011, the Florida legislature repealed the formerly mandatory duty of local governments to update 
and submit general plans for state review on a seven-year cycle. FLA. STAT. § 163.3191 (2010) (repealed 2011); 
Stroud, supra note 119, at 412. Now it suffices for local governments to write a septennial letter reporting their 
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2. Critiques 
Critiques of the West Coast Model are, to some extent, state-specific, 
which should hardly be surprising given the differences described above. The 
critiques are also time-specific, especially as to California, whose state housing 
framework has undergone big changes since the early 2000s and especially over 
the last few years. But measured by results, the West Coast Model has been a 
disappointment everywhere. 
Oregon and Washington have achieved somewhat denser patterns of 
housing development than other similar states, which is consistent with their 
stated goal of confining growth within urban boundaries while producing 
sufficient housing.157 Yet “the increase in [Portland and Seattle’s] . . . rate of 
housing production pales in comparison to what similarly-sized cities like 
Phoenix and Atlanta have achieved through outward expansion.”158 And despite 
the Oregon LCDC’s unique authority to establish minimum densities and direct 
the implementation of comprehensive plans, ninety percent of the residential 
land in Oregon’s largest city remains zoned for single-family homes.159 
Since California adopted its RHNA framework in 1980, the state has 
become the poster child for housing policy dysfunction. A prominent 2005 study 
found that local governments in California with state-approved housing 
elements issued no more building permits than noncompliant jurisdictions, 
controlling for observable jurisdiction-level characteristics.160 A more recent 
study finds some evidence that localities with approved housing elements 
developed more BMR housing—but less market-rate housing—than similar 
localities without certified housing elements.161  
 
self-assessed need for plan amendments. FLA. STAT. § 163.3191(1) (2019). According to leading land-use 
attorney, Nancy Stroud, the housing element of a newly formed Florida municipality will get a careful look and 
be rejected by the state if it does not accommodate forecasted population growth, but municipalities are 
effectively on their own once they have an initial, state-approved plan in place. Telephone Interview with Nancy 
E. Stroud, Of Counsel, Lewis, Stroud & Deutsch, P.L. (Oct. 2, 2018). 
 157. See Issi Romem, Can U.S. Cities Compensate for Curbing Sprawl by Growing Denser?, BUILDZOOM 
(Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.buildzoom.com/blog/can-cities-compensate-for-curbing-sprawl-by-growing-
denser. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Diller & Sullivan, supra note 119, at 225 n.224 (reporting figures as of Dec. 23, 2017). 
 160. Paul G. Lewis, Can State Review of Local Planning Increase Housing Production?, 16 HOUSING POL’Y 
DEBATE 173 (2005).  
 161. See Ramsey-Musolf, supra note 130 (comparing jurisdictions in the Los Angeles and Sacramento 
regions with and without approved housing elements). A problem with studies in this vein is that rich 
jurisdictions are likely to have more planning capacity, greater NIMBYism, and more opportunities to extract 
rents through inclusionary-zoning requirements than poor jurisdictions; and planning capacity is probably 
correlated with having an approved housing element. This would bias the results of studies that treat jurisdictions 
without an approved element as counterfactuals for jurisdictions with an approved element, unless one has good 
measures of planning capacity and NIMBYism. For a case study of two Silicon Valley suburbs which suggests 
that California’s framework is becoming more effective, see Jessie Agatstein, The Suburbs’ Fair Share: How 
California’s Housing Element Law (and Facebook) Can Set a Housing Production Floor, 44 REAL EST. L.J. 
219 (2015). 
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So what went wrong? One must be a bit circumspect in answering this 
question, because there is no state whose land-use interventions have been 
shown to expand the supply of housing substantially. I would venture, however, 
that the failures of the West Coast Model are at least partly due to (1) the use of 
projected household growth rather than market conditions to set housing-supply 
targets, and (2) a misplaced presumption of local good faith with respect to the 
design and implementation of land-use plans.  
a. Aiming at the Wrong Target 
The West Coast Model improves on its Northeastern counterpart by 
recognizing that local governments may over-restrict market-rate housing 
development.162 It also furnishes a procedural framework for negotiating 
regional (California)163 or countywide (Washington and Oregon)164 housing 
goals in advance of discrete rezoning and project-permitting decisions.165 But 
the West Coast Model launches these negotiations with a specific target in mind, 
and the target is perverse: accommodating projected household growth.166 
A region that has allowed little new housing will have a depressed rate of 
new household formation, but this hardly means that the region has little need 
for new housing. On the contrary, if many people want to live in the region, the 
barriers to new housing will manifest in sky-high prices for existing housing; 
this, in turn, slows the rate of new household formation.167 Young adults who 
cannot afford a place of their own will live with their parents or stacked up with 
roommates. The corresponding slowdown in the rate of household formation 
yields a smaller projection of “regional housing need,” while the economic 
reality is exactly the opposite.168 
 
 162. See supra text accompanying notes 121–125. 
 163. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65584 et seq. (West 2019); CAL. MANUAL 18–21; see also supra text 
accompanying note 121. 
 164. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 197.296(2) (2017) (regarding zoning in Oregon); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 36.70A.106 (2019) (regarding the submission process in Washington); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 121–123. In practice, county-level coordination never worked very well in Oregon, and the 
state’s population forecaster now tells each city in a county how much growth it shall accommodate. See 
Sullivan, supra note 121, at 59–65. 
 165. As Rick Hills and David Schleicher have emphasized, such procedural frameworks can reduce the 
impact of NIMBYism on land use decisions, if there’s a viable mechanism to enforce the agreements. See infra 
Subpart IV.B.2.  
 166. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65584 et seq. (West 2019). 
 167. See Sarah Mawhorter, Housing Policies in California Cities: Seeking Local Solutions to a Statewide 
Shortfall (Dec. 2018) (unpublished working paper), http://californialanduse.org/working-papers.html.  
 168. California law also presumes that “housing need” for new households at a particular income level can 
only be accommodated with new housing units, which are sold or rented at a price those households can afford—
hence the division of the RHNA into units for very-low, low, moderate, and above-moderate income households. 
This overlooks the effect of new construction—or its absence—on the price of existing units. If the market 
produces loads of new luxury housing, some people will trade up, and existing less-fancy units will become 
more affordable. Conversely, if there are serious barriers to meeting demand for new luxury units, developers 
will scoop up existing less-fancy homes, renovate them, and put them on the market as luxurious, like-new units. 
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Because population and household growth in high-demand regions is 
endogenous to housing supply, it makes little sense to fix supply targets on the 
basis of population projections. Oregon all but acknowledges this point. 
Regulations issued in 2014 tell the state’s population forecaster to account for 
local governments’ “[p]lanned new housing,” “[e]xpected changes to zoning 
designations or density,” and “[a]dopted policies regarding population 
growth.”169 Yet other Oregon laws tell local governments to gauge their housing 
needs and draw urban boundaries on the basis of the population forecast.170 Thus 
does the planning dog chase its own tail.  
The absurdity of basing housing-need determinations on population 
forecasts is well illustrated by the fact that, for the current planning cycle in 
California, the city of Beverly Hills—with a median home price of roughly $3.5 
million171—received an affordable housing quota of precisely three units, and a 
market-rate quota of zero units.172 When journalists noticed this and began 
asking snarky questions, the city’s leadership responded that the tiny allocations 
were reasonable because Beverly Hills’s population was not growing.173 
According to the traditional logic of the West Coast Model, the city’s leadership 
had it exactly right. And this illustrates just how wrong it is for states to base 
local housing obligations on population-growth projections. Under any sane 
regime, a region comprised of Beverly Hillses—of cities that have utterly 
stanched population growth despite astronomical demand—would be 
presumptively categorized as having enormous unmet housing need.174  
Or consider that San Francisco County, which as of this writing “has the 
highest total RHNA target assigned relative to population” of all counties in the 
state,175 is expected to accommodate a mere 7.5% increase in its housing stock 
over the 2014–2022 planning cycle.176 More than 60% of San Francisco’s target 
consists of subsidized, below-market-rate units that will not be built for decades, 
 
 169. PORTLAND STATE UNIV., FORECAST AND DELIVERABLES, 577‐050‐0050(3) (2019), 
https://www.pdx.edu/ogc/sites/www.pdx.edu.ogc/files/Amended%20577-050-0050%20Forecast%20Process% 
20and%20Deliverables.pdf. For a history of Oregon population forecasting, see Sullivan, supra note 121. 
 170. See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.296(2) (2017); see also supra text accompanying note 121. 
 171. Beverly Hills Home Prices & Values, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/108ncinit-hills-ca/home-
values/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2019).  
 172. Thomas Fuller & Conor Dougherty, California Today: The Beverly Hills Affordable Housing 
Loophole, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/05/us/california-today-beverly-hills-
affordable-housing.html.  
 173. Minneapolis Just Eliminated Single-Family Zoning. Should California Cities Follow Suit?, GIMME 
SHELTER: THE CALIFORNIA HOUSING CRISIS PODCAST (Dec. 27, 2018), 
https://calmatters.org/housing/2018/12/minneapolis-bans-single-family-zoning-should-california/. 
 174. I say “presumptively” because a state might reasonably decide that some regions with high housing 
prices and low growth should be allowed to stay that way—say, because of historic preservation or 
environmental concerns.  
 175. NEXT10, MISSING THE MARK: EXAMINING THE SHORTCOMINGS OF CALIFORNIA’S HOUSING GOALS 29 
(Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.next10.org/housing-goals.  
 176. The city’s RHNA share for the current planning cycle totals 28,870 units, and its housing stock circa 
2013 totaled 376,081 units. See S.F. GEN. PLAN, 2014 HOUSING ELEMENT, at PART I (2015) [hereinafter 2014 
HOUSING ELEMENT]. 
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if ever. They will not be built because, as the city’s housing element frankly 
acknowledges, producing that much below-market housing would require a 
stunning $7.3 billion in subsidies.177  
This is not normal or healthy. San Francisco, one of the nation’s most 
expensive housing markets, should be producing new market-rate housing at 
many times the rate contemplated by its RHNA allocation. Whereas San 
Francisco’s eight-year target for market-rate units corresponds to a housing-
stock expansion of less than 3%, the economically productive metropolises in 
our nation’s more affordable regions increased their housing stock by 30%–60% 
over just the period from 2000 to 2013.178 The Charlestons, Atlantas, and 
Phoenixes of the world didn’t manage this feat with billion upon billion in public 
subsidies. They did it simply by allowing developers to build.179 San Francisco 
should too—but it won’t face much pressure to do so unless it’s assigned a much 
bigger RHNA for unsubsidized housing. 
This is not to say that there is one uniquely best or most defensible way to 
set housing-supply targets. But if West Coast Model states were serious about 
the problems canvassed in Part I, they would be well advised to tie local housing 
quotas to good indicators of unmet demand (such as housing prices that 
substantially exceed the usual costs of production),180 as well as actual or 
potential access to job centers via convenient, non-greenhouse-gas-intensive 
modes of commuting.  
Or, more simply, the state might require every local government to zone 
for a substantial increase in housing supply, and then let the market determine 
which regions shall grow. In recognition of the fact that the affordable metro 
areas of the South and Southwest managed to increase their housing supply by 
30%–60% in barely more than a decade,181 policymakers in a high-cost state 
might decide that local governments should plan for a potential 50% increase in 
housing supply, and maintain this “potential growth buffer” through decennial 
revisions of the general plan and zoning maps. A state agency would review the 
periodic revisions, rejecting those that fail to demonstrate potential for 50% 
growth (relative to the then-current housing stock), or that assign the buffer to 
difficult-to-develop sites. 
The details of such a scheme are far beyond the scope of this Article. For 
now, suffice it to observe that West Coast Model states are not going to solve 
the housing-supply problem so long as cities or regions can effectively pick their 
 
 177. Id. at I.101. 
 178. See Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 28, at 16, 19 fig.3. 
 179. See Joseph Gyourko et al., A New Measure of the Local Regulatory Environment for Housing Markets: 
The Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index, 45 URB. STUD. 693 (2008) (documenting geographic 
variation in the stringency of land-use regulation). 
 180. Cf. Issi Romem, Paying For Dirt: Where Have Home Values Detached From Construction Costs?, 
BUILDZOOM (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.buildzoom.com/blog/paying-for-dirt-where-have-home-values-
detached-from-construction-costs (providing metro-area estimates of construction costs and home values). 
 181. See Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 28, at 19 fig.3. 
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own housing quotas by enacting onerous controls that curtail population growth 
notwithstanding high demand.  
b. The Misplaced Presumption of Good Faith 
A key takeaway from the political science and economics research 
surveyed in Part I is that homeowners wield outsized influence over local 
governments, and that the self-interest of incumbent homeowners is at war with 
the public interest in expanding the housing stock of high-cost metro areas. Yet 
the West Coast Model states have tacitly assumed that local governments will 
try diligently and in good faith to meet the state’s housing targets. This 
presumption of good faith is manifested in the standards for judicial review of 
local housing plans, and in the lack of a robust state-law framework to prevent 
or deter local governments from evading commitments in their state-approved 
plans. 
Begin with judicial review. California courts have long treated housing 
elements as “legislative enactments” entitled to the usual presumption of validity 
that other legislation enjoys—even if the state agency has rejected the housing 
element in question.182 So long as the housing element “contain[s] the elements 
mandated by the statute,” the courts will uphold it.183 Whether it actually enables 
construction of the required number of units has been deemed irrelevant as 
matter of law to the housing element’s validity.184  
In Washington and Florida, the reviewing state agency cannot make 
binding determinations about the validity of a housing plan, but may challenge 
the plan before an administrative tribunal.185 In both states, “comprehensive 
plans and development regulations . . . are presumed valid upon adoption,”186 
 
 182. See, e.g., Fonseca v. City of Gilroy, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 374, 387 (Ct. App. 2007) (restating and applying 
doctrine that housing element is a legislative enactment subject to strong presumption of validity, 
notwithstanding agency disapproval); Buena Vista Gardens Apartments Ass’n v. City of San Diego Planning 
Dep’t., 220 Cal. Rptr. 732, 737, 739 (Ct. App. 1985) (stating that “the appropriate standard of appellate review 
is whether the local . . . [government] has acted ‘arbitrarily, capriciously, or without evidentiary basis,’” and 
upholding housing element notwithstanding state agency’s rejection of it for want of, inter alia, “a 
comprehensive five-year schedule of actions” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)). For a 
review of other cases to similar effect, see Field, supra note 135, at 54–61. 
 183. Fonseca, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 387. 
 184. Id. at 382 (“[J]udicial review of a housing element for substantial compliance with the statutory 
requirements does not involve an examination of the merits of the element,” that is, “whether the programs 
adopted are adequate to meet their objectives.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Black Prop. 
Owners Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305 (Ct. App. 1994)); Buena Vista Gardens, 220 Cal. Rptr. 
at 737 (treating agency’s view of workability of plan as a “merits” question not for courts to consider in judging 
plan’s validity).  
 185. In Washington, this adjudicator is the specialized Growth Management Hearing Board. See 24 WASH. 
PRAC., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & PRACTICE § 18.3 (2d ed. 2019). In Florida, it’s the general-purpose Division of 
Administrative Hearings. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3184 (2019). 
 186. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.320(1) (2019). There is an exception for certain coastal development 
regulations. See id. 
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and the burden of proof is on the party challenging them.187 Washington’s 
administrative tribunal “shall find compliance” unless it determines that the plan 
or development regulation at issue “is clearly erroneous.”188  
Only Oregon has firmly rejected judicial deference to local governments 
with respect to the plan. Approval by the LCDC is necessary to make a 
comprehensive plan legally effective,189 and Oregon courts give LCDC actions 
the usual deference afforded to administrative rules and orders.190  
Beyond the legal standards for housing plan validity, the tacit presumption 
of good faith is also manifested in the lack of backstopping measures to 
counteract local evasion of duly adopted plans. Zoning and other local 
ordinances must be consistent with the plan, but consistency challenges have to 
be brought within a brief window of time following enactment of the ordinance 
at issue,191 and courts strongly defer to local governments when evaluating 
consistency.192  
California and Oregon purport to limit local evasion of the plan at the 
project-permitting stage, by requiring local agencies to use only “objective” 
standards,193 and to act on project applications within a fixed, reasonably short 
period of time.194 But these strictures are less binding than they appear, and their 
weakness represents another manifestation of the tacit presumption of good 
faith. For example, time limits under California’s Permit Streamlining Act kick 
in only after the local government has completed reviews under the California 
Environmental Quality Act and resolved any internal appeals.195 
Environmental appeals of municipal decisions are heard by the city council.196 
 
 187. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.320(2) (2019); see also FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(5)(2)(a) (2019) (stating 
that plans rejected by the state agency still enjoy a presumption of validity, and that it is the agency’s burden to 
prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that the comprehensive plan or plan amendment is not in compliance” 
with state law). 
 188. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.320(3) (2019). 
 189. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.319–.335 (2017); OR. ADMIN. R. 660–045 (2018). 
 190. See, e.g., 1000 Friends of Or. V. Land Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 724 P.2d 268, 284 (Or. 1986) 
(en banc) (extending deference to LCDC interpretations of law); City of Happy Valley v. LCDC, 677 P.2d 43, 
46 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (applying abuse-of-discretion review to LCDC decision rejecting plan). 
 191. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65860(b) (West 2019) (90 days). 
 192. See Marracci v. City of Scappoose, 552 P.2d 552, 553 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (rejecting developer’s 
argument that project that complied with the plan could not be denied on basis of more restrictive zoning 
ordinance, on ground that it was local government’s prerogative to decide when and how to evolve “more 
restrictive zoning ordinances . . . toward conformity with more permissive provisions of the plan”); see also 
CECILY TALBERT BARCLAY & MATTHEW S. GRAY, CALIFORNIA LAND USE & PLANNING LAW 25–26, 46–47 
(36th ed. 2018) (discussing “arbitrary and capricious” and “no reasonable person” standards in California). The 
California courts have been more willing to enforce those policies of the general plan that the courts deem to be 
“fundamental, mandatory and clear.” See, e.g., Ideal Boat & Camper Storage v. Cnty of Alameda, 145 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 417, 425 (Ct. App. 2012). 
 193. See Honchariw v. Cty. of Stanislaus, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 874, 875–76, 880 (2011) (discussing objective 
standards requirement and tracing it to a bill enacted in 1999); see also supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 194. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65950 (West 2019); see also supra text accompanying note 146. 
 195. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65950(a); Eller Media Co. v. City of L.A., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 262, 264 (Ct. 
App. 2001). 
 196. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21151 (West 2019). 
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So if a city councilmember wants to kill a housing project in her district, she can 
always insist on further, better, or different environmental analyses. Once the 
clock finally starts to run on the developer’s permit application, local officials 
may “encourage” the developer to withdraw and resubmit it,197 perhaps 
suggesting that if only this or that change were made, the application would more 
likely be approved. Or the decisionmaker may approve the project with 
conditions that make it tough to build or market. Weird or unexpected conditions 
might be challenged on the theory that the underlying development standard 
violates the state’s objectivity requirement, but this is a crapshoot. Objectivity is 
a matter of degree,198 and in any event, California’s objectivity requirement only 
governs conditions that reduce a project’s density or render it “infeasible.”199  
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the tacit presumption of good faith 
is reflected in the lack of any material consequences for local governments that 
fail to meet their housing targets. Prior to the 2017 California housing package 
(discussed in the next Part), no West Coast Model state had enacted statutory 
ex-post punishments tied to actual housing construction over the planning cycle. 
This is in sharp contrast to the Northeastern Model states, which expose 
jurisdictions that fail to meet their BMR-housing targets to the feared builder’s 
remedy.200 Though Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New Jersey provide for 
plan-based exemptions from the builder’s remedy, Massachusetts and Rhode 
Island extend this exemption only to local governments making adequate yearly 
progress toward their affordable-housing goals.201  
In principle, housing agencies in the West Coast Model states could 
incentivize local follow-through by announcing that the agency will review a 
locality’s next plan very harshly if the local government fails to meet its housing 
targets under the current plan. Cities hoping to avoid fiscal and regulatory 
sanctions for not having an approved plan would then have good reason to 
permit the housing for which they planned. But to induce compliance in this 
way, the state agency must have authority to reject a housing plan as unlikely to 
work, given the local government’s track record. California law historically 
would not allow this, and the presumption of validity in Washington and Florida 
works against it too.202  
Putting all these pieces together—the inane, population-forecast metric of 
housing need; the deference to local governments on the substance of their plans; 
 
 197. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65943 (West 2019) (stipulating that clock restarts with each resubmission of 
an application). 
 198. Cf. Rogue Valley Ass’n of Realtors v. City of Ashland, No. 97-260, slip op. at 17 (Or. LUBA Sept. 24, 
1998) (“[F]ew tasks are less clear or more subjective than attempting to determine whether a particular land use 
approval criterion is clear and objective.”). 
 199. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65589.5(d) (West 2019). 
 200. See supra Subpart II.A. 
 201. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. In New Jersey, the prospect of a court-ordered builder’s 
remedy hangs over all local land use decisions, so local governments disregard outcomes at their peril. See supra 
text accompanying note 99. 
 202. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65589.5(d) (West 2019); FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(5)(2)(a) (2019); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 36.70A.320(2) (2019). 
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the barriers to consistency challenges; the lack of an expeditious procedure for 
permitting projects that conform to the plan but violate contrary local 
ordinances; and the failure to punish or reward local governments on the basis 
of housing outcomes—one cannot help but wonder whether the state legislators 
who forged the West Coast Model were themselves acting in good faith. Did 
they really mean to overcome local barriers to the supply of an adequate amount 
of new housing, or was the mandate to plan for “needed housing” just a means 
of prettifying some other agenda?203 
III.  THE NEW YIMBY MEASURES 
Legal scholars and economists who write about housing-supply barriers 
have tended to regard state-level interventions skeptically, if at all.204 Their 
skepticism is rooted in the risk that state control of local land-use regulation will 
enable local homevoter coalitions to band together into regional cartels.205 In the 
absence of state control, the argument goes, developers should be able to buy off 
some local governments in a region and thereby increase the regional housing 
supply.206 But once the state gets involved, antidevelopment interests can wield 
state law to make every local government establish rigid growth boundaries, 
onerous inclusionary zoning ordinances, or other restrictions that stanch the 
regional supply of new housing.  
The state-cartelization thesis may be overdrawn—local governments have 
proven themselves quite capable of coordinating exclusionary policies without 
directives from the state207—but the traditional Northeastern and West Coast 
Models do not inspire much confidence in the states’ ability to intervene 
constructively in local land use. And yet, as housing prices in the expensive 
metro areas rocketed upward following the Great Recession of 2007–2009, the 
states, led by California, responded with forceful measures to increase the supply 
of market-rate as well as BMR housing. This Part explains California’s 
 
 203. In Oregon and Washington, the “other agenda” was presumably the establishment of urban growth 
boundaries. In California, the other agenda is less apparent, but it may have been to support developers of BMR 
housing (much like the Northeastern Model); cf. Ramsey-Musolf, supra note 130 (finding, during study period, 
that jurisdictions with approved housing elements produce more BMR housing, but less market-rate housing, 
than jurisdictions without approved housing elements). 
 204. See, e.g., FISCHEL, ZONING RULES, supra note 4, at 54–57, 365–67 (discussing weakness of state 
housing requirements, and concluding with a dozen-item menu of suggestions for combatting housing supply 
restrictions, on which the “state planning mandate” is not mentioned). One exception is an article by John 
Infranca, written independently of this Article, which also discusses state ADU and density mandates. See John 
Infranca, The New State Zoning: Land Use Preemption Amid a Housing Crisis, 60 B.C. L. REV 823 (2019). 
Infranca focuses on upzoning by state statute, whereas I think the more promising reforms concern housing 
quotas and the nature of the plan. See infra Parts III & IV. 
 205. See, e.g., FISCHEL, ZONING RULES, supra note 4, at 307 (suggesting that homeowners in Portland metro 
area favor regional controls as a means of restricting housing supply); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth 
Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 434–35 (1977) (discussing this risk). 
 206. See Ellickson, supra note 205, at 404–10 (arguing that developer influence means that exclusionary 
practices by some homogenous suburbs are unlikely to distort allocation of housing and people across metro 
areas). 
 207. See supra Part I. 
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reworking of its housing framework, as well as recent initiatives in California 
and other states to curtail the locally popular practice of zoning developable land 
exclusively for single-family homes on large lots.  
Pushing the state-level interventions is a nascent Yes In My Backyard 
(YIMBY) movement.208 YIMBY groups are springing up around the country to 
lobby for more housing at the state and local levels.209 The YIMBYs’ state-
legislative and fundraising successes warrant a rethinking of the state-
cartelization thesis, a point to which I shall return below. 
A. CALIFORNIA STRENGTHENS THE WEST COAST MODEL  
Starting around 2005 and accelerating a decade later, California passed a 
flurry of bills that try to answer critiques of the West Coast Model. In 2017 
alone, the legislature enacted a fifteen-bill housing package. The state is feeling 
its way toward a better way of setting housing-supply targets, and the tacit 
presumption of good faith on the part of local governments is under attack.  
1. Devising a Better Target 
California Senate Bill 828 (SB 828), enacted in 2018, begins to establish a 
new ground norm for RHNAs, the regional housing targets.210 The bill was a 
political compromise and leaves in place the old idea of tying housing quotas to 
population projections, while adding a new overlay of administrative discretion 
to plump up regional quotas on the basis of a nationally normed affordability 
goal.211 Determinations of housing need are to account for the percentage of 
“cost burdened” households in the region (households spending more than 30% 
of their income on housing), relative to “the rate of housing cost burden for a 
healthy housing market.”212 The “healthy housing market” standard is in turn 
defined as a cost-burden rate “no more than the average [such rate] in 
comparable regions throughout the nation.”213 Similarly, the “overcrowding 
 
 208. See Kenneth Stahl, “Yes in My Backyard”: Can a New Pro-Housing Movement Overcome the Power 
of NIMBYs?, 41 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., Mar. 2018.   
 209. See Stahl, supra note 208; see also YIMBY, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YIMBY (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2019). 
 210. S.B. 828, 2017–2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018). SB 828 builds on a measure passed a year earlier, A.B. 1068, 
which curtailed Council of Governments (COG) authority to deviate from the state’s official population forecast, 
and which added “[t]he percentage of renters’ households that are overcrowded” as a factor to be weighed when 
converting the population forecast into RHNA quotas. See Assemb. B. 1086, 2017-2018 Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 
2017) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65584, 65584.01, 65584.05 (West 2019)). 
 211. The bill, as passed initially by the state senate, provided that HCD “shall grant allowances” for the 
factors discussed in this paragraph, but the state assembly removed this language in favor of a more permissive 
authorization “to make adjustments.” See 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVersionsCompareClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB828&cversion
=20170SB82895AMD. 
 212. S.B. 828 § 2 (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65584.01(b)). 
 213. Id. 
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rate” among renter households should be “no more than the average 
overcrowding rate in comparable regions throughout the nation.”214  
SB 828 is a very important development in the housing policy dialectic. 
The bill explicitly confronts, and condemns, the way in which exclusionary 
jurisdictions have, until now, been rewarded for their exclusion with small 
housing quotas.215 The idea of a nationally normed “healthy markets” standard 
represents a new and facially plausible alternative to setting housing quotas on 
the basis of population trends.216 But the bill’s metric of housing-market health 
is problematic: the “percentage of cost burdened households” fails to account 
for the effect of prices on population flows. As housing becomes more expensive 
in supply-constrained markets, less affluent residents are evicted or bought out 
and leave for cheaper pastures, and only rich people choose to move in.217 This 
tends to equalize the share of cost-burdened households across supply-
constrained and unconstrained regions.218 Indeed, in economic models with 
costless mobility, an interregional disparity in the percentage of household 
income spent on housing will persist only if certain regions offer locational 
amenities not found elsewhere.219 So, ironically, the fact that a region has a 
persistently large share of cost-burdened households may indicate that it is doing 
a very good job protecting environmental and other characteristics which make 
it desirable, not that it suffers from welfare-reducing supply constraints.  
These conceptual problems notwithstanding, California’s housing agency 
may still manage to ramp up housing quotas using the authority granted by SB 
828. Specifically, the housing agency could try to convert disequilibrium 
changes in the share of cost-burdened households into bigger RHNAs for the 
state’s expensive, supply-constrained regions. Because moving between regions 
is costly, supply-constrained regions experiencing positive economic shocks are 
 
 214. Id. 
 215. S.B. 828 § 3 (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65584.04(f)) (stating that neither “[p]rior 
underproduction of housing . . . from the previous regional housing needs allocation” nor “[s]table population 
numbers” shall be “a justification for a determination or a reduction in a jurisdiction’s share of the regional 
housing need”).  
 216. And the bill’s influence may be spilling across state lines: Oregon is about to launch its first state-
directed regional housing needs assessment, and has authorized the state housing agency to consider not only 
population forecasts, but also “economic trends” and “trends in density and . . . urban residential development.” 
H.B. 2003 § 1, Gen. Assemb, Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019). Oregon has also told local governments estimating housing 
need to “adopt findings related to changes in,” inter alia, “housing costs” and “household incomes.” Or. HB 
2003 § 10(a). 
 217. See, e.g., ROMEM & KNEEBONE, supra note 25 (finding that the San Francisco Bay Area has the greatest 
socioeconomic disparity between its in-migrants, who tend to be rich, and its out-migrants, who tend to be poor, 
of all metro areas in the United States). 
 218. Tellingly, the share of cost-burdened households in the San Francisco region is smaller than that in the 
Riverside-San Bernardino region. See California’s High Housing Costs: Causes and Consequences, 
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE (Mar. 16, 2015), https://lao.ca.gov/Infographics/californias-high-housing-
costs. This is the case even though the price of housing relative to replacement cost in the San Francisco region 
is almost twice as high as in the San Bernardino-Riverside region. See Romem, supra note 180. 
 219. See, e.g., Albouy and Ehrlich., supra note 41(presenting model in which high housing costs relative to 
wage persist in equilibrium only because of locational amenities). 
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also likely to experience at least temporary increases in the share of cost-
burdened and overcrowded households.220 In the fall of 2019, HCD used its new 
authority to triple the RHNA for the Southern California Association of 
Governments. 221 
To be sure, newly ambitious RHNAs under SB 828 might not achieve very 
much if California’s courts continue to give unstinting deference to local 
governments’ housing elements, and if even the best of plans come to naught 
because there are no guardrails on implementation. But California has started 
responding to these critiques as well.  
2. Upending the Presumption of Local Good Faith 
I suggested earlier that if a state took seriously the political economy of 
local land use, the state would presume bad faith rather than good faith with 
respect to the design and implementation of the housing element, and backstop 
approved housing elements with strong measures to combat local governments’ 
evasion of their state-approved plans.222 California is starting to take this idea to 
heart.  
a. The Standard for a “Substantially Compliant” Housing 
Element  
California has not expressly abrogated the courts’ deferential, check-the-
boxes test for the validity of a housing element,223 but local governments can no 
longer count on judicial or administrative tolerance of dysfunctional housing 
plans. HCD now openly rejects the courts’ gloss on substantial compliance, 
applying a more functional test (at least since 2012) and all but inviting legal 
challenge.224 In 2017, the legislature authorized HCD to review housing-element 
implementation and, upon discovering a serious failure of implementation, to 
rescind the agency’s finding that the housing element substantially complies 
with state law.225 This new emphasis on implementation is hard to square with 
the courts’ longstanding position that substantial compliance is just a matter of 
 
 220. Price controls—rent control and BMR deed restrictions—may mute this. 
 221. Liam Dillon, Southern California Must Plan for 1.3 Million New Homes in the Next Decade, Newsom 
Says, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2019) https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-08-22/southern-california-
housing-growth. 
 222. See supra Subpart II.B.2. 
 223. Regarding the traditional test, see supra notes 182–184 and accompanying text. 
 224. See Barbara E. Kautz, Housing Elements: Beware of What You Promise (Sept. 19, 2013) (unpublished 
working paper) (criticizing a 2012 letter from HCD to the Association of Bay Area Governments, in which the 
agency wrote: “While a court may review a housing element to find whether it contains the elements mandated 
by the statute, the Department’s review considers the adequacy of information, program commitments, and 
timeframes to meet various statutory goals and objectives”) https://www.cacities.org/ 
UploadedFiles/LeagueInternet/28/288f671f-501d-4ce4-9099-557bd10ef7f0.pdf. 
 225. Assemb. B. 72, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2017) (adding CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65585(i)(1)(a) 
(West 2019) (A.B. 72). The first enforcement action under A.B. 72 was filed against a city that amended a 
specific plan in a manner that conflicted with the housing element. See Complaint, Cal. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. 
Dev. v. City of Huntington Beach, No. 30-2019-01046493-CU-JR-CJC (Cal. Sup. Ct. Jan. 25, 2019).  
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whether the housing element “contains the elements mandated by the statute.”226 
So too is a new requirement that local governments allocate their RHNA shares 
to imminently developable sites,227 as is a fairly recent statutory provision 
encouraging affordable-housing developers to challenge housing elements’ 
assignment of RHNA shares to sites.228 The California Supreme Court, which 
has yet to address what constitutes a substantially compliant housing element, 
may eventually conclude that the legislature has tacitly ratified HCD’s gloss on 
substantial compliance.229 
b. Pressure to Remain in Compliance  
In the early 1990s, only about a quarter of California jurisdictions had 
HCD-approved housing elements in place.230 By the early 2000s, more than 50% 
were compliant.231 Today the figure is about 90%.232 This evolution reflects 
escalating legislature and judicial pressure to adopt and maintain compliant 
housing elements. The legislature has tied local governments’ eligibility for an 
ever-lengthening list of grant programs to housing element compliance,233 and 
trial courts have enjoined noncompliant local governments from issuing building 
permits for commercial and other uses.234 In 2005, the legislature stripped local 
 
 226. Fonseca v. City of Gilroy, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 374, 387 (Ct. App. 2007); see also text accompanying note 
183. 
 227. See infra text accompanying notes 244–247. 
 228. See infra note 245. 
 229. It is significant in this regard that A.B. 72 was enacted subsequent to HCD’s public flaunting of the 
judicial test for substantial compliance. Also, in 2018, the legislature codified its intent to “ensure that future 
housing production meets, at a minimum, the regional need established for planning purposes.” S.B. 828, 2017-
2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018) (adding CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65584(a)(2) (West 2019)).  
As for the origins of the “substantial compliance” test, it was added to the housing element law in 1984, 
and at that time the legislature expressed its intent to codify the standard first applied in Camp v. Bd. Of 
Supervisors, 176 Cal. Rptr. 620 (Ct. App. 1981). See Hernandez v. City of Encinitas, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875, 880 
(Ct. App. 1994) (quoting the legislative declaration). Camp is actually a better decision than many more recent 
“substantial compliance” cases, because the Camp court gave considerable weight to the views of the state 
housing agency and characterized “substantial compliance” as a matter of substance rather than form. See 176 
Cal. Rptr. at 629–32. Thus, the statutory origins of the substantial compliance standard would not prevent the 
California Supreme Court from putting a more demanding gloss on it than the lower courts have to date. 
However, because the substantial compliance test per Camp governs challenges to any element of the general 
plan, not just the housing element, see 176 Cal. Rptr. At 629, the California Supreme Court may be wary of 
making the test very demanding. 
 230. See PAUL G. LEWIS, CALIFORNIA’S HOUSING ELEMENT LAW: THE ISSUE OF LOCAL NONCOMPLIANCE 
21–22 (2003) (reporting that 19% were deemed compliant in 1991, and 37% by 1993).  
 231. Id. at 4–5 fig.1.1, fig.1.2 (noting that in 2002, 51% of cities and 66% of counties were deemed by HCD 
to be compliant). 
 232. CAL. DEP’T. OF HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., HOUSING ELEMENT COMPLIANCE REPORT (2019), 
http://www.hcd.ca.gov/community-development/housing-element/docs/status.pdf.  
 233. See DEP’T HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., INCENTIVES FOR HOUSING ELEMENT COMPLIANCE (2009), 
http://hcd.ca.gov/community-development/housing-element/docs/loan_grant_hecompl011708.pdf. Since 2009, 
the legislature has provided additional funding to compliant jurisdictions through a real-estate recording fee. See 
SB. 2 Planning Grants, DEP’T HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., http://www.hcd.ca.gov/grants-funding/active-
funding/planning-grants.shtml (last Nov. 6, 2019). 
 234. For a now-somewhat-dated summary of housing element litigation, remedies, and consent decrees, see 
SANTA BARBARA CTY. COUNSEL, SUMMARY OF HOUSING ELEMENT LAW AND LITIGATION 19–25 app. A (2007), 
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governments without compliant housing elements of authority to use local 
zoning or the general plan to deny 20%-BMR projects on any site where housing 
is a permitted use.235 Additional penalties are in the offing: a 2019 statute 
subjects noncompliant local governments to escalating monthly fines of up to 
$600,000.236 It also authorizes courts to appoint a judicial agent with “expertise 
in planning” to “bring the jurisdiction’s housing element into substantial 
compliance.”237 No city will relish the prospect of bleeding $600,000 a month 
while a court rewrites its housing element.  
c. The New, Self-Executing Housing Element? 
 The traditional West Coast requirement that local ordinances conform to 
the plan did little to help developers get projects approved. In California, a 
consistency challenge had to be brought within ninety days of enactment of the 
ordinance,238 and even a successful challenge might result only in an order 
telling the local government to make the ordinance consistent (rather than an 
order approving a housing project). But a little-noticed reform adopted in 2004 
and extended in 2018 lays down a path for later, as-applied challenges. The 2004 
legislation requires local governments to approve 20%-BMR projects whose 
location and density comport with the housing element, “even [if the project] is 
inconsistent with both the jurisdiction’s zoning ordinance and general plan land 
use designation.”239 The 2018 statute put developers of 100% market-rate 
projects on similar footing,240 and, in conjunction with an amendment the 
previous year, appears to have eliminated deference to local governments on the 




 235. S.B. 575, 2005–2006 Leg. (Cal. 2005) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65589.5(d) (West 2019)). 
 236. Assemb. B. 101, 2019–2020 Gen. Assemb. § 4 (Cal. 2019) (adding subsections (k)–(n) to CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 65585 (West 2019) (explaining that the local authority can be imposed a fine of up to $100,000, which 
is subject to increase by a factor of six if the court finds the original fees insufficient); see also Liam Dillon and 
Taryn Luna, California Leaders Strike Deal to Give Cities and Counties Hundreds of Millions to Fight 
Homelessness, L.A. TIMES (June 27, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-homeless-housing-
money-state-budget-20190627-story.html. 
 237. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65585(l)(3)(B). 
 238. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65860(b) (West 2019); see also supra text accompanying note 198. 
 239. Assemb. B. 2348, 2003–2004 Gen. Asemb. § 4 (Cal. 2004) (amending CAL. GOV’T 
CODE §§ 65589.5(d)(5)(A), 65915(b)(1) (West 2019)). 
 240. See Assemb. B. 3194, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2018) (adding CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 65589.5(j)(4) (West 2019)) (requiring approval of projects that comply with the general plan—of which 
the housing element is a part—notwithstanding “zoning standards and criteria” to the contrary). In contrast to 
the 2004 amendments for twenty percent BMR projects, the 2018 amendments are silent on whether local 
governments must grant permits for housing-element-compliant projects if the housing element conflicts with 
the land-use element and thus violates the background state-law requirement of “horizontal consistency” among 
components of the general plan. However, an intermediate court of appeals has held that housing elements that 
conflict with other components of the plan are valid and enforceable so long as the housing element 
acknowledges the inconsistency and spells out an action plan to fix it, for example, by amending the conflicting 
component of the plan. See Friends of Aviara v. City of Carlsbad, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 805, 810–11 (Ct. App. 
2012). 
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components of the general plan. 241 The thrust of these reforms is to make the 
housing element self-executing. 242 Developers may apply for permits on the 
authority of the housing element, and the local officials who review the project 
must disregard more restrictive zoning ordinances. Local governments that deny 
or reduce the density of a project in violation of this principle must pay the 
prevailing party’s attorney fees.243  
d. The Requirement of Imminently Developable Sites 
 A favorite ruse of anti-housing local governments has been to assign their 
RHNA shares to sites that are impractical to develop.244 A limited builder’s 
remedy, enacted in 2005, puts some pressure on local governments not to do 
this,245 and in 2017, California took another big step, ordering local governments 
 
 241. The 2018 amendments do not expressly prescribe an evidentiary standard for resolving questions about 
the consistency of zoning with the general plan. However, when the consistency language was added to the bill, 
the associated bill analysis emphasized that the legislature had in 2017 abrogated deference to local governments 
on questions about a project’s consistency with applicable standards, and quoted language to the effect that a 
project must be deemed compliant with the plan if a “reasonable person” could deem it so. See BILL ANALYSIS, 
Assemb. B. 3194, SEN. COMMITTEE ON TRANSP. & HOUS. 4 (2018), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB3194; see also text 
accompanying notes 248-252 (describing and contextualizing the new evidentiary standard). This drafting 
history, together with the stated purpose of A.B. 3194—to thwart local efforts to evade the HAA by zoning for 
less bulk or density than the general plan allows, thereby shunting multifamily housing projects into 
discretionary variance or rezoning processes, see BILL ANALYSIS, Assemb. B. 3194, SEN. FLOOR 3–4 (2018), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB3194 (suggesting 
strongly that local governments are now prohibited from denying or reducing the density of housing projects if 
a reasonable person could deem the project compliant with the plan, notwithstanding zoning standards that are 
more restrictive). 
 242. Indeed, it appears that even commitments made in the housing element to allow greater bulk or density 
by some specified date in the future can now be enforced through the HAA. See BILL ANALYSIS, Assemb. B. 
3194, SEN. GOV’T & FIN., (2018), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/ 
billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB3194 (distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate denials of 
projects whose density is consistent with the density contemplated for the site by the general plan, giving as 
example of the former a denial during “a [reasonable] period between an amendment to portions of a general 
plan, such as the housing element, and when the local government updates its zoning ordinances to match the 
general plan”); Assemb. B. 72, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2017) (adding CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65585(i) 
(West 2019) (using term “inconsistency” in reference to “any failure to implement any program actions included 
in the housing element”) (emphasis added). 
 243. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65585.5(k)(2) (West 2019). 
 244. This bit of conventional wisdom is indirectly supported by the California Legislative Analyst’s finding 
that most multi-family construction occurs on sites which are not designated for multifamily construction in the 
corresponding housing element. See LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, DO COMMUNITIES ADEQUATELY PLAN 
FOR HOUSING? 8–9 (2017) [hereinafter LAO, DO COMMUNITIES ADEQUATELY PLAN], 
https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2017/3605/plan-for-housing-030817.pdf. Evidently, cities “plan” for multifamily 
housing where its uneconomical to build, and then work out case-by-case exemptions for certain developers.  
 245. The relevant statutory provisions state that if the local government has not designated sufficient sites 
for its low- and moderate-income RHNA shares, it may not rely on local zoning or the general plan to deny a 
project that is proposed for a residential site in which at least twenty percent of the units would be affordable to 
lower-income households. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65589.5(d)(5)(B) (West 2019); S.B. 575, 2005–2006 
Leg. § 1 (Cal. 2005). The only allowable ground for denial in most cases is that the project would have a 
“specific, adverse impact upon the public health or safety.” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65589.5(d)(2). In these 
proceedings, the local agency has the burden of proof “to show that its housing element does identify adequate 
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to accommodate their RHNA allocations on imminently developable sites.246 
Using HCD-issued forms, local governments must furnish a parcel-by-parcel 
enumeration of the available or potentially available sites for housing 
development, noting for each parcel its “realistic and demonstrated” 
development potential at various levels of affordability, current uses of the 
parcel, barriers to development at the parcel’s potential density over the next 
period in the planning cycle, and any steps the local government intends to take 
to remove those constraints.247  
e. An End to Deference on Project-Specific Denials and Density 
Reductions 
 As far back as 1982, with the first iteration of its Housing Accountability 
Act (HAA), California recognized that local governments may try to evade state 
housing mandates through project-specific shenanigans, such as unwarranted 
delay, bad-faith application of existing standards, or denial on the basis of post 
hoc requirements invented for the purpose of killing the project.248 The original 
HAA provided that local governments may deny or reduce the density of a 
housing project that complied with applicable development standards at the time 
the permit application was submitted only if the decisionmaker makes “written 
findings supported by substantial evidence” that the project would have a 
“specific, adverse [and non-mitigable] impact upon the public health or 
safety.”249 Subsequently, the legislature clarified that only “objective” standards 
could be used to deny or reduce the density of a project.250 
The difficulty with this requirement is that development standards are 
never perfectly clear, and it’s hard for judges who lack intimate familiarity with 
the development process to say whether a standard is clear enough to qualify as 
“objective.”251 The 2017 housing package includes a clever fix: housing 
proposals must be deemed compliant with applicable development standards “if 
there is substantial evidence that would allow a reasonable person to conclude” 
 
sites with appropriate zoning and development standards and with services and facilities to 
accommodate . . . [the jurisdiction’s] share of the regional housing need for the very low, low-, and moderate-
income categories.” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65589.5(d)(5).  
 246. See Fonseca v. City of Gilroy, 56 Cal. Rptr. 374, 390–91 (Ct. App. 2007) (discussing 2005 
amendments, while applying previous standards which did not require parcel identification); Assemb. B. 1397, 
2017–2018, Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2017) (delineating criteria for what counts as an available site). 
 247. Assemb. B. 1397, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2017) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE 
CODE §§ 65583(a)(3), 65583.2 (West 2019)). If the local government assigns more than fifty percent of its lower-
income RHNA share to presently non-vacant parcels, it must make findings supported by substantial evidence 
that the existing use of each such parcel “is likely to be discontinued” during the planning period. CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 65583.2(g)(2)(West 2019). 
 248. 1982 Cal. Stat. 5484, ch. 1438 (adding CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65589.5 (West 2019)). 
 249. Id. 
 250. S.B. 948, 1999–2000 Leg. (Cal. 1999) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65589.5(d)(2)). 
 251. Cf. Rogue Valley Ass’n of Realtors v. City of Ashland, No. 97-260, slip op. at 17 (Or. LUBA Sept. 24, 
1998) (“[F]ew tasks are less clear or more subjective than attempting to determine whether a particular land use 
approval criterion is clear and objective.”) 
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that the project conforms to the standards.252 So if a local government chooses 
to employ mushy standards, it will have enormous difficulty denying any 
project, as the very mushiness of the standards means there will almost always 
be enough evidence to allow (not require) a reasonable person to conclude that 
the standards were met. 
The 2017 amendments also hack away at local governments’ discretion to 
deny zoning-compliant projects on the basis of alleged health or safety impacts. 
Previously, such projects could be denied or reduced in density if there was 
substantial evidence in the record to support the local government’s health or 
safety finding.253 Going forward, the local government must show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the project would have a “significant, 
quantifiable, direct, and unavoidable [public health or safety] impact, based on 
objective, identified written public health or safety standards . . . as they existed 
on the date the application was deemed complete.”254 The local government 
must make these findings in writing within sixty days of its decision,255 and, if 
the decision is challenged in court, the local government must carry the burden 
of proof.256 Lest judges fail to get the message, the legislature in 2018 declared 
that adverse health and safety impacts from new housing “arise infrequently.”257 
Finally, recent amendments to the HAA extend standing to sue to “housing 
organizations” and potential residents, and require defendants to pay the 
attorney’s fees of prevailing plaintiffs.258 Developers who have ongoing 
relationships with a local government may be wary of litigating, say, a modest 
reduction in the size of their project. The attorney’s fee and liberal standing 
provisions enable other parties to step in and make local governments follow 
their own rules. 
f. Statutory Consequences for Failing to Meet Housing Targets 
 With the passage of California Senate Bill 35 (SB 35) in 2017, California 
became the first West Coast Model state to make local governments liable for 
failing to meet state housing targets, not just for failing to plan.259 SB 35 directs 
HCD to determine mid-cycle and at the end of the cycle whether each local 
government is on pace to meet, or has met, its RHNA targets.260 If a local 
government falls short, it must permit as-of-right development of qualifying 
 
 252. Assemb. B. 1515, 2017–2018 Leg. § 1 (Cal. 2017) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65589.5(f)(4)). 
 253. The Housing Accountability Act originally required “written findings supported by substantial 
evidence” that the project would have “a specific, adverse [and not feasibly mitigable] impact upon the public 
health or safety.” 1982 Stats. 5484, ch. 1438.  
 254. S.B. 167, 2017–2018 Leg. (Cal. 2017) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65589.5(j)(1)(A)). 
 255. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65589.5(j)(2). 
 256. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65589.5(i), 65589.6. 
 257. Assemb. B. 3194, § 1, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2018) (adding subdivision (a)(3) to CAL. GOV.’T 
CODE § 65589.5). 
 258. See S.B. 167 (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65589.5(k)(1)(A)).  
 259. S.B. 35, 2017–2018 Leg. (Cal. 2017) (enacted). 
 260. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65913.4(a)(4) & (h)(7) (West 2019). 
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projects that comply with objective zoning and development standards.261 
Projects submitted under SB 35 must be approved or rejected by the local 
government within a brief window of time or else they are deemed approved as 
a matter of law, and they are exempt from environmental review.262 
In keeping with the idea of the housing element as self-executing and 
preemptive, SB 35 provides that in the event of inconsistency between “zoning, 
general plan, subdivision, or design review standards . . . a development shall be 
deemed consistent with the objective zoning and subdivision standards . . . if the 
development is consistent with the standards set forth in the general plan.”263 
(The housing element is a component of the general plan.) 
Though SB 35 projects must meet several other criteria that may blunt the 
statute’s impact,264 the statute advances an important principle: the local 
prerogative to use cumbersome, discretionary permitting procedures is 
conditional on the local government actually permitting the amount of new 
housing—including market-rate housing—that the state expects of it.265  
* * * 
California’s housing policy contraption would have made Rube Goldberg 
blush. But abstracting from the jury-rigged details, the big picture is this: 
California, home to the nation’s most expensive housing markets, is groping its 
way toward a nationally normed, “healthy housing market” standard for how 
much new housing local governments must accommodate. California has also 
taken steps to make state-approved housing plans self-executing, so that 
developers can get permits for plan-compliant projects notwithstanding contrary 
local ordinances. California has terminated judicial deference to local 
governments on the question of whether a development proposal complies with 
applicable zoning, development, environmental, and safety standards. And, 
using fee-shifting rules, liberal standing, and evidentiary reforms, California has 
armed interest groups and private citizens to challenge permit denials and 
density reductions, as well as the adequacy of the housing plan as a whole. These 
are unabashedly pro-housing reforms, applicable to market-rate as well as 
affordable projects. 
Taken together, the California reforms are redefining the character and 
function of the comprehensive plan. Rather than serving as an “impermanent 
 
 261. See S.B. 35, § 3 (now codified as CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65913.4 (West 2019)). 
 262. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65913.4(b) & (c).  
 263. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65913.4(a)(5)(B). 
 264. The project must have at least ten percent BMR units (more if the jurisdiction has a compliant housing 
element and met its quota for market-rate housing in the previous cycle), must not use sites that were recently 
occupied by residential tenants or rent-controlled dwelling units, and, for larger projects, must pay union wages. 
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65913.4(a)(4), (7) & (8). 
 265. The same principle is also advanced by another statutory provision added in 2017, which stipulates that 
local governments may not count a parcel toward their lower-income RHNA quota without rezoning it for by-
right development, if the parcel had been counted toward the quota but not developed in the previous planning 
cycle. See Assemb. B. 3197, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2017) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65583.2I 
(West 2019)). 
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constitution” for zoning and development ordinances,266 or as a statement of a 
community’s aspirations for its built environment,267 the plan, through its 
housing element, increasingly resembles a compact between the local 
government and the state about development permitting. Through the plan, local 
governments provide the state with an inventory of developable or re-
developable parcels within their territory, agree to accommodate a certain 
number of new housing units on those parcels, and commit to a schedule of 
actions to remove development constraints.268 In return for making these 
promises, the local government maintains its eligibility for certain funding 
streams and avoids incursions on its regulatory autonomy. Developers, housing 
organizations, and potential residents can enforce the compact in court, both by 
suing the local government to make it follow through on rezoning and other 
actions promised in the housing element, and by demanding building permits on 
the authority of the housing element itself, even if the project conflicts with other 
local ordinances. 
And yet this agreement is not quite a contract. The housing element, as a 
component of the local government’s general plan, remains local law, and may 
itself be amended without the state agency’s consent. The agency can respond 
to bad amendments by decertifying a housing element midcycle—exposing the 
local government to a loss of funding and possibly builder’s remedy lawsuits—
but the agency cannot compel the local government to stick to the original 
compact. Nor may the agency rewrite the housing element of a local government 
that has failed to revise its housing element on the state’s cycle.  
One can think of the housing element, then, as a kind of provisionally 
preemptive state intervention in local land use. The state has considerable 
influence over the housing element’s content, and while in place, the housing 
element supersedes contrary local regulations and establishes a basis for 
development permitting. But the housing element’s preemptive character is 
softer than that of ordinary state law, both because the housing element must be 
locally adopted before it takes effect, and because it can be changed by the local 
government without the concurrence of the state—albeit at the price of risking 
pecuniary and regulatory sanctions.  
It bears emphasis, finally, that the California transformation I have 
described in this section is still a work in progress. Housing elements in practice 
may fall pretty far short of the (evolving) statutory ideal. For example, during 
the most recent planning cycle, HCD approved the housing element of famously 
supply-constrained San Francisco, notwithstanding the plan’s utterly vacuous 
program to address and remove constraints.269 The California framework seems 
 
 266 For influential statements of this theory of the plan, see Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a 
Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955); Mandelker, supra note 117. 
 267. On plans as dreamy visions for the future, see ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 138, at 69-72. 
 268. See supra Subpart III.A. 
 269. See 2014 HOUSING ELEMENT, supra note 176, at C.23–C.24 app. C (setting forth a few vaguely stated, 
ongoing program actions to address constraints, while entirely ignoring one of the primary constraints identified 
the housing element’s own analysis of constraints: the city’s very unusual and cumbersome discretionary review 
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unlikely to achieve very much absent political leadership from the governor and 
HCD to make it work. The state’s recently elected governor, Gavin Newsom, 
has made housing a priority, so his tenure will be an important test case for the 
framework.270  
B. DENSITY MANDATES 
In 1981, Oregon’s LCDC promulgated the Metropolitan Housing Rule, 
which sets minimum zoning densities for cities in the Portland metro area.271 
Ever since, land-use scholars have regarded the rule with a kind of wry 
bemusement, as if to say, “Oh, leave it to Oregon’s urban-boundary enthusiasts 
to try something way too zany for any other state.”272 Yet in recent years, and 
on both coasts, states have begun to challenge local control over housing density, 
including the density of market-rate housing. This is an ideologically important 
development because, as Part II explained, the expensive Northeastern states 
traditionally regarded the “affordability problem” as being solely about barriers 
to the construction of subsidized, deed-restricted housing,273 and because even 
West Coast states often privilege projects with a large share of BMR units.274  
To date, most of the new density interventions have focused on so-called 
ADUs, small homes which may be developed in an under-utilized garage or 
basement, or added in the backyard of existing or proposed house.275 
Washington, California, Oregon, New Hampshire, and Vermont now require 
local governments to permit ADUs on parcels zoned for single family homes.276 
Connecticut, Florida and Rhode Island have proceeded a bit more indirectly, 
encouraging ADUs by allowing local governments to count them toward the 
 
procedure); Letter from Paul McDougall, Hous. Policy Manager, Cal. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Dev., to John 
Rahaim, Dir., Planning Dep’t, City of S.F. (Sept. 10, 2014) (on file with author) (deeming the city’s draft housing 
element compliant, without comment on constraints). 
 270. See Alexei Koseff, Newsom Blazing a Trail of His Own, S.F. CHRONICLE, Feb. 23, 2019, at A7 
(comparing Newsom’s housing positions with those of his predecessor). 
 271. The rule is codified at OR. ADMIN. R. 660-07-000–660-07-360 (2018). For discussion of its history, 
see City of Happy Valley v. Land Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 677 P.2d 43, 44 (Or. 1984).  
 272. See, e.g., FISCHEL, ZONING RULES, supra note 4, at 303–07, 366-67 (describing that Portland is 
“Oregon’s boat to float”); Hills, supra note 95, at 1639–42 (praising Metropolitan Housing Rule, but describing 
the adoption of anything similar in New Jersey, the subject of his article, as “improbabl[e]”).  
 273. See supra Subpart II.A. 
 274. See supra Subpart III.B. (describing reforms in California). 
 275. ADUs are typically defined by statute as a small dwelling (for example, less than 800 or 1200 square 
feet) contained within, or located in close proximity to, another existing or zoning-authorized structure. See, e.g., 
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65852.150 (West 2019). 
 276. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65852.2 (West 2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:72 (2018); VT. STAT. 
ANN. Tit. 24, § 4412(1) (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.63A.215 (2019); S.B. 1051, 2017– 2018 Leg. § 6 (Or. 
2017) (enacted); WASH. STATE. DEP’T. OF CMTY., TRADE, AND ECON. DEV., MODEL ACCESSORY DWELLING 
UNIT ORDINANCE RECOMMENDATIONS (1994) http://mrsc.org/getmedia/3ccc6c5e-0cc9-43c1-8936-
b0017c7c161e/ADUordrecommendations.pdf.aspx (describing model ADU ordinance which local governments 
of a certain size in Washington must conform to). 
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locality’s fair-share obligation for affordable housing.277 Several other states 
have enacted modest ADU incentive programs.278  
More aggressive density mandates are also on the table. In 2019, Oregon 
enacted a statewide upzoning bill that requires cities with at least 25,000 
residents to allow fourplexes in all areas zoned for residential use, and cities with 
10,000–25,000 residents to allow duplexes.279 Cities that fail to bring their 
zoning ordinances into compliance within two to three years will have to permit 
duplexes and fourplexes pursuant to a default model ordinance issued by the 
LCDC.280  
The most ambitious of the statewide upzoning bills would rezone 
residential parcels near transit stations for four-to-five story buildings.281 
California state senator Scott Wiener has been pushing this idea since early 
2018,282 drawing national attention to the connections between housing density, 
socioeconomic mobility, mass transit, and climate change.283 So far his efforts 
have been unavailing, 284 but the governor has signaled support, 285 legislators in 
other states are picking up on the idea, 286 and it seems safe to say that statewide 
 
 277. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (2019); FLA. STAT. § 163.31771 (2019); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-128-
8.1(b)(5) (2018). 
 278. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. § 4-926 (LexisNexis 2019) (providing for loan 
program for affordable housing including ADUs). 
 279. H.B. 2001, 80th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Or. 2019) (enacted).  
 280. H.B. 2001 § 3. 
 281. See Scott Wiener, My Transit Density Bill (S.B. 827): Answering Common Questions and Debunking 
Misinformation, EXTRANEWSFEED (Jan. 16, 2018), https://extranewsfeed.com/my-transit-density-bill-sb-827-
answering-common-questions-and-debunking-misinformation-226eaa7e1653. 
 282. Id.; see also S.B. 50, 2019–2020 Leg. (Cal. 2019). 
 283. See, e.g., Conor Dougherty, California Lawmakers Kill Housing Bill after Fierce Debate, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/17/business/economy/california-housing.html; Conor 
Dougherty & Brad Plumer, A Bold, Devisive Plan to Wean Californians from Cars, NY TIMES (Mar. 16, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/16/business/energy-environment/climate-density.html; Megan McArdle, 
Opinion, Democrats’ Housing Problem, WASH. POST. (Apr. 19, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2018/04/19/democrats-housing-problem/; Dante 
Ramos, Go On, California—Blow up Your Lousy Zoning Laws, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 14, 2018), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/01/14/california-blow-your-lousy-zoning-
laws/AcT0vOJCdArOJp3cBH9zmJ/story.html; David Roberts, The Future of Housing Policy Is Being Decided 
in California, VOX (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.vox.com/cities-and-urbanism/2018/2/23/17011154/sb827-
california-housing-crisis. 
 284. Wiener’s 2017 bill, SB 827, died in its first committee vote. See Dougherty, supra note 283. His 2018 
bill, SB 50, sailed through its first two committee hearings before an obscure legislative procedure was used to 
table it. See Liam Dillon, The Revenge of the Suburbs: Why California’s Effort to Build More in Single-Family-
Home Neighborhoods Failed, L.A. TIMES (May 22, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-
california-sb50-failure-single-family-homes-suburbs-20190522-story.html. 
 285. See Randy Shaw, New Progress in Battling Housing Crisis, BEYONDCHRON (Oct. 15, 2019), 
http://beyondchron.org/will-ca-boost-housing-in-2020/. 
 286. In Washington, an upzoning-near-transit bill covering the Seattle region has been introduced. See S.B. 
5424, 2019 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019); Doug Trumm, State Sen. Palumbo Plans to Introduce a Minimum Housing 
Density Bill, THE URBANIST (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.theurbanist.org/2018/10/05/state-sen-palumbo-plans-
to-introduce-a-minimum-housing-density-bill/. In Massachusetts, one house of the legislature has voted to 
require every local government to zone at least one district “of reasonable size” for multi-family housing, at 
state-prescribed minimum densities. See S.B. 2311, 189th Gen. Court § 6 (Mass. 2016) (enacted); see also Katie 
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upzoning bills will be the subject of ongoing debate and attention in the years 
ahead, in California and beyond.287 
The statewide upzoning bills have generated a lot of excitement, but it’s 
not clear that states will be able to get local governments to allow significantly 
more housing simply by preempting local restrictions on size and density. The 
evolution of California’s ADU legislation offers an instructive lesson.288 The 
state’s ADU framework dates to 1982, when the legislature decreed that local 
governments may disallow ADUs within residential zones only if the locality 
makes findings of “specific adverse impacts on the public health, safety, and 
welfare.”289 Many local governments responded by “authorizing” ADUs while 
requiring ADU applicants to obtain onerous, discretionary permits.290 
Concerned that local governments were abusing their discretion, the state 
legislature, in 2002, directed local governments to permit ADUs ministerially; 
demanded approval of ADU applications that conform to state-prescribed 
requirements (irrespective of local ordinances); prescribed a template to which 
local ADU ordinances must conform; and required local governments to submit 
their ADU ordinances to the state housing agency for review.291 The 2002 bill 
did not, however, displace “height, setback, lot coverage, architectural review, 
site plan review, fees, charges, and other zoning requirements generally 
 
Lannan, Chandler: State Senate “Ready to Go” on Housing Bill, TELEGRAM.COM (Feb. 27, 2018), 
http://www.telegram.com/news/20180227/chandler-state-senate-ready-to-go-on-housing-bill. 
 287. In addition to overt density mandates, several states have tried to use regulatory safe harbors to prod 
local governments into zoning for greater density. Oregon, Washington, California, and New Jersey provide 
examples. Since the mid-2000s, California has encouraged rezoning for higher densities through a safe-harbor 
provision in the housing element law. Sites zoned at or above the statutory minimum densities are deemed to 
have adequate density, as a matter of law, to accommodate a portion of the jurisdiction’s lower-income RHNA 
share. See Assemb. B. 2348, 2003–2004 Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2004) (adding CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65583.2 (West 
2019)). Similarly, in New Jersey, localities seeking immunity from the builder’s remedy must zone at minimum 
densities for 20%-BMR projects. See In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 6 A.3d 445, 461–64 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2010), aff’d In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5:97, 74 A.3d 893, 897 (N.J. 2013) (invalidating 
regulation which, in the court’s view, would have allowed local governments to comply with their Mt. Laurel 
obligations by zoning land at insufficient density and with excessive BMR requirements). In Oregon and 
Washington, state agencies have derived minimum zoning densities from the principle of confining growth 
within urban boundaries. Oregon’s latest regulation, issued in 2009, spells out density safe harbors for local 
governments throughout the state that seek to adjust their growth perimeter. OR. ADMIN. R. § 660-024-0040(8) 
(2018). The Washington Supreme Court invalidated the Growth Management Hearing Board’s attempt to create 
“bright line” minimum urban densities. See Viking Properties, Inc. v. Holm, 118 P.3d 322, 329 (Wash. 2005) 
(en banc). However, observers see Washington as having de facto density requirements for land within the 
growth boundaries. See Egon Terplan, Learning from Washington’s Growth Management Act, THE URBANIST 
(July 31, 2017), https://www.spur.org/publications/urbanist-article/2017-07-31/learning-washington-s-growth-
management-act (“Within urban areas, most growth must be allocated with minimum densities of four units per 
acre.”). 
 288. See Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, A Room of One’s Own: Accessory Dwelling Unit 
Reforms and Local Parochialism, 45 URB. LAW. 519, 541–67 (2013). 
 289. Id. at 541 (quoting 1982 Cal. Stat. 5502). 
 290. See ASSEMBLY FLOOR ANALYSIS, Assemb. B. 1866, 2001–2002 Leg. (Cal. Aug. 28, 2002).  
 291. See Assemb. B. 1866; Brinig & Garnett, supra note 288, at 541–43. 
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applicable to residential construction in the zone in which the property is 
located.”292  
Studying the response to this statute, Margaret Brinig and Nicole Garnett 
collected the zoning ordinances of every California municipality with more than 
50,000 people, as well as public-meeting minutes and news stories. They found 
that most California cities—including Los Angeles, San Diego, and San 
Francisco—effectively thwarted the new mandate with a “thousand paper 
cuts.”293 Cities discouraged ADU construction via design review, costly 
building-material mandates, rental restrictions, owner-occupancy requirements, 
minimum lot sizes, conditional use permits, permit-filing fees, impact fees, and 
tight allowances for the permissible size of an ADU.294 Some of these 
requirements probably violated state law, but anti-ADU local governments had 
few compunctions about pushing the envelope of their reserved authority.295  
Frustrated by local intransigence, California enacted additional ADU bills 
in 2016, 2017, and 2019. The 2016 statute further constrains local requirements 
for parking, unit size, fire sprinklers, utility-connection fees, and lot-line 
setbacks.296 Additional tweaks were made in 2017,297 and in 2019 the legislature 
created an essentially unqualified right for every homeowner in the state to add 
a freestanding backyard ADU of up to 800 square feet, plus a “junior ADU” of 
up to 500 square feet within the envelope of an existing structure. 298 The 2019 
legislation also preempted local impact fees on ADUs of up to 750 square feet. 
299 The new measures seem to have generated a flood of ADU applications,300 
which suggests that local intransigence can be overcome if the legislature is 
willing to preempt a ton of local law and terminate local permitting discretion. 
 
 292. See Assemb. B. 1866 § 2 (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65852.2(b)(1)(G) (West 2019)). 
 293. Brinig & Garnett, supra note 288, at 546–47; see also John Infranca, Housing Changing Households: 
Regulatory Challenges for Micro-Units and Accessory Dwelling Units, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 70–86 
(2014) (detailing regulatory barriers to ADUs in five cities across the country). 
 294. Brinig & Garnett, supra note 288, at 543–66.  
 295. The death by a thousand cuts story also applies to so-called micro-units, an attempt to provide more 
affordable housing through small, dorm-like units. See David Neiman, How Seattle Killed Micro-Housing, 
SIGHTLINE INST. (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.sightline.org/2016/09/06/how-seattle-killed-micro-housing/.  
 296. S.B. 1069, 2015–2016 Leg. (Cal. 2016) (enacted).   
 297. S.B. 229, 2017–2018 Leg. (Cal. 2017) (enacted) (clarifying, inter alia, that the restriction on utility 
fees applies to fees charged by special districts and water corporations). 
 298. See Dylan Casey, How to Make Your Home a Triplex, CARLA (Oct. 9, 2019), 
https://carlaef.org/2019/10/09/how-to-make-your-home-a-triplex/; Dylan Casey, Making Sense of This Year’s 
ADU Legislation, CARLA (Sept. 13, 2019), https://carlaef.org/2019/09/13/making-sense-of-this-years-adu-
legislation/. 
 299. S.B. 13, 2018–2019 Leg. (Cal. 2019) (enacted). 
 300. See David Garcia, ADU Update: Early Lessons and Impacts of California’s State and Local Policy 
Changes, TERNER CTR. FOR HOUS. INNOVATION (Dec. 21, 2017), https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/blog/adu-
update-early-lessons-and-impacts-of-californias-state-and-local-policy (“across the board cities are seeing 
significant increases in ADU applications, with many cities doubling, tripling, or even quadrupling their totals 
from 2016”); Liam Dillon, How Lawmakers Are Upending the California Lifestyle to Fight a Housing Shortage, 
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2019) https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-10-10/california-single-family-
zoning-casitas-granny-flats-adus (noting that Los Angeles has received 13,300 requests to build ADUs since 
2017 legislation, a twenty-fold increase over previous application rate). 
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And yet, it’s hard to imagine an upzoning-near-transit bill passing if the 
bill knocks out discretionary local control over development permitting. 
Notably, Senator Wiener’s bills would have left in place local authority over 
demolition control, design standards, permitting procedures, fees, and much 
more.301 If a similar bill is eventually enacted, local governments will have a 
field day inventing ways to evade it. 302 
C. CONCLUSION 
Spurred by the YIMBY movement, legislatures in the high-cost coastal 
states are showing new interest in local governments’ land-use policies and are 
intervening in new and unambiguously pro-housing ways. There is clearly a 
receptive audience among state policymakers for ideas about how to overcome 
local NIMBYism and increase the supply of market-rate as well as BMR 
housing, particularly near mass transit. But there also seems to be some 
uncertainty about how best to proceed. Just about everything is on the table: new 
ways of setting housing-supply targets (national norming); new density 
requirements (ADUs and beyond); new tools for pressing local governments to 
follow their own rules (attorney’s fees, evidentiary standards, time limits, as-of-
right permitting, and permitting on the basis of the housing element); and more 
prescriptive requirements for the housing plan itself (imminently developable 
sites).  
IV. A WAY FORWARD: “HOUSING ELEMENTS” AS TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-
UP DEVICES FOR OVERCOMING LOCAL BARRIERS TO HOUSING 
This Part takes up the “how best to proceed” question. Without purporting 
to offer a universal answer—there probably is none—I will suggest a variation 
on the emerging California model of the housing element as a preemptive 
intergovernmental compact for development permitting. The argument sounds 
in political economy, not normative theory. I take it as given that economically 
productive metro areas should allow a lot more housing to be built, especially in 
high-density forms near transit. The question is how to get them to allow it. 
Today the California model, like its West Coast antecedents, represents a 
largely top-down strategy for controlling local barriers to housing supply.303 The 
state tells local governments how much new housing they must accommodate 
through their housing elements, and the state uses the threat of fiscal and 
 
 301. For an explanation from its author, see Scott Wiener, S.B. 827 Retains an Awful Lot of Local Control 
and Community Planning, MEDIUM (Apr. 8, 2018), https://medium.com/@Scott_Wiener/sb-827-retains-an-
awful-lot-of-local-control-and-community-planning-b1d111fc1007.  
 302. That said, a statewide upzoning-near-transit bill would probably accomplish more in California than in 
most other states, because California’s Housing Accountability Act makes it difficult for local governments to 
impose discretionary conditions on otherwise permissible projects whose effect is tantamount to reducing the 
project’s density. See supra notes 248–256 and accompanying text. But local governments could still impose 
nondiscretionary fee, design, labor, and affordability requirements that make many transit-near-density projects 
uneconomic to build.  
 303. See supra Subpart III.A.2. 
F - ELMENDORF_26 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 11/6/2019  7:14 PM 
December 2019] BEYOND THE DOUBLE VETO 129 
regulatory sanctions to induce local governments to adopt compliant housing 
elements.304 It is a fair question, though, whether any high-cost state will be able 
to expand the supply of housing substantially without changing the local politics 
of housing—the political dynamics in cities and suburbs that led to decades of 
underproduction.  
A central contribution of this Part is to show that the emerging California 
model can readily be adapted to put bottom-up as well as top-down pressure on 
local barriers to housing supply. Specifically, with a few modest extensions, the 
California framework could be used to increase the political leverage and 
policymaking discretion of relatively pro-housing factions in city politics, and 
to facilitate regional housing deals by enabling local governments to make 
credible commitments to one another. 
Boiled down to essentials, the proposed variation on the California model 
combines a procedure for periodically (and unobtrusively) redefining the local 
regulatory baseline for housing development, in keeping with the state’s goals; 
a mechanism to guard the new baseline against the retrogressive tactics of local 
governments; and interventions that redistribute policymaking authority toward 
relatively pro-housing factions at the local level.  
In defending this approach, I develop a historical analogy to Jim Crow and 
the federal Voting Rights Act (VRA). The problem states now face in trying to 
control local barriers to housing supply is structurally quite similar to the 
problem the federal government faced in the 1960s when it undertook to 
dismantle the regime of publicly enforced racial hierarchy that prevailed 
throughout the South. In both cases, a central government seeks to control the 
behavior of local officials whose political incentives operate at cross purposes 
with the objectives of the central government. In both cases, the central 
government lacks the political will or administrative resources to entirely 
subsume the local government’s functions.  
The VRA tackled the local-political-incentives problem by defining a new 
regulatory baseline for voting, one which enfranchised black citizens en 
masse.305 White office holders then had to answer to black preferences—or else 
find some new way to keep blacks from voting.306 To forestall local evasion of 
the new regulatory baseline, VRA provided for centralized, pre-implementation 
review of all future changes to voting standards and procedures.307 My variation 
on the California model embodies the same basic ideas—new regulatory 
baselines, preclearance to guard against retrogression, and redistribution of 
political power—but adapts them to deal with a context in which there is no 
general consensus about what the new baseline should be, doubtful support for 
centralizing control over the traditionally local government function in question, 
 
 304. See supra Subpart III.A.2. 
 305. See infra Subpart IV.B.1. 
 306. See infra Subpart IV.B.1. 
 307. See infra Subpart IV.B.1. 
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and no easy enfranchisement-oriented solution for the political incentive 
problem.308 
Subpart IV.A lays out the elements of my proposal, and briefly explains 
what further reforms would be needed to fully realize it in the state that’s come 
closest to date, California. Subpart IV.B explains the model’s top-down and 
bottom-up mechanisms for inducing local governments to relax locally erected 
barriers to new housing.  
A. ELEMENTS OF THE MODEL 
Extending California’s recent innovations, the model I shall defend has the 
following components: 
(1) The state, through a housing agency under control of the governor, 
periodically determines the minimum amount of new housing that each 
region of the state shall accommodate over the planning cycle. The agency 
or a regional council of governments then divvies up the regional need among 
local governments. Both the need determination and the divvying should be 
grounded in economic conditions—not population projections—so that new 
housing is added where it would be more valuable, and so that escalating 
prices result in higher housing quotas. (Alternatively, the state might just 
require all economically significant regions to maintain a substantial 
potential-housing buffer, such as, capacity to accommodate a 30–50% 
increase in the housing stock over the course of a decade.)309 
(2) After receiving their housing targets, local governments must draft and 
submit to the state housing agency a parcel-specific “housing element,” in 
which the locality explains how it will accommodate its share of state-
determined housing need, or the housing buffer, over the planning cycle. The 
housing element may spell out or incorporate by reference zoning, fees, and 
development standards and procedures applicable to the parcels. It must also 
identify local constraints to development of the planned-for housing, and set 
forth a schedule of actions to mitigate or remove unreasonable constraints.  
(3) A state-certified housing element, once enacted by the local government, 
becomes the local government’s highest law with respect to land use, at least 
until the local government has produced its quota of housing for the cycle.310 
It supersedes any contrary provisions found in local regulations, ordinances, 
ballot measures, the general plan, or the city or county charter. (This is the 
sense in which the model establishes a preemptive compact. A state-law 
framework empowers the local legislative body and the state agency acting 
together to preempt contrary local law, including law that the municipal 
legislature cannot override on its own, such as the city charter.) 
(4) To reduce information costs for developers and planning department 
staffers, housing elements should include an appendix listing any local 
ordinances, regulations, or charter provisions that the local government and 
the state agency agree to deem preempted by the housing element. Some such 
 
 308. Local officials might be less resistant to new housing if potential future residents were enfranchised to 
vote in local-government elections, but this would require a radical break with traditional civic arrangements.  
 309. See supra Subpart IV.A. 
 310. The state might allow local governments to restrict development in ways that contravene commitments 
made in the housing element after the local government has produced its quota of housing for the cycle. 
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measures may be preempted as of the date of the housing element’s 
enactment, while others may be preempted prospectively. (For example, the 
housing element might deem an identified constraint to be preempted in the 
future if it is not reformed by the date listed in the housing element’s schedule 
of actions to ameliorate constraints.) 
(5) To discourage local hamstringing of projects that comply with size and 
density conditions specified in the housing plan, the state should authorize 
developers and third-party interest groups to bring as-applied challenges to 
local regulations and procedures, while flipping the traditional presumption 
of consistency. Thus, just as California’s HAA now stipulates that housing 
projects shall be deemed compliant with applicable standards if there is 
substantial evidence in the record that would allow a reasonable person to 
find the project compliant, housing projects should also be deemed exempt 
from any local procedure, fee, or other requirement if there is substantial 
evidence in the record that would allow a reasonable person to find the 
requirement, as applied to the project in question, inconsistent with the 
housing element.  
(6) A housing element “substantially complies” with state law if (a) the state 
agency determines that the local government, operating with the housing 
element in place, is substantially certain to meet its housing quota, or (b) the 
agency concludes that achievement of the quota is uncertain, or infeasible 
without public subsidy, but that the housing element removes or 
appropriately commits the local government to removing all unreasonable or 
unnecessary regulatory and procedural constraints to meeting the housing 
target.311 Courts should defer to the agency’s certification decision if 
supported by substantial evidence. 312 The housing agency should have 
authority to establish, by regulation, classes of presumptively unreasonable 
constraints.  
(7) A local government may amend its housing element during the planning 
cycle if the locality gives the state agency proper notice including written 
findings about whether the amendment would or would not render the 
housing element noncompliant.313 The agency may respond with 
suggestions, requests for further information, and, as appropriate, warnings 
about decertification. The local government shall again notify the agency 
upon adoption of the amendment, at which point the agency shall either 
recertify or decertify the housing element.314 Decertification would strip the 
housing element of its preemptive force vis-à-vis provisions of local law that 
 
 311. Here, a slight variation in word choice (“unreasonable” vs. “unnecessary”) may end up being 
consequential, as “necessity” connotes a stricter standard than “reasonable.” Note also that if the state adopts the 
“potential-housing buffer” approach at step (1), then housing element validity will usually be evaluated under 
(4)(b), because market conditions will not usually support a 30–50% expansion of the housing stock over the 
planning cycle even in the absence of regulatory constraints. 
 312. If the agency fails to act on a housing element within a brief period of time (say, sixty days), the element 
shall be deemed certified by operation of law. 
 313. If it proves necessary, the state could further strengthen the framework by stipulating that housing 
elements and housing-element amendments to which the state agency has properly objected may be adopted 
only through an exceptional local legislative procedure such as, for example, supermajority vote of the city 
council, or supermajority council vote followed by referendum approval.  
 314. If the agency fails to act within a reasonable period of time (say, sixty days), the housing element would 
be deemed recertified as a matter of law. 
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take precedence over ordinary municipal legislation (such as provisions 
found in the charter or adopted by popular vote).  
(8) Local governments shall report annually to the state housing agency on 
development applications received, applications approved and denied, time 
from submittal of application to final approval/denial, and anything else that 
the state agency deems reasonably necessary for monitoring implementation 
of housing elements.  
(9) Local governments that lack a current, state-approved housing element, 
or whose housing element has been decertified, should face substantial and 
prompt pecuniary sanctions.  
(10) If a local government fails to enact a certified housing element by the 
statutory deadline, the mayor, with the approval of the state housing agency, 
should be authorized to issue an interim housing element. 315 An interim 
housing element would have the same legal effect as a regularly adopted 
housing element, but shall lapse in (say) 180 days, unless reissued by the 
mayor and reconfirmed by the housing agency at that time. Development 
proposals submitted while an interim housing element is in effect shall be 
permitted on the basis of it, even if the permitting decision occurs after the 
interim element has lapsed or been replaced. 
To be clear, neither California nor any other state has fully realized this 
model. As of this writing, California still falls short in several significant 
respects:  
First, California has just begun to wrestle with the inadequacies of the 
population-forecast approach to determining housing need.316 The state is 
feeling its way toward an alternative, but the shape of what’s to come is not yet 
apparent. 
Second, it’s doubtful that local governments may use the housing element 
to suspend constraints found in the city charter or adopted by voters, outside of 
extreme cases where the measure at issue unequivocally disables the local 
government from meeting its RHNA target.317 Courts have done backflips to 
 
 315. For cities without a mayor-council form of government, the state could delegate authority to issue 
interim housing elements to the city manager, or to the president of the city council. Also, a state-approved 
interim housing element should either be exempt from review under the California Environmental Quality Act 
(CEQA), or subject to review but not subject to being enjoined if environmental review has not been completed 
prior to issuance of the housing element. CEQA-induced delays would defeat the whole point of interim housing 
elements—namely, ensuring that local governments have an up-to-date, compliant housing element in place, 
and thereby avoiding the environmental and social harms associated with a lack of sufficient, appropriately 
located new housing. 
 316. See supra notes 211–222 and accompanying text. 
 317. The main source of the doubt is a provision stating, “Nothing in this article shall be construed to be a 
grant of authority . . . with respect to measures that may be undertaken or required by a local government to be 
undertaken to implement the housing element of the local general plan.” CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65589(c) (West 
2019). Since municipal legislative bodies ordinarily lack authority to override voter-adopted or charter-
embedded measures, treating the housing element as superseding such measures would be tantamount to treating 
the housing element article of the government code as a “grant of authority” to municipal legislatures. For 
examples of extreme cases where voter-adopted measured were found to be preempted, see Bldg. Indus. Ass’n 
v. Oceanside, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137 (Ct. App. 1994); Urban Habitat Program v. Pleasanton, No. RG06-293831 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2010).  
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preserve voter-adopted measures that make it difficult, if not facially impossible, 
for the local government to accommodate its RHNA share.318  
Third, local governments can still throw up lots of barriers to housing-
element-compliant projects. While recent reforms to the HAA prevent local 
governments from denying or reducing the density of a project on the basis of 
zoning that a reasonable person could deem inconsistent with the plan (including 
the housing element),319 the HAA does not exempt projects from fees, 
procedures, and other non-zoning constraints at cross purposes with the plan. 
Finally, there is no established convention, such as a “preemption appendix,” for 
giving low-cost notice to developers and planning staff about any features of the 
local development process that the local government agrees to deem preempted 
by the housing element.  
Fourth, California has no provision for interim housing elements. One city, 
Encinitas, has gummed up the state framework with a charter provision requiring 
housing elements to be enacted by referendum vote.320 The city’s voters have 
consistently rejected the housing elements presented to them.321 As the housing 
element becomes more legally consequential under state law, other cities are 
likely to parrot Encinitas unless the state neutralizes their efforts.  
Fifth, the state legislature has not adopted an explicit, functional definition 
of what constitutes a “substantially compliant” housing element—although the 
definition proposed here is similar to the definition that HCD now uses, 322 and 
it’s arguable that HCD’s definition has been tacitly ratified by the legislature.323 
These caveats notwithstanding, California has certainly taken big steps 
toward the model I have sketched. The state has strengthened the preemptive 
force of the housing element and made it self-executing in key respects;324 
 
 318. See, e.g., Shea Homes Ltd. v. Alameda, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 739 (Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting preemption 
claim because it was possible that the measure would not conflict with housing element, at least if voters 
approved certain measures in the future); cf. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of San Diego v. Encinitas, No. 37-2017-
00023267-CU-WM-NC (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2018) (declining to enjoin voter-approval requirement for 
future housing elements because the city’s voters might behave reasonably in the future, notwithstanding their 
rejection of every housing element considered in the previous thirty years). 
 319. See supra text accompanying notes 238–242. 
 320. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of San Diego, slip op. at 4; Judge Orders the City of Encinitas to Adopt a Housing 
Element; City’s First Since 1992, PUB. INTEREST LAW PROJECT (Jan. 9, 2019), 
http://www.pilpca.org/2019/01/09/encinitas-housing-element-order/ (noting that city has not enacted a housing 
element update for nearly thirty years). While the court order in Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of San Diego counts as a one-
time success, the court refused to enjoin Encinitas’s voter-approval requirement prospectively, so the strategy 
of embedding voter- or supermajority-approval requirements in city charters may still be attractive to NIMBY 
activists hoping to gum up the housing-element process or pressure HCD into approving weak housing elements.   
 321. Barbara Henry, Encinitas Voters Turn Down City’s Latest Housing Plan Ballot Measure, THE SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Nov. 7, 2018) https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sd-no-housing-plan-20181107-
story.html. 
 322. See Kautz, supra note 224 (“the Department’s review considers the adequacy of information, program 
commitments and timeframes to meet various statutory goals and objectives”). 
 323. Compare supra notes 182–184 and accompanying text (explaining traditional standard of review), with 
notes 222–229and accompanying text (arguing that recent legislation supports functional compliance standard, 
and noting HCD’s gloss on substantial compliance).  
 324. See supra Subpart III.A.2. 
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housing-need determinations are now supposed to reflect national norms 
concerning “healthy housing markets;”325 the housing agency and (more tacitly) 
the legislature have pushed back against the traditional, deferential-to-local-
governments conception of “substantial compliance”;326 and the legislature has 
subjected local governments that remain out of compliance to a schedule of 
escalating fiscal penalties. 327 
B. THE CASE FOR THE MODEL  
The case for my proposal depends on the nature of the problem to be 
solved. From the point of view of a YIMBY state legislator who, let us assume, 
is well versed in the relevant economics, political science, and legal-academic 
literatures, the problem of overcoming locally-erected barriers to housing has 
the following salient features: extreme but geographically uneven preference 
conflict between state and local officials; substantial intracity conflicts over 
housing policy, at least in larger cities; asymmetric information (local 
governments have the advantage); a tradition of local control over land use; and 
weak or uncertain support in the statewide electorate for transferring control to 
the state.  
(1) Extreme but geographically uneven preference conflict between the state 
government (which wants more housing) and the municipal actors 
responsible for zoning and project permitting, many of whom want to 
preserve the status quo.  
As Part I explained, many local governments in expensive regions of the 
nation are dominated by homevoters who have strong financial interests in 
opposing new housing—especially housing in their neighborhoods—and who 
vote accordingly. Making the state/local conflict all the more intense is the fact 
that new housing can change local electorates in ways that threaten incumbent 
officeholders. Imagine a sleepy suburb of single-family homes that is compelled 
to permit five-story residential buildings within a half mile of transit stations, as 
a California lawmaker has proposed.328 In come thousands of new residents 
whose land-use preferences are likely to be quite different than those of the 
existing homeowners.329 Local politicians who’ve built their brands serving 
 
 325. See supra Subpart III.A.1. 
 326. See supra Subpart III.A.2.  
 327. See supra Subpart III.A.2. The legislature has also removed some exceptions that charter cities 
previously enjoyed. See S.B. 1333, 2017–2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018) (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65700 to apply 
consistency and other requirements to charter cities). These amendments respond to The Kennedy Comm’n v. 
Huntington Beach, 224 Cal. Rptr. 3d 665 (Ct. App. 2017) (holding that charter cities are not required to make 
zoning and specific plans consistent with their housing element). 
 328. See supra text accompanying notes 281–283.  
 329. If the newcomers are renters, they’ll support the development of more rental housing (though perhaps 
not in their neighborhoods). See Hankinson, supra note 69. And even as owners, they’ll probably have a greater 
taste for density, and less willingness to pay for roads and parking, than existing residents who own dispersed 
single-family homes. 
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homogenous, single-family-home neighborhoods will have a strong personal 
incentive to block the change, not just to put on a show opposing it. 
That said, the degree of state/local preference conflict over new housing is 
geographically uneven. The state wants a lot more housing in some places (near 
transit and employment centers), but not in others (environmentally sensitive 
lands, and places where prices haven’t escalated). And among the local 
governments targeted for more housing, opposition to the state’s agenda is likely 
to be much stronger in affluent, homogenous communities where nearly 
everyone is a homeowner than in mixed polities where renters make up a large 
share of the electorate.330 Opposition may also be weaker in communities that 
elect their local governments at-large rather than by-district.331 
(2) Intracity conflict over housing policy, the outcome of which may depend 
on procedural rules and the relative strength of the mayor and the city 
council. 
Particularly in cities that are socioeconomically and housing-tenure 
diverse, housing policy is likely to be an ongoing source of political conflict and 
compromise rather than an issue on which homevoters always get their way. 
Business interests may be forceful advocates for pro-growth policies,332 while 
neighborhood groups will favor local restrictions. Mayors, to a first 
approximation, are likely to be more supportive of liberal housing policies than 
city councilpersons elected from territorial districts.333 This is so because mayors 
answer to city-wide electorates, not district-specific constituencies (where 
neighborhood groups are well organized), and because mayors run in relatively 
expensive elections (making them more dependent on deep-pocketed business 
interests).334 As well, because of their higher profile, mayors have a better 
 
 330. But as Subpart I.B. explained, many big cities are also showing “NIMBY” characteristics. 
 331. See Michael Hankinson & Asya Magazinnik, How Electoral Institutions Shape the Efficiency and 
Equity of Distributive Policy (Sept. 17, 2019) (unpublished working paper), http://mhankinson.com/assets/ 
hankinson_magazinnik.pdf (finding that shifts from at-large to by-district elections induced by the California 
Voting Rights Act caused substantial reductions in number of housing permits issued citywide). Researchers 
have also found that zoning was adopted earlier in cities that elected their councils by-district rather than at-
large, and that cities with by-district elections have more exclusionary zoning codes. See James Clingermayer, 
Distributive Politics, Ward Representation, and the Spread of Zoning, 77 PUB. CHOICE 725, 730, 733–34 (1993); 
James Clingermayer, Electoral Representation, Zoning Politics, and the Exclusion of Group Homes, 47 POL. 
RES. Q. 969, 975–78 (1994). This is consistent with the idea that neighborhood/homevoter interests have more 
power under districted than at-large electoral systems. See Aaron Deslatte et al., Policy of Delay: Evidence from 
a Bayesian Analysis of Metropolitan Land‐Use Choices, 46 POL’Y STUD. J. 674, 689–90 (2018) (finding that in 
cities with districted elections, the degree of building-industry concentration has weaker influence on permitting 
delays).  
 332. An increase in housing supply that brings down prices would raise the effective (real) wage paid to 
workers, at no cost to employers. 
 333. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101 IOWA L. REV. 91, 
112–15, 124–29 (2015) [hereinafter Hills, Jr. & Schleicher, Planning]. Notably, the pending California bills to 
upzone all land in the state near transit and job centers for four-to-five story buildings has (as of this writing) 
been endorsed by the mayors of San Francisco, Oakland, San Jose, Sacramento, and Stockton, but no 
endorsements from city council members have been announced. Scott Wiener (@Scott_Wiener), TWITTER (Jan. 
17, 2019, 8:20 AM), https://twitter.com/Scott_Wiener/status/1085934772717641728. 
 334. Hills, Jr. & Schleicher, Planning, supra note 333, at 112–15, 124–29. 
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chance than city members of developing a personal brand known to voters,335 
which may provide some buffering against the discontent of homevoters 
reacting to neighborhood change. 
One consequence of these intracity conflicts (coupled with a lack of strong 
parties in municipal legislatures) is that the procedures through which land-use 
policy is developed can have big consequences for housing outcomes.336 
Specifically, as Rick Hills and David Schleicher have argued, a city’s policy is 
likely to be more accommodative of new housing if it is forged through citywide 
grand bargains, rather than worked out seriatim through project- or site-specific 
decisions.337 The seriatim, project-specific approach privileges the interests of 
those who have the most at stake in individual projects (like the neighborhood 
NIMBYs),338 whereas the prospect of a grand bargain can activate groups that 
would benefit from a big citywide or regional increase in the supply of housing 
(such as employers and municipal labor unions), particularly if the mayor plays 
an agenda-setting role.339 
(3) Asymmetric information about how best to reconcile the state’s desire for 
more housing with local preferences over urban form and community 
character. 
YIMBY state legislators know they want a lot more housing, and higher 
density housing, in expensive regions of the state. But they probably have little 
if any idea about how to assemble a given number of units into a built-form 
package that minimizes public opposition in any given locale. The local officials 
who make project-approval decisions on a daily basis are likely to have a much 
better sense of this. 
(4) A deeply rooted tradition of discretionary local control over land use, 
such that local governments have an enormous variety of tools with which to 
vitiate prescriptive mandates from the state. 
We saw in Part III that state legislators are increasingly willing to tell local 
governments that they must allow certain types of housing (like ADUs), or 
certain densities of housing. But as evidenced by the nearly forty-year game of 
cat and mouse that California has played with local governments over ADUs, 
it’s doubtful that nondiscrimination requirements (“treat housing type X the 
 
 335. See Christopher S. Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, Political 
Parties, and Election Law, 2 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 398–403 (2013). 
 336. More specifically, it is internal conflict plus the lack of meaningful partisan competition for control of 
city government that makes the procedural rules so important. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, 
Balancing the “Zoning Budget,” 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 81, 124–27 (2011) [hereinafter Hills, Jr. & Schleicher, 
Balancing]. 
 337. See id; Hills, Jr. & Schleicher, Planning, supra note 333. 
 338. Cf. Katherine Levine Einstein et al., Who Participates in Local Government? Evidence from Meeting 
Minutes, 17 PERSP. ON POL. 28, 28–46 (2019) (studying minutes of planning and zoning board meetings in the 
Boston area and finding that homeowners are vastly overrepresented among people who comment on land-use 
issues, and nearly always speak in opposition to proposed developments). 
 339. Business interests are hard to engage on individual projects (which considered in isolation have no 
tangible effect on the regional housing market), but will be highly motivated to lobby on proposals that would 
materially increase the total supply of housing in the labor markets from which they hire. See supra note 332.  
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same as housing type Y”) or narrow mandates (“allow housing type X on parcels 
zoned for single-family homes”) will actually result in local governments 
permitting a lot more housing. Such requirements do not prevent local agencies 
from exercising their permitting discretion to stymie projects they dislike,340 or 
from enacting facially neutral ordinances that make the state-favored housing 
type tough to develop. 
To be sure, California’s HAA generally prevents local governments from 
denying or reducing the density of projects that comply with objective standards, 
but the Act does not prevent local governments from otherwise conditioning 
projects in extremely subjective ways.341 So it was that San Francisco’s planning 
commission recently demanded changes to an infill condo development because 
the windows looked too upscale,342 and turned back a small ADU-and-an-
addition project because the commission thought the architect could improve the 
unit’s internal layout.343 This kind of nitpicking leads to interminable delays, and 
positions anti-development factions to weigh down projects with uneconomic 
conditions.344  
(5) Weak or (at best) highly uncertain support in the statewide electorate for 
consolidating state control over zoning and development permitting.  
Strong conflicts between state and local preferences often give rise to field 
preemption,345 so perhaps it’s not surprising that California has cut off most local 
discretion with respect to ADUs. Yet thoroughgoing state control over ADUs is 
probably tenable only because ADUs pose such trivial threats to neighborhood 
character and homeowner wealth. No interest group cares enough to wage a big 
battle against ADU mandates. At some point, though, strong pro-housing 
interventions by the state may engender serious pushback, such as a ballot 
initiative to constitutionalize local control over land use.346 Should that occur, 
 
 340. See sources cited, supra note 36.  
 341. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65589.5(j)(1) & (5) (West 2019). 
 342. See Laura Wenus, Development Delayed as SF Commission Wants Less Aggressive Design, 
MISSIONLOCAL (Feb. 24, 2017), https://missionlocal.org/2017/02/development-delayed-as-sf-commission-
wants-less-aggressive-design/ (quoting planning commissioner Myrna Melgar, “Big windows, to me, are a 
statement of class and privilege”). 
 343. See Scott Feeney (@graue), TWITTER (Aug. 23, 2018, 6:16 P.M.), 
https://twitter.com/graue/status/1032798736160718849.  
 344. The HAA’s distinction between density-reducing and non-density reducing conditions is rather 
arbitrary, because a significant risk of substantial conditions or delays will deter developers from even proposing 
redevelopment projects that are only modestly more profitable than the next best use of the land. 
 345. See generally Richard Briffault, Essay, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995 
(2018) (exploring city-level enactment of liberal policies and state-level preemption of those same policies in 
states with Republican-dominated legislatures and Democratic cities). 
 346. In California, an umbrella organization of anti-housing activists recently formed to lobby the state and 
support allied candidates for local and state offices. See Livable California Celebrates Candidates, LIVABLE 
CAL. (Nov. 10, 2018), https://www.livablecalifornia.org/second-post/ (documenting the group’s actions). As of 
this writing, there are two pending state-constitutional “home rule” challenges to SB 35—the 2017 state statute 
which requires expedited, by-right permitting of certain projects—if the local government has failed to meet its 
housing targets. See generally Petition for Writ of Mandamus and a Complaint for Declaratory Relief and 
Injunctive Relief, Huntington Beach v. State, No. 30-2018-00984280-CU-WM-CJC (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 
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it’s not at all clear that YIMBYs would prevail. Some recent opinion polls 
suggest that a supermajority of the California electorate objects to giving the 
state more authority over development permitting,347 although other polls find 
broad support for higher density housing near transit.348 Public opinion outside 
of California appears to be quite protective of local control, but there has not 
been much work on the subject.349  
* * * 
To sum up, the housing problem is a very tough nut: the preferences of 
local officials tend to diverge sharply from the preferences of the pro-housing 
faction in state government; local governments can vitiate state mandates by 
exploiting their permitting discretion, residual regulatory authority, and superior 
information; and state lawmakers who would like to wrest control of zoning and 
development permitting from local governments cannot count on support from 
the statewide electorate. 
 
2018); Letter from Dee Williams-Ridley, City Manager, City of Berkeley Planning & Dev. Dep’t, to Dana 
Ellsworth (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.cityofberkeley.info/uploadedFiles/Clerk/Level_3_-
_General/1900%20Fourth%20Street%20090418.pdf (denying SB 35 permit application on ground that state law 
is unconstitutional). I expect the SB 35 challenges to fail, but their failure could catalyze a ballot initiative to 
expand cities’ home rule powers over land use.  
 347. See USCDORNSLIFE, USC DORNSIFE/LOS ANGELES TIMES CALIFORNIA POLL (2018), 
https://dornsife.usc.edu/unruh/past-polls/. The study found that, by a 3:1 margin, registered and likely California 
voters endorsed proposition that “[t]he authority to approve housing developments should remain primarily with 
cities and counties,” as opposed to “[t]he state should have greater authority to approve housing developments 
than it does now.” Id. at 8. It also found that voters are more than twice as likely to attribute housing 
unaffordability to “lack of rent control” and “lack of funding for low income housing,” than to “too little 
homebuilding” or “restrictive zoning rules.” Id. at 7. For more on this, see Carson Bruno, Californians See the 
Housing Affordability Crisis as a Threat to the California Dream, EUREKA (May 19, 2015), 
https://www.hoover.org/research/californians-see-housing-affordability-crisis-threat-california-dream 
(reporting results of Hoover Institution poll, finding that (1) while most Californians see housing affordability 
as a big problem, only about a third favor relaxing zoning or open-space requirements to accommodate more 
housing; and (2) that when respondents were asked about “new housing in your area,” the only type of housing 
to receive majority support was single family homes with large yards). 
 348. See Californians & Their Government, supra note 69, at 5 (finding that “62 percent [of likely voters] 
favor requiring local governments to change zoning for new development from single-family to multi-family 
housing near transit and job centers”). 
 349. Marble & Nall, supra note 69. The authors recently surveyed residents of the nation’s twenty largest 
metro areas and found overwhelming support for “giving neighborhoods more voice over development 
proposals.” See id. at 13, tbl.A-5. Conversely, they found a lack of support for “changing local laws to allow 
more construction.” See id. They also asked about a hypothetical state law to require local governments to allow 
apartment buildings and found majority support only among those renters who also favor a national housing 
guarantee. See id. While one might think that liberal homeowners would be moved to support high-density 
housing, the authors show that self-interest trumps ideology. For a useful comparison, see Hankinson, supra 
note 69, at 491, figs. C8 & C9 (reporting results from national survey showing that in average-to-expensive 
cities, only about 25% of homeowners would support a 10% increase in the citywide housing supply, whereas 
about 50%–60% of renters in the same cities would support the policy); see also Andrew H. Whittemore & Todd 
K. BenDor, Exploring the Acceptability of Densification: How Positive Framing and Source Credibility Can 
Change Attitudes, 10 URB. AFF. REV. 1, 24–28 (2018) (finding in a national survey that several positive frames 
reduced, rather than increased, homeowners’ support for a denser-than-typical residential project in their 
neighborhood).  
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As the balance of this Subpart will explain, the model I have outlined—
building on and extending the recent California reforms—aims to crack the 
housing nut with complementary top-down and bottom-up forces. Applying 
pressure from above, the state would use the threat of fiscal penalties to get local 
governments to periodically revisit and liberalize their entire framework for 
housing development, including zoning maps, development standards and fees, 
permitting procedures, and anything else that might stand in the way of 
achieving the local government’s quota of new housing. This periodic 
redefinition of the local regulatory baseline would occur in a manner that is 
politically discreet, sensitive to information asymmetries, and resistant to 
backsliding. The complementary, bottom-up strategy is to subtly shift the 
balance of local policymaking authority toward more housing-tolerant factions, 
while giving these factions the ability to use state law to make credible 
regulatory-reform commitments. 
1. From the Top Down: Baseline Change and Lock-In, Done Discreetly  
It should now be clear that if states are to curtail local barriers to the supply 
of housing, it is not enough to preempt discrete local rules, such as height and 
density limits near transit stations. Changes to the regulatory status quo must be 
backstopped against the evasive tactics of local governments wielding residual 
regulatory authority and permitting discretion. The bigger the intervention, the 
greater the need for backstopping.  
There is one seminal example of a higher-level government acting under 
conditions of extreme preference conflict to change the regulatory status quo 
among lower-level governments, while effectively backstopping the new 
regulatory baseline against evasion: the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA),350 
through which Congress overcame generations of black disenfranchisement in 
the South.351 The variation on the California model I have sketched represents 
an effort to borrow and adapt the VRA paradigm.  
Structurally, the problem facing Congress in 1965 was in key respects quite 
similar to the problem faced today by state lawmakers trying to induce local 
governments to allow a lot more housing in areas of economic opportunity. In 
both cases, the central government wants local governments to heed the interests 
of a class of outsiders (blacks in the VRA example, would-be residents in the 
housing example), but the local governments don’t allow the outsiders to vote 
in their elections, and the interests of the excluded outsiders are at war with the 
interests of those who do vote.352 In both cases, adherence to the central 
 
 350. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89–110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). 
 351. See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY 
IN THE UNITED STATES 206-17 (2009); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING 
RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION (1991).  
 352. There is also considerable evidence that opposition to new, higher-density housing is exacerbated by 
cultural or racial hostility to would-be newcomers, particularly among conservatives. See Jonathan Mummolo 
& Clayton Nall, Why Partisans Do Not Sort: The Constraints on Political Segregation, 79 J. POLITICS 45, 48–
49 (2017) (showing that conservatives prefer racially homogenous neighborhoods); Trounstine, supra note 76, 
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government’s policies would transform local electorates in ways that could 
jeopardize incumbent politicians’ hold on office.353 In both cases, preference 
conflict between the central government and local governments varies with 
geography. By the mid-20th century, black disenfranchisement was mostly a 
Southern phenomenon, and within the South, blacks were geographically 
concentrated.354  
So, what did the federal government do about black disenfranchisement? 
Initially, it tried to enforce the 15th Amendment with affirmative litigation.355 
By the 1950s, many federal courts stood ready to enjoin unconstitutional 
discrimination against black voters, but prescriptive mandates in the form of 
injunctions didn’t achieve much black enfranchisement.356 When one 
discriminatory law was invalidated, another would be enacted to take its 
place.357 When voting registrars were personally enjoined from violating the 
rights of African Americans, they would resign and the jurisdiction would move 
to have the injunction lifted, thus positioning a newly appointed registrar to 
continue his predecessor’s unconstitutional conduct.358  
But with the VRA, the cat finally caught the mouse. Congress’s solution 
for Jim Crow disenfranchisement was to ban one particularly damaging 
instrumentality of racial discrimination—tests of literacy and moral character as 
a prerequisite to voting359—and to backstop the ban by conditionally preempting 
all changes to state and local electoral practices in the South.360 No electoral 
reform in the so-called “covered jurisdictions” could take effect unless approved 
by the U.S. Department of Justice or the District Court for the District of 
Columbia.361 The burden of proof in these preclearance proceedings was on the 
covered jurisdiction to show that the change was neither intended to make 
minority voters worse off (“retrogression”), nor likely to have that effect.362 In 
 
at 10 (showing that “whiteness” of precinct is strongly correlated with support for growth controls, and that 
restrictive land use policies exacerbate racial segregation). 
 353. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 328–329 (describing transformation of local electorate’s land-use 
preferences that may result from introduction of dense residential buildings, especially rental buildings, into 
neighborhoods of single family homes). 
 354. On Southern politics and racial conflict at the time, see V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE 
AND NATION (1949). Among jurisdictions covered by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the share of the adult 
population that voted in the presidential election of 1964 was at least twelve percentage points lower than the 
national average. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 300 (1966). 
 355. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL 
PROCESS 715–17 (5th ed. 2016); KEYSSAR, supra note 351; BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, FREE AT LAST TO VOTE: THE 
ALABAMA ORIGINS OF THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT (2007). 
 356. ISSACHAROFF, ET AL., supra note 355; KEYSSAR, supra note 351; LANDSBERG, supra note 355. 
 357. ISSACHAROFF, ET AL., supra note 355; KEYSSAR, supra note 351; LANDSBERG, supra note 355. 
 358. ISSACHAROFF, ET AL., supra note 355; KEYSSAR, supra note 351; LANDSBERG, supra note 355. 
 359. Voting Rights Act § 4.  
 360. Voting Rights Act § 5. 
 361. Id. 
 362. Id. The retrogression standard is a judicial gloss. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 
328 (2000); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).  
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short, Congress both changed the regulatory baseline for voting and locked in 
the new baseline with the preclearance mechanism.  
It was an elegant solution. The ban on literacy and moral-character tests 
knocked out the principal source of local discretion with respect to voter 
registration, and thus the channel of sub rosa discrimination.363 Meanwhile, the 
preclearance framework adroitly navigated between two competing dangers: the 
risk that a covered jurisdiction would invent some discriminatory substitute for 
literacy tests, and the risk that the federal administrator would push the covered 
jurisdictions too hard, inducing so much local opposition as to inadvertently fell 
the whole regime. The substantive modesty of the retrogression standard, which 
allowed local governments to change their practices in any way that did not 
make minority voters worse off, limited the risk of administrative overreach.364 
Conversely, the procedural requirement that covered jurisdictions bear the 
burden of proving that proposed changes were non-retrogressive made it 
difficult for subnational governments to exploit asymmetric information about 
the likely effects of a change. If the federal administrator couldn’t tell whether a 
change would make minority voters worse off, the law required her to block it, 
unless or until the subnational government revealed why the change would not 
be retrogressive.365 
The VRA was enormously successful. Registration and turnout rates 
among African Americans in the South surged almost overnight.366 Several 
studies comparing adjacent “covered” and “noncovered” counties show that 
blacks in the covered jurisdictions realized huge gains in non-electoral domains 
as well, such as labor market outcomes.367 Once blacks could vote, Southern 
politicians paid attention to their interests.368 
 
 363. See Daniel S. Goldman, Note, The Modern-Day Literacy Test?: Felon Disenfranchisement and Race 
Discrimination, 57 STAN. L. REV. 611, 620 (2004), and sources cited therein. 
 364. It’s not clear whether “retrogression” was the standard envisioned by Congress in 1965, but as glossed 
by the courts, see supra note 362, the VRA limits the risk of administrative overreach.  
 365. Reno, 528 U.S. at 320; Beer, 425 U.S. at 120. 
 366. See KEVIN J. COLEMAN, CONG. RES. SERV., THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965: BACKGROUND AND 
OVERVIEW 12–13 (2014); see also Desmond Ang, Do 40-Year-Old Facts Still Matter? Long-Run Effects of 
Federal Oversight under the Voting Rights Act (Harv. Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. 18-033, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3271907 (estimating that long-run voter turnout in the covered jurisdictions increased 
by four-to-eight percentage points). 
 367. See generally Elizabeth U. Cascio & Ebonya Washington, Valuing the Vote: The Redistribution of 
Voting Rights and State Funds Following the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 129 Q. J. ECONOMICS 379 (2014) 
(estimating effects on state spending on counties with large black populations); Abhay Aneja & Carlos 
Avenancio-Leon, Labor Market Effects of Minority Political Power: Evidence from the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 (Oct. 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (estimating effects on black wages); Ang, supra 
note 366 (documenting long-run effects on voter turnout); Andrea Bernini et al., Race, Representation and Local 
Governments in the US South: The Effect of the Voting Rights Act (CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12774, Mar. 
13, 2018) (estimating that VRA doubled black representation in local government in covered jurisdictions, 
relative to control counties). 
 368. In addition to the studies cited supra note 367, see Sophie Schuit & Jon C. Rogowski, Race, 
Representation, and the Voting Rights Act, 61 AM. J. POL. SCI. 513, 524 (2017) (showing effects on roll call 
votes of Members of Congress on civil rights legislation). 
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The model I have sketched for housing is akin to the VRA, in that it 
combines baseline change with a preclearance-type lock-in mechanism.369 A 
new regulatory baseline is periodically established through housing elements, 
and retrogression is controlled through centralized, pre-implementation review 
of housing-element amendments.  
But there are also some significant differences. Most important, the new 
regulatory baseline for housing is negotiated administratively on a case-by-case 
basis, and periodically revisited, rather than prescribed by statute once and for 
all.370 And whereas the VRA categorically eliminated the principal source of 
local “permitting discretion” with respect to voting, the housing framework 
tacitly delegates the analogous question to an administrative agency, which must 
decide whether the discretionary permitting arrangements of any given local 
government constitute unreasonable constraints on housing development.371  
The lock-in mechanism also diverges somewhat from the VRA paradigm. 
Whereas the VRA conditionally preempted the field of electoral regulation, 
barring local governments from changing any standard, rule, or procedure 
without federal preapproval, the California model for housing is much less 
draconian, even with the extensions I have proposed. Local governments remain 
free to enact or modify any rule or regulation that is subordinate to the housing 
element, without pre-implementation review. Indeed, local governments may 
unilaterally amend the preemptive compact itself (the certified housing 
element), putting the onus on the state to decertify the housing element or accede 
to the amendment. The regulatory baseline defined by the original compact is 
therefore “locked in” only to the extent that the local governing body fears the 
sanctions associated with decertification or wants to maintain the suspension of 
charter provisions or voter-approved measures that the certified housing element 
has superseded.372  
 
 369. One might suppose that the Fair Housing Act (FHA)—the federal government’s 1960s-era response to 
discrimination in the housing market—would offer a better model than the VRA. But the FHA (in contrast to 
the VRA) effected neither a clear revision to the regulatory baseline for new housing, nor a mechanism to prevent 
retrogression. At best, the FHA expressed an aspiration: no unnecessary, racially disparate impacts. See Tex. 
Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015). But the FHA 
depends entirely on case-by-case litigation (like 15th Amendment enforcement prior to the VRA), and the goal 
that informs FHA disparate-impact analysis can be understood in two different and often mutually contradictory 
ways. See id. at 2548–50 (Alito, J., dissenting). Therefore, it’s not surprising that the FHA’s impact has been 
very limited. See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of 
Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L REV. 357, 421 (2013) 
(reviewing decades of case law and finding that housing-barrier challenges under the FHA almost never 
succeed).  
 370. See supra Subpart IV.A. 
 371. See supra Subpart IV.A (proposing definition of “substantial compliance,” which calls for 
administrative review of reasonableness of any local barrier to achieving a locality’s housing quota if 
achievement of the quota is uncertain). 
 372. Under both current California law and the extension that I have sketched, the state agency lacks 
authority to impose a housing element of its own design on a local government which is out of compliance. This 
distinguishes the model from standard “cooperative federalism” arrangements, which often authorize a federal 
agency to promulgate implementation plans on a state’s behalf if the state fails to enact its own, federally 
F - ELMENDORF_26 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 11/6/2019  7:14 PM 
December 2019] BEYOND THE DOUBLE VETO 143 
These departures from the VRA paradigm have an underlying logic: they 
accommodate the absence of a political consensus about metropolitan land use. 
By the mid-1960s, when Congress passed the VRA, there had emerged an elite 
national consensus that blacks should be able to vote on the same terms as 
whites, and that no one should have to surmount a test of literacy or moral 
character, or pay a tax, as a prerequisite to voting.373 By contrast, there is today 
no readily articulable, state-level consensus about how much new housing 
should be planned for and where it should go. Nor has local discretion in 
development permitting come to be regarded as illegitimate. No doubt many 
homeowners are quite happy that their planning commission and city council 
can impose ad hoc limitations on nearby projects. The mantra of “local control 
over land use” elicits broad support in statewide surveys of public opinion.374  
Under these circumstances, the political genius of the emerging California 
model is that it should soon enable the state to bring about something 
functionally similar to a statewide zoning and development code, without quite 
appearing to do so. More precisely, the governor will be well positioned to bring 
this about if California authorizes the housing agency to plump up regional 
housing quotas on the basis of market conditions; settles on a functional 
definition of housing element “substantial compliance”; clarifies that certified 
housing elements supersede all local law to the contrary, including charter and 
voter-enacted provisions; and establishes evidentiary and procedural rules (such 
as the proposed extension of the Housing Accountability Act) that make it 
feasible for developers to get plan-compliant projects exempted from 
cumbersome local rules that were not authorized by the housing element.375 The 
first two steps are necessary to prevent restrictive local governments from 
dodging meaningful administrative scrutiny of their housing restrictions (by 
showing either that their housing element notionally “contains the elements 
mandated by statute,”376 or that they will meet a trivial housing target even with 
substantial constraints in place). The third and fourths steps are necessary to 
make the theoretical preemptive effect of the housing plan a practical reality.  
Once California completes these steps, the set of local housing elements, 
viewed as a whole, will be akin to a statewide zoning and development code for 
an ample quantity of new housing. The housing elements, locally drafted but 
approved by a state agency, will control the basic size-and-density terms for 
development. The state agency, under control of the governor, can be expected 
to establish fairly aggressive housing targets, and generally to review housing 
elements with an exacting eye. This is so because the governor, of all the state’s 
 
approved plan. Cf. Dave Owen, Cooperative Subfederalism, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 177, 186–88 (2018) 
(discussing federal Clean Water Act in relation to state-local cooperative programs). 
 373. See Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: The People and the Poll 
Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 72 (2009). 
 374. See supra notes 347–349 and accompanying text. 
 375. These conditions correspond to Elements of the Model (1), (6), (3), and (5) respectively, per supra 
Subpart IV.A. 
 376. See supra notes 182–184 and accompanying text.  
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elected officials, is likely to be the most reliably supportive of pro-housing 
policies. The governor answers to the statewide electorate, not just to 
homeowners in the high-cost regions. The governor runs in expensive statewide 
elections, which means that deep-pocketed business interests are likely to have 
her ear as well.377 Gubernatorial elections are also relatively high-turnout and 
high-information affairs, which makes them hard for homevoters to control.378 
And because the governor’s capacity to carry out her non-housing agenda 
depends on tax revenue, the governor should be quite sensitive to housing 
bottlenecks on economic growth.379 
Yet even as housing elements in the aggregate would function like a 
preemptive statewide zoning and development code, the rules that apply within 
the territory of a local government will have been proposed initially by that 
government, negotiated with the state in a low-limelight administrative setting, 
and codified as a component of the locality’s own general plan, rather than as 
state law. The housing element’s de jure status as local law, and the obscure 
process through which state approval is obtained, should help state legislators 
parry any accusation that they have imposed a statewide zoning map.  
The local prerogative to draft the housing element means that local 
governments have substantial leeway to decide how best to reconcile the state’s 
housing objectives with local preferences over the built environmental and 
community character. Importantly though, under the test for substantial 
compliance that I have proposed, a local government could only avoid 
administrative scrutiny of the reasonableness of its zoning, development 
standards, procedures, and fees if the local government persuades the state 
agency that the locality is “substantially certain” to meet its housing target.380 
Much as the VRA’s evidentiary standards encouraged covered jurisdictions to 
come forward with evidence about the likely effects of a proposed election-law 
change,381 so too does the proposed test for substantial compliance encourage 
local governments to rectify information asymmetries in housing element 
review, either by sharing information about local conditions with the state or by 
committing to development standards and procedures that render 
 
 377. Cf. Liam Dillon, How California’s Candidates for Governor Want to Fix the State’s Housing Problems, 
L.A. TIMES (May 10, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-governor-housing-roundup-20180510-
htmlstory.html. (summarizing housing positions platforms of leading candidates for Governor of California in 
2018, nearly all of whom took strong positions in favor of expansion of supply). 
 378. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 335, at 398–403 (reviewing literature); J. Eric Oliver & Shang 
E. Ha, Vote Choice in Suburban Elections, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 393, 404 (2007) (finding that homeowners 
are vastly overrepresented in suburban local government elections relative to their share of the voting-eligible 
population, and that their vote choice in these elections is informed more by particular issues or personal 
knowledge of candidates rather than partisanship); Joseph T. Ornstein, Municipal Election Timing and the 
Politics of Urban Growth (Apr. 30, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (finding that off-cycle 
local government elections, which result in lower turnout, lead to more restrictive housing policies). 
 379. See supra Subpart I.C.3. 
 380. See supra Subpart IV.A. (element #6). 
 381. See Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
after Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2143, 2154 (2015). 
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inconsequential phenomena that are hard for the state to see. 382 Similarly, the 
proposed evidentiary standard for project-specific preemption challenges would 
give local officials a strong incentive not to hide local development requirements 
by omitting them from the housing element’s analysis of constraints. If a state-
certified housing element openly acknowledges and justifies a restriction, the 
local government would have a strong argument that no reasonable person could 
deem normal applications of that restriction inconsistent with the housing 
element. But if the constraint is not acknowledged in the housing element, and 
if it materially delays, downsizes, or raises the cost of a developer’s plan-
compliant project, project proponents would have a strong case for an exemption 
and the local government would be on the hook for proponents’ legal fees.  
Notice also that to the extent that there does emerge a political consensus 
about unacceptable land-use controls—either in general or as to certain 
retrograde local governments—the state housing agency could easily 
incorporate these norms into its review of housing elements. For example: 
• The agency could announce that, as a general matter, it will deem 
housing elements not to have “remov[ed] all unreasonable regulatory and 
procedural constraints”383 unless the housing element requires local 
authorities to process development applications exclusively on the basis 
of procedures, standards, and fee schedules that were published on the 
planning department’s website prior to date on which the developer’s 
application was deemed complete.384 The informational costs and project 
risks generated by a local government’s failure to commit to this 
transparency principle arguably represent an unreasonable constraint on 
housing production. 
• The agency could announce that, as a general matter, discretionary 
permitting of housing-element-compliant projects will be deemed to be 
an “unreasonable constraint” if the jurisdiction failed to meet its housing 
target during the previous planning cycle.385 This would put pressure on 
local governments to commit to ministerial permitting through their 
housing element.386  
• The agency could push local governments whose development 
permitting is unusually slow to enact, through their housing elements, a 
 
 382. For example, the preferences of local officials who review permit applications. 
 383. See supra Subpart IV.A. (element #6). 
 384. SB 330, enacted just before this Article went to press, prohibits local governments from applying to a 
project “ordinances, policies, and standards” not in effect when the developer’s preliminary application was 
submitted. See S.B. 330, 2018-2019 Leg. (Cal. 2019) (adding CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65589.5(o) (West 2019)). 
Because of SB 330, there’s no longer much reason for HCD to try to bring about similar local commitments 
through housing element review. I retain the example mainly to illustrate how reforms that housing advocates 
have pursued through the legislature could just as easily (and often more easily) be pursued in the administrative 
arena, under a robust housing element / state review framework.  
 385. Oregon’s state planning agency has ordered local governments to eliminate discretionary approval 
standards vis-a-vis “needed housing.” See, e.g., BILL KLOOS, FAIR HOUSING COUNCIL OF OREGON—PLANNING 
FOR HOUSING: DON’T FORGET THE BASICS 18 (May 15, 2008) (citing LCDC Compliance Order (Aug. 23, 1982) 
and Staff Report (Aug. 19, 1982) at 28-19); id. (citing LCDC Work Task Order 02-WKTASK-001412, at 4 (June 
27, 2002) (faulting planned development overlay zoning for insufficient clarity).  
 386. The commitment would be credible since the housing element is the highest law of the local 
government, and because amending the housing element risks decertification. 
F - ELMENDORF_26 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 11/6/2019  7:14 PM 
146 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:79 
local fix for gaping loopholes in the Permit Streamlining Act.387 This 
California statute stipulates that if a public agency fails to complete its 
review of a project within a designated period of time, the project shall 
be deemed approved as a matter of law. But the clock starts to run only 
after the agency has completed environmental reviews, 388 and the clock 
is tolled by internal appeals. With an eye to chinking these gaps, the 
housing agency might announce that as to jurisdictions whose permitting 
times were very slow during the previous cycle (and which failed to meet 
their targets), the agency will deem the local government to have 
“unreasonable constraints” unless the housing element includes a 
deemed-approved proviso limiting review of plan-compliant projects to 
(say) twelve months, inclusive of environmental studies and internal 
appeals.389 
As valuable as it would be to empower the housing agency to establish such 
norms by regulation, it is equally important that the framework not require any 
of this. The agency should be allowed to proceed case-by-case rather than by 
general rule if it wishes. The agency should be able to issue loose guidelines 
rather than firm rules, or rules that establish only rebuttable presumptions, 
thereby retaining flexibility to make politically informed judgements about what 
different local governments will tolerate. Because the strength of state/local 
preference conflict over housing varies geographically, and because some 
communities have greater political resources for pushing back than others, a 
state-law framework for boosting the supply of housing needs this flexibility.  
2. From the Bottom Up: Strengthening Pro-Housing Actors in City 
Politics, and Facilitating Regional Deals 
While top-down pressure applied through housing-element review and 
preclearance of amendments is central to the framework I have sketched, it is 
not everything. My extension of the California model would also strengthen the 
hand of local actors who favor more accommodative housing policies, in ways 
that go considerably beyond what California has achieved to date. 
For example, city councils would be able to unfetter themselves from 
voter-enacted growth controls and permitting rigmarole—and to do this without 
going to the voters, and while deflecting blame to someone else. A council 
would need only to obtain the state agency’s approval of a housing element that 
conflicts with the problematic voter-adopted constraints. If homevoters 
complain, the city council can respond, “The state pushed us to do it; we had to 
or else we’d lose funding.” And if homevoters gripe to the governor or the 
 
 387. For citations to the provisions of the Permit Streamlining Act mentioned in this paragraph, see supra 
note 195. 
 388. That is, environmental review under CEQA. See supra note 195.  
 389. To be sure, a housing element’s “deemed approved” provision could not, as such, exempt the local 
government from otherwise applicable state law such as CEQA. But CEQA review is only triggered by 
discretionary government actions. See BARCLAY & GRAY, supra note 192, at 144. And if the housing element 
commits the local government to approving projects ministerially (at least after a certain period of time following 
project submission), then CEQA would become inapplicable at that time. 
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housing agency, the state-level actors can answer in kind: “All we did was 
approve your city council’s proposal for accommodating a reasonable amount 
of new housing. If you want it done differently, tell them, but don’t complain to 
us.”  
Notice also that the proposed framework gives the city council a menu of 
options, varying in certainty and transparency, for displacing problematic local 
constraints to new housing. At one end of the spectrum, the council could list a 
local rule or practice in the housing element’s appendix as one which is “deemed 
preempted” as of the date of the housing element’s enactment. This would be 
tantamount to voting to repeal the constraint, except that doing it through the 
housing element may help shift some blame to the state. At the other end of the 
spectrum, the council could simply omit certain known constraints from the list 
of constraints that the housing element acknowledges and justifies. This would 
set up developers to argue for project-specific exemptions on the theory that a 
reasonable person could deem the constraint inconsistent with the housing 
element. At the same time, city lawmakers could plausibly deny that they ever 
intended to preempt the constraint. An intermediate option is to list the constraint 
in the housing element’s appendix with a future date of preemption, stipulating 
that it shall then be preempted if not reformed beforehand. 390 This would shift 
the burden of legislative inertia to defenders of the constraint while foisting 
political responsibility for the tough choice of what to do about it onto a future 
city council. In sum, the menu of options allows the city council to tailor its 
constraint-alleviation strategy to the political exigencies of the moment. 
To be sure, city councils are not reliably pro-housing actors.391 Given the 
choice, some will jealously defend local constraints on housing development. 
Still, survey evidence suggests that many city council members understand the 
housing-supply problem and would like to do something about it, but feel 
hemmed in politically.392 A state-law framework that positions city councils to 
remove constraints while dodging blame should do some good, perhaps 
especially with respect to older, voter-adopted constraints whose undoing may 
seem less an affront to today’s electorate.  
My adjustments to the California model would also bolster mayors vis-à-
vis city councils in negotiations over the housing element. (As explained above, 
 
 390. To similar effect, the housing element could state that certain densities or floor-to-area ratios for 
designated sites will be made available by a specified future date. See supra note 242 (arguing that such 
commitments are already directly enforceable through project-specific litigation under the HAA). 
 391. If elected from territorial districts, they will tend to be responsive to homeowner interests in the 
neighborhood. See supra note 333 and accompanying text. 
 392. See PAUL G. LEWIS & MAX NEIMAN, CITIES UNDER PRESSURE: LOCAL GROWTH CONTROLS AND 
RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY 41–51 (2002) (concluding, based on survey of local officials in California, 
that most city members have neutral or pro-growth attitudes toward housing, but are often cowed by grassroots, 
anti-growth factions); see also Michael Manville & Taner Osman, Motivations for Growth Revolts: Discretion 
and Pretext as Sources of Development Conflict, 16 CITY & COMMUNITY 66, 70 (2017) (arguing, based on 
several case studies, that voter-adopted growth controls often result from perception that city councils too readily 
grant variances and rezonings to accommodate developers). 
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mayors are likely to be more supportive of liberal housing policies.)393 The key 
move is to authorize mayors to promulgate interim housing elements if the 
state’s deadline has passed without the local government enacting a compliant 
housing element using the normal, locally prescribed procedures. Once mayors 
have this power, city councils will make generous concessions ex ante to the 
mayor, in the hopes of avoiding a veto or other mayorally induced delay of the 
council’s housing element.  
Notice finally that my extension of the California framework would 
powerfully support bottom-up initiatives to plan for more housing in a region. 
Consider by way of illustration the recent efforts of the Metro Mayors Coalition 
in Greater Boston and the Committee to House the Bay Area (“CASA”) in the 
San Francisco Bay Area.394 In each case, a regional planning entity convened a 
consortium of elected officials,395 and the consortium developed quantitative 
targets for new housing in the region as well as guidelines for zoning and 
development-permitting reforms.396 These efforts build on Rick Hills and David 
Schleicher’s important insight that land-use policy is likely to be more 
accommodative of new housing if it can be forged through grand bargains on 
citywide or larger scales, rather than worked out seriatim through project- or 
site-specific upzonings and downzonings.397  
As Hills and Schleicher acknowledge, the central challenge for the grand-
bargain approach is “designing an enforcement mechanism.”398 What is to keep 
individual members of a city council from defecting, once community groups 
and nearby homeowners start complaining about specific projects in the 
councilmember’s district? Or, at the regional level, what is to keep the 
municipalities that forge a Greater Boston or Greater Bay Area plan from 
reneging on their commitments to one another? California’s experience since the 
early 1980s with its RHNA process suggests that regionally coordinated plans 
are worthless if the plans don’t actually compel local governments to remove 
development constraints or issue building permits.399 
 
 393. See supra text accompanying notes 333–335. 
 394. See Tim Logan, Citing “Housing Emergency,” 15 Mayors Pledge to Boost Construction, BOS. GLOBE 
(Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2018/10/02/citing-housing-emergency-local-mayors-
pledge-dramatically-boost-construction/plYlzBr3OoM6W6la3L1zTL/story.html (reporting on announced goal 
of 185,000 new units by 2030, a tripling of the rate of housing relative to the previous decade); Rachel Swan, 
Bay Area Leaders Propose Aggressive Housing Fix, and New Agency to Get It Done, S.F. CHRONICLE (Dec. 12, 
2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Bay-Area-leaders-propose-aggerssive-housing-fix-
13461969.php. 
 395. The CASA consortium includes business, labor, and interest group leaders, as well as elected officials. 
See CASA Membership Roster, METRO. TRANSP. COMM’N, https://mtc.ca.gov/our-work/plans-projects/casa-
committee-house-bay-area/casa-membership-roster (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). 
 396. See supra note 394. 
 397. See Hills, Jr. & Schleicher, Planning, supra note 333, at 170; Hills, Jr. & Schleicher, Balancing, supra 
note 336, at 90–96. 
 398. Hills, Jr. & Schleicher, Planning, supra note 333, at 125. 
 399. See supra Subpart II.B.2. 
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But consider how the Metro Mayors and CASA undertakings could play 
out if the parent state had the legal framework I have sketched in place. 
Quantitative housing goals set by the collaborative would probably become de 
facto floors for the state’s housing-need assessment for the region. Knowing that 
there’s a regional-elite consensus for a certain amount of new housing, the 
state’s housing agency would have little reason to demand less.400  
Similarly, the collaborative’s guidelines for zoning and regulatory reform 
would inform the agency’s review of “constraints” under housing elements 
submitted by local governments in the region. If most of the region’s local 
governments have, through the collaborative, condemned a particular barrier to 
development, the state housing agency would have a strong political and legal 
basis on which to disallow it in that region, if not elsewhere.401 Moreover, 
commitments made in housing elements to remove such constraints would be 
credible, both because constraints listed in the preemption appendix would 
automatically sunset on the specified date, and because any later-adopted 
substitute for such constraints would be vulnerable to an as-applied preemption 
challenge. 
If the understandings reached through Metro-Mayor type collaboratives 
can be enforced in these ways, it should be much easier to motivate local officials 
to join the regional planning efforts in the first instance. As well, the interest 
groups that stand to benefit from a big increase in the regional housing supply, 
such as chambers of commerce and municipal unions, would have strong 
incentives to lobby the collaborative.402 
3. Caveats 
The model I have sketched holds considerable promise, and to 
operationalize it in the West Coast Model states (especially California) would 
require only modest tinkering with extant state-law frameworks. But the model’s 
limitations should be acknowledged, too. Some NIMBY governments may 
manage to exploit their superior information about local conditions to 
bamboozle the state agency into certifying dysfunctional housing elements.403 
Other NIMBY localities may be able to get the agency to approve transparently 
 
 400. This assumes there’s some play in the joints of the housing need determination. As explained above, 
California recently revised the statutory framework governing this determination in ways that give considerable 
discretion to the housing agency. See supra Subpart III.A.1. 
 401. Opposition to the constraint by leaders of a supermajority of the local governments suggests that it is 
probably unreasonable in light of regional housing needs. 
 402. No doubt NIMBY groups will organize to lobby the collaborative too, but it may be harder for them to 
get homeowners riled up by the collaborative’s policy proposals, as opposed to tangible projects in the 
homeowner’s neighborhood. 
 403. This risk is exacerbated by resource shortages at the California housing agency. See LAO, DO 
COMMUNITIES ADEQUATELY PLAN, supra note 244, at 7 (noting that as of 2017, HCD had only a $1 million 
budget line and seven staff persons for housing element review). The main advantage of state-mandated 
upzoning (for example, requiring local governments to allow four-to-five story buildings on all parcels near 
transit), relative to the housing-element approach, is that state-mandated upzoning obviates the risk of local 
governments “complying” by assigning their quota to hard-to-develop sites.  
F - ELMENDORF_26 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 11/6/2019  7:14 PM 
150 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:79 
awful housing elements by arguing that the dysfunctional features are necessary 
to forestall a local insurrection.404 Finally, as economists and legal scholars have 
long argued, there is always some risk that state institutions for regulating land 
use will end up serving regional homevoter cartels.405 This risk must be weighed, 
however, against the reality of extreme supply constraints in the absence of state 
control, and the potential payoff from using state law to empower a relatively 
pro-housing set of actors at the local level.  
CONCLUSION  
Fifty years in the making, the problem of local barriers to housing supply 
in economically productive regions is finally having its moment in the sun. To 
the present moment of possibility, this Article has contributed both a descriptive 
account of the state frameworks for controlling local housing-supply 
restrictions, and an extension and defense of the model toward which our 
nation’s most expensive and supply-constrained state, California, seems to be 
evolving.  
The model is one of preemption by intergovernmental compact. The state 
periodically establishes regional housing-production targets, which are divvied 
up among local governments. Local governments must submit to the state 
housing agency a parcel-specific plan for how they will meet their quotas, 
including a schedule of actions to remove local constraints on the development 
of housing. Once approved by the agency and enacted as a local ordinance, this 
plan—the “housing element”—becomes the highest law of the local government 
with respect to land use. Developers may apply for building permits on the 
authority of the housing element itself. Local governments seeking to amend 
their housing element must provide notice and a written justification to the 
state’s housing agency, and the agency may respond by decertifying the housing 
element, exposing the local government to pecuniary and possibly regulatory 
sanctions. 
While “double vetoes”—opportunities under state law to overturn locally 
approved development permits—are certainly one legacy of the states’ land-use 
interventions since the 1960s, they’re no longer the whole story. The statutory 
evolution charted in this Article is now positioning advocates to use state law, 
and state-approved housing plans, to challenge not project approvals, but the 
local regulations and exercises of permitting discretion that stand in the way of 
desperately needed new housing. 
 
 
 404. For example, San Francisco’s (HCD-approved) housing element tries to justify extant constraints that 
“conserve and protect existing housing and neighborhood character” by arguing that without such constraints, 
“an even greater check on new housing construction could result from public opposition to new development.” 
2014 HOUSING ELEMENT, supra note 178, at I.86. 
 405. See supra text accompanying notes 205–209. 
